Tully v. Johnson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedMarch 16, 2022
Docket3:10-cv-00299
StatusUnknown

This text of Tully v. Johnson (Tully v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tully v. Johnson, (E.D. Va. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division THOMAS M. TULLY, Petitioner, v. Civil Action No. 3:10cv299 GENE JOHNSON, Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION Thomas M. Tully (“Tully”), a Virginia prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions in the Circuit Court for the County of Frederick (“Circuit Court”) for breaking and entering with intent to commit assault and battery, malicious wounding, misdemeanor assault and battery, and two counts of maliciously causing bodily injury by caustic substance. (ECF No. 1.) By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on February 23, 2011, the Court dismissed the action. Tully v. Johnson, 3:10cv299, 2011 WL 744644, at *11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2011). The Court found that all of Tully’s claims for relief were procedurally defaulted. Id, at *6, *11. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied Tully a certificate of appealability and dismissed his appeal. Tully v. Johnson, 445 F. App’x 713, 713 (4th Cir. 2011). Thereafter, this Court denied multiple motions for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) filed by Tully. See, e.g., Tully v. Johnson, No. 3:10cv299, 2012 WL 1259102, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 2012); Tully v. Johnson, No. 3:10cv299, 2012 WL 113861, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2012). On September 16, 2021, the Court received Tully’s latest request for relief under Rule 60(b). (“Rule 60(b)(6) Motion,” ECF No. 70.) Tully contends that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted. (ECF No.

70, at 10.) In support of this assertion, Tully submits an affidavit from Lisa Hoskins, one of the victims of his crimes, wherein she asserts that she falsely stated that Tully did not live with her at the time of the crimes. (ECF No. 70-1, at 2.) I. GENERAL PARAMETERS FOR RULE 60(B)(6) RELIEF Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to “relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Such relief is an “extraordinary remedy” requiring a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950)). The party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) “must make a threshold showing of timeliness, ‘a meritorious claim or defense,’ and lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” Coleman v. Jabe, 633 F. App’x. 119, 120 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011)). A party must also demonstrate “exceptional circumstances.” Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1984)). After a party satisfies this threshold showing, “he [or she] then must satisfy one of the six specific sections of Rule 60(b).” Jd. (quoting Werner, 731 F.2d at 207). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) permits a court to grant relief for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) requires that the movant “show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Shanklin v. Seals, No. 3:07cv319, 2011 WL 2470119, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2011) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)).

I. ANALYSIS A. Tully’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion Is Not Timely Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), Tully was required to file his motion within a reasonable time after the entry of the February 23, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”). Tully’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion, filed over ten years after the entry of the challenged judgment, without any explanation for that lapse of time, was not filed in a reasonable time. See McLawhorn v. John W. Daniel & Co., Inc., 924 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 1991) (“We have held on several occasions that a Rule 60(b) motion is not timely brought when it is made three to four months after the original judgment and no valid reason is given for the delay.” (citing Cent. Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1974); Consol. Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1967))). B. Tully’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion Lacks Merit Second, Tully has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstance that would warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief. “Claims of actual innocence, whether presented as freestanding ones or merely as gateways to excuse a procedural default, should not be granted casually.” Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 404 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Court reviews Tully’s arguments under the more lenient standard for gateway actual innocence claims because subscribing to Tully’s actual innocence claim would permit the Court to consider the merits of his otherwise defaulted claims. A gateway claim requires a petitioner to present “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—

that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). “Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Jd. Ifa petitioner meets the burden of producing new, truly reliable evidence of his or her innocence, the Court then considers “‘all the evidence,’ old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under ‘rules of admissibility that would govern at trial,’ and determines whether the petitioner has met the standard for a gateway claim of innocence. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28). The Court must determine “whether ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Sharpe v.

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Related

Ackermann v. United States
340 U.S. 193 (Supreme Court, 1950)
Schlup v. Delo
513 U.S. 298 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Calderon v. Thompson
523 U.S. 538 (Supreme Court, 1998)
House v. Bell
547 U.S. 518 (Supreme Court, 2006)
United States v. Lighty
616 F.3d 321 (Fourth Circuit, 2010)
Aikens v. Ingram
652 F.3d 496 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)
Thomas Tully v. Gene Johnson
445 F. App'x 713 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)
Rubin R. Weeks v. Mike Bowersox
119 F.3d 1342 (Eighth Circuit, 1997)
Gonzalez v. Crosby
545 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Sharpe v. Bell
593 F.3d 372 (Fourth Circuit, 2010)
Feaster v. Beshears
56 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D. Maryland, 1999)
Werner v. Carbo
731 F.2d 204 (Fourth Circuit, 1984)

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Bluebook (online)
Tully v. Johnson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tully-v-johnson-vaed-2022.