Tuesday Seales-Perkins v. Kristen Caprino

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 6, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03059
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TUESDAY SEALES-PERKINS, Case No. 2:25-cv-3059-DC-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 KRISTEN CAPRINO, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff brings this action against attorney Kristen Caprino. Her first amended complaint 18 suffers from the same deficiencies noted in the court’s prior screening order. Accordingly, the 19 court recommends that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 20 Screening and Pleading Requirements 21 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 22 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 23 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 24 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 25 relief. Id. 26 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 28 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 1 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 2 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 3 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 4 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 5 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 6 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 7 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 8 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 9 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 10 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 11 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 12 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 13 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 14 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 15 Analysis 16 Plaintiff brings this action against Kristen Caprino, an attorney who represented parties 17 adverse to her in a state court action. ECF No. 4 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that she has “long engaged 18 in activity protected by the ADA,” and that defendant knew plaintiff was a disability advocate 19 and caregiver. Id. at 2. Despite her knowledge of plaintiff’s ADA status, defendant filed a 20 motion for sanctions in the state court action. Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s actions chilled her 21 ability to litigate and amounted to retaliation because plaintiff’s income is derived from federal 22 assistance. Id. at 2-3. Upon amendment, plaintiff asserts a single claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. 23 § 12203 of Title V of the ADA. Her claim, however, fails to the same reasons identified in the 24 court’s December 22, 2025 order. 25 The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. 26 §§ 12101, et seq. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. 27 §§ 12111, et seq. Title II prohibits discrimination in the provision of services and programs by a 28 public entity, and the provision of transportation to the general public. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 1 et seq. Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et 2 seq. Section 12203, under Title V of the ADA, prohibits retaliation against individuals who 3 oppose unlawful acts under the ADA. See Louie v. Carichoff, No. S-05-0984-DFL-DAD (PS), 4 2006 WL 662742, at 2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2006). 5 Title V of the ADA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12203, contains two primary substantive 6 provisions. Section 12203(a) prohibits retaliation against any individual who has opposed 7 unlawful acts under the ADA or participated in investigations, proceedings, or hearings under the 8 chapter. Section 12203(b) makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any 9 individual in the exercise or enjoyment of ADA rights. 10 Plaintiff alleges that defendant chilled her ability to litigate in state court and retaliated 11 against her by bringing a motion for sanctions against plaintiff. ECF No. 4. As an initial issue, 12 the complaint does not allege how defendant violated any provision of the ADA. Title I concerns 13 employment, and plaintiff has not alleged that she was in any employment situation with 14 defendant. Title II concerns discrimination by a public entity, which defendant is not. And 15 Title III concerns discrimination in public accommodations, which defendant, as a private 16 attorney, does not provide. 17 Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that she requested accommodation in an opposition to 18 any of defendant’s act or practice, or that she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 19 any investigation, proceeding, or hearing concerning defendant’s act or practice. Therefore, 20 plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim of retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), and 21 her retaliation claim under the ADA should be dismissed. 22 Plaintiff’s allegation at bottom is that defendant violated the ADA by filing a motion for 23 sanctions against her, but plaintiff has not alleged how defendant’s action violated the ADA. 24 Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Based 25 on the foregoing, I recommend that this action should be dismissed without leave to amend, 26 because amendment would be futile. See Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th 27 Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is proper only if 28 it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) 1 | Gnternal quotation marks and citations omitted); California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. 2 | Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Valid reasons for denying leave to 3 | amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.”). 4 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 5 1. Plaintiff's amended complaint, ECF No. 4, be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 6 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the case. 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 8 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen days of 9 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 10 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 11 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 12 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 13 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 14 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 15 1991). 16 7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ January 6, 2026 q——— 19 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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