Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States

3 Cl. Ct. 364, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5702, 1983 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1655
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedAugust 9, 1983
DocketNo. 322-81T
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 3 Cl. Ct. 364 (Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 364, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5702, 1983 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1655 (cc 1983).

Opinion

OPINION

WHITE, Senior Judge.

This is an action for the recovery of federal income taxes and interest in the total amount of $36,059.88, which Tulia Feedlot, Inc. (“the plaintiff” or “the corporation”) was required to pay pursuant to deficiency notices for its fiscal years that ended on August 81, 1976, and on August 31, 1977.

It is concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

Background Information

The plaintiff is a closely held Texas business corporation. It was organized in 1962 by a group of local grain farmers for the purpose of conducting a cattle feedlot in Tulia, Texas. The plaintiff was and is engaged in the business of feeding cattle purchased by it and later resold to packing companies after a fattening program, feeding cattle for other persons under contract, and selling the grain of its shareholders. The principal motivation of the corporation’s organizers was to have a better market for their grain.

It was necessary for the corporation to borrow money during the years in question, and also during previous years, for the purchase of cattle, for the purchase of feed, and for operating expenses. The corporation did not have sufficient capital for these purposes without obtaining loans.

Beginning in the middle 1970’s and continuing thereafter, including the years in question, the loans were obtained by the corporation from the Production Credit Association of Plainview, Texas (“the PCA”). The corporation’s cattle and feed served as the primary collateral for the loans. However, the PCA did not regard the corporation’s cattle and feed as adequate security for the loans to the corporation; and the PCA, as a condition precedent to the making of the loans, required that their repayment be personally guaranteed, to the extent of 100 percent of the anticipated indebtedness, by one or more individual guarantors having adequate financial assets to make good on the commitment, if necessary.

Accordingly, continuing guaranties were provided to the PCA by the 11 directors of the corporation for each of the fiscal years 1976 and 1977.1 The 11 directors were all shareholders in the corporation, and together they owned approximately 98 percent of the corporation’s stock. For the fiscal year 1977, an additional shareholder, who was not a director, provided a continuing guar[365]*365anty to the PCA on behalf of the corporation. Each guaranty was for a specific amount, and the total amount guaranteed by the several guarantors for each year slightly exceeded the total amount of the corporation’s indebtedness to the PCA for the particular year.

Near the end of each fiscal year, each guarantor was paid a fee by the corporation for the guaranty which he or she furnished to the PCA on behalf of the corporation. In computing the total amount of the guarantor fees that would be paid in 1976 and 1977, the corporation took 3 percent of the average annual outstanding indebtedness of the corporation to the PCA, and prorated this amount among the guarantors in proportion to the amount which each guarantor personally guaranteed. As a result of the computation, the corporation in 1976 paid guarantor fees in the total amount of $26,140.50, and in 1977 the corporation paid guarantor fees in the total amount of $33,-004.10.

In the corporation’s income tax returns for its fiscal years 1976 and 1977, the corporation deducted the guarantor fees of $26,-140.50 and $33,004.10, respectively, among the other items listed as ordinary and necessary business expenses. On examining the plaintiff’s income tax returns for the years mentioned, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deductions relating to the guarantor fees, determined that such fees constituted dividends, made adjustments in accordance with this determination, and issued deficiency notices to the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter paid the deficiencies, together with interest; filed timely claims for refund; and, upon the disallowance of the claims, instituted the present action.

Tulia I

For a number of years before the period that is involved in the present litigation, lending institutions had required that loans made to the corporation be personally guaranteed, to the extent of 100 percent of the expected indebtedness, by individuals having the financial ability to make good on such commitments, if necessary. Before July 1970, all the guaranties had been made by shareholders of the corporation without the payment of any fee from the corporation. However, at the regular meeting of the corporation’s Board of Directors held on July 14, 1970, the board voted to obtain an additional guaranty of $25,000 from each of the previous guarantors, and to pay each guarantor annually a fee equal to 3 percent of the amount guaranteed by him or her. Accordingly, the corporation in 1970 paid the guarantors, who were the principal shareholders of the corporation, a total of $54,000 as guarantor fees.

The corporation deducted this amount for income tax purposes under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. § 162(a)), but the deduction was disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service. The corporation paid the resulting deficiency, plus interest, and then instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to recover the total amount paid. The district court found that the guarantor fees were ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a), and that they were reasonable in amount. The Government appealed, and the district court’s decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case of Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States, 513 F.2d 800 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 362, 46 L.Ed.2d 281 (1975) (“Tulia I”). The appellate court held (id. 513 F.2d at 803-04) that the guarantor fees constituted distributions of property made by the corporation to its shareholders under 26 U.S.C. § 316, and not ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a).

Tulia II

The present case was transferred to this court from its predecessor, the United States Court of Claims, pursuant to section 403(d) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (Pub.L. 97-164, 97th Cong., 96 Stat. 25, 57-58).

[366]*366While the case was pending before the Court of Claims, it was considered by that court on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant contended in support of its motion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented the plaintiff from litigating the present action, because (according to the defendant) the facts in this case are similar to the facts that were involved in the earlier case of Tulia I, which was prosecuted by the same plaintiff and was ultimately disposed of adversely to the plaintiff. The plaintiff responded to the defendant’s contention before the Court of Claims by asserting that the facts in the present case are significantly different from those in the earlier litigation.

In an order dated September 10, 1982 (“Tulia II”),

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3 Cl. Ct. 364, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5702, 1983 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tulia-feedlot-inc-v-united-states-cc-1983.