Tudor Dupont v. Sterling Family Trust

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-2636
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AL TUDOR DUPONT; AURELIA No. 24-2636 ANDERSON, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-09785-SVW-AS Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

STERLING FAMILY TRUST; ROCHELLE H. STERLING, individually and as sole Trustee of Sterling Family Trust, and as Manager of Beverly Hills Properties LLC; DONALD. T. STERLING CORPORATION, doing business as Beverly Hills Properties, LLC; BEVERLY HILLS PROPERTIES, LLC,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

DOES, 1-20, inclusive,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted March 4, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: IKUTA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and LIBURDI, District Judge.***

Al Tudor DuPont and Aurelia Anderson appeal the denial of their motion for

preliminary injunction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) and affirm.

The Court reviews a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction motion

for abuse of discretion. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023).

Appellants asserted a reasonable accommodation claim under the Fair

Housing Act (“FHA”). At the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court held

that Appellants failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. As one of the

reasons for this conclusion, the district court stated Appellants did not establish that

“someone similarly situated was treated differently.” While a claim of disparate

treatment under the FHA requires a showing of similarly situated individuals being

treated differently than the movant, a reasonable accommodation claim does not.

Compare Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1997) (listing

the elements for a disparate treatment claim under the FHA), with Ohio House, LLC

v. City of Costa Mesa, 122 F.4th 1097, 1133 (9th Cir. 2024) (listing the elements for

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Michael T. Liburdi, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

2 24-2636 a reasonable accommodation claim under the FHA). To the extent that the district

court applied a disparate impact standard, it erred.

Even if the district court erred, any error was harmless as the district court

correctly held Appellants failed to establish discrimination, which includes a refusal

to make a reasonable accommodation. See Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of

2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). An accommodation is

considered reasonable “when it imposes no fundamental alteration in the nature of

the program or undue financial or administrative burdens.” Giebeler v. M & B

Assoc., 343 F.3d 1143, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations and citations omitted).

The requested accommodation follows a rent stabilization commission

decision requiring repairs to Appellants’ apartment. The ordinance requiring

relocation in such an event specifically indicates what constitutes a “comparable”

unit. WEHO MUN. CODE § 17.52.110(i). It provides that housing shall be comparable

in several ways including “location, size, [and] number of bedrooms.” Id. Appellants

now occupy a one-bedroom, one-and-one-half-bath apartment but request a two-

bedroom apartment at the same reduced rent price. Therefore, the district court did

not abuse its discretion because there was no likelihood of success on the merits.1

AFFIRMED.2

1 Any procedural error was therefore harmless. 2 Appellants’ motions for judicial notice, Dkts. 15.1, 32.1, are denied.

3 24-2636