Tully v. Robertson

19 F.2d 954, 1927 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1203
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedMay 31, 1927
DocketNo. 1173
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 19 F.2d 954 (Tully v. Robertson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tully v. Robertson, 19 F.2d 954, 1927 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1203 (D. Md. 1927).

Opinion

SOPER, District Judge.

The bill of complaint in this case is brought under section 4915 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Comp. St. § 9460). The complainant prays to be adjudged entitled to claims 6, 7, and 9 of his application for patent, No. 206,-389, filed in the United States Patent Office December 10,1917, and also to claims 2 to 10, 18, and 19 of his application for patent, No. 497,891, filed September 2, 1921. All of these claims Were rejected by the several tribunals of the Patent office, whose decision was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Ap-‘ [955]*955peals of the District of Columbia. See 56 App. D. C. 274, 12 F.(2d) 624.

The first application relates to a process for the treatment of fabric of the usual material for shirts, shirt waists, and the like. Only such exposed parts of the garment as are liable to be soiled in use are subjected to the treatment. It consists in the application of a water-resistant, adhesive stiffening material, preferably a plastic cementitious solution of cellulose acetate. Drawings attached to the application illustrate the process as applied to the bosom of a man’s shirt, as well as to collars and cuffs. The main object of the invention is to provide a class of apparel adapted to resist soiling and deformation of the surface by wetting, but still capable of being laundered. While the exposed portions of the garment are protected from wear and soiling, they nevertheless display the normal texture and color of the treated material.

The second application is merely a continuation of the first. It relates specifically to collars and cuffs, which may be attached to the garment by permanent sewing or by buttons or other fasteners, and its principal object is to provide collars and cuffs adapted to resist soiling and to be cleansed by ordinary washing without starching. It was probably filed' as a separate application rather than as an amendment, in order to incorporate certain adaptations of the invention not disclosed in the specification of the first application.

Claims 6 and 7 of the first application, which were rejected, may be compared with claim 4, which was allowed. They are as follows:

“4. A textile fabric garment of the class adapted to be laundered, having only those parts exposed to rapid wear, soiling, rumpling, and the penetration of moisture in use protected by the impregnation of the interstitial spaces of the component yarns of said parts only with the residue of a solution of cellulose acetate left by evaporation of the solvent.”
“6. A textile fabric garment of the class described having a multiply section stiffened by impregnation with a translucent waterproof cementitious plastic material causing the plies to adhere to each other.
“7. A garment of the class described having a multiply section, including face plies of cloth and a filling ply, saturated with a transparent waterproof cementitious material.”

Claims 6 and 7 were first rejected, with all other claims of the application, on the patent to Closmann of 1907. His invention relates to the coating of starched and ironed goods, so as to form an impervious layer, whereby they may be washed without removing the starch or destroying the stiffness of the goods. He did not impregnate the article thoroughly, but coated it only with a solution of pyroxylin in amyl acetate. He thought that thereby the linen is not rendered unnaturally stiff, “as the coating does not produce such stiffness as is affected by other processes, where the pyroxylin is thoroughly impregnated with the linen.” The Examiner noticed that the Tully application calls for, not merely a coating, but a thorough impregnation of the goods; but he said that the only distinction between the Tully process and the other processes referred to by Closmann is that Tully selects the collars and cuffs only of a garment for treatment, leaving other parts untreated, and he thought there was no invention in this step. The Examiners in Chief sustained the primary examiner, basing their opinion on the Closmann patent; but the Assistant Commissioner, on appeal, reversed the lower tribunals in this respect, saying:

“Claims 1, 2, 3, and 8 are rejected on a statement of the prior art in the Closmann patent. * * * Closmann lived in Germany, and the statement of the prior art may have been a statement of what was done in Germany, not what was done in the United States. The statement in the specification is too vague and indefinite to really disclose what was intended. There is no showing whether the prior art to which he refers began with starched or unstarched goods. All doubts certainly should be resolved in favor of the present applicant. These claims must therefore be allowed, with claim 4.”

The Assistant Commissioner nevertheless affirmed the rejection of claims 6 and 7 upon the bare statement that they do not distinguish from the art cited against them. The Court of Appeals merely stated that claims 6 and 7 were rejected' on the patent to Clos-mann. Neither tribunal attempted to explain why the Closmann patent is too vague to anticipate claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, but is nevertheless sufficiently definite to invalidate claims 6 and 7. It has been suggested in argument that claims 6 and 7 are distinguishable from the granted claims, in that the former relate to a process in which the whole garment is impregnated, whilst in the latter a portion only is treated with the stiffening material. But the word “section,” in claims 6 and 7, seeins to be used as the equivalent of “portion,” indicating that a part only of the garment is stiffened. Furthermore, it is eon-[956]*956ceded by tbe pleadings in the case that the action of the Patent Office upon the granted claims was correct, and, with this concession in mind, no reason appears why claims 6 and 7 should not be allowed.

Claims 9 and 10 were added by Tully to his application to bring them into interference with claims 1 and 4, respectively, of the Huey patent of September 13, 1921. They are as follows:

“9. Web material having a permanent stiffness in portions thereof produced by treatment of the web subsequent to the formation of the latter, and having other portions thereof in a soft and pliable state adapted to facilitate folding.” Claim 1 of Huey patent, 1,390,292.
“10. A fabric of uniform original texture, which has been made permanently stiff-except at predetermined folding or cutting lines.” Claim 4 of Huey patent, 1,390,292.

Claim 10 was granted by the Patent Office, but claim 9 was rejected and the decision of the Patent Office was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Manifestly the two claims involve the same idea, and the inconsistency in the actions of the Office is so glaring that, since the institution of this suit, the Primary Examiner has granted a motion of Huey to dissolve the interference between his claim 4 and Tully’s claim 10.

; Claim 9 was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner on the ground that it contains new matter, shown in the Huey patent, but not in the earlier first application of Tully. Huey calls for a web material having a permanent stiffness in portions thereof, not destroyed by wetting, produced by treatment subsequent to the fabrication thereof, and having other portions in a soft and pliable state, adapted to facilitate folding, as well as to serve as hinges. The drawing accompanying the specification is said to be intended to illustrate merely one of various possible adaptations of the invention.

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Bluebook (online)
19 F.2d 954, 1927 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tully-v-robertson-mdd-1927.