Tucker v. Wycough

109 S.W.2d 939, 194 Ark. 840, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 239
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 8, 1937
Docket4-4794
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 109 S.W.2d 939 (Tucker v. Wycough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tucker v. Wycough, 109 S.W.2d 939, 194 Ark. 840, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 239 (Ark. 1937).

Opinion

Smith, J.

Appellees, Ernest A. Wycough and Mrs. Willie Wycough, who are husband and wife, brought this suit against the administrator and heirs-at-law of James Swaim, deceased, upon the theory that about six years before his death the deceased had entered into an agreement with them to the effect that they should take care of deceased for the remainder of his life, furnish him with a home, including his meals or such as he cared to eat with them, certain other personal services, including his laundry work, and nursing during sickness, and that in consideration therefor deceased, Swaim, should devise appellees all property he might own at his death.

Swaim died October 29, 1936, and R. W. Tucker was appointed administrator of his estate. In the complaint filed in this cause, it was alleged that the administrator was about to make distribution of the assets which had come into his hands. It was prayed that he be enjoined from doing so, and no other relief was prayed against the administrator. The existence and full performance of the above contract was alleged, and it was prayed that its execution be enforced or, if not, that appellees be adjudged to 'be entitled to the net value of the estate in payment of their services. The complaint of Mrs. Wycough was dismissed, but it was decreed that her husband “ should recover upon the said complaint the full net value of the assets of the estate of James Swaim, deceased, the same being the agreed value of the benefits accruing to James Swaim for services rendered him,” and from that decree is this appeal.

The effect of this decree is to enforce performance of the alleged contract to make a will. It is this allegation which conferred jurisdiction upon the chancery court to hear the cause, and that chancery courts have jurisdiction to enforce such contracts has been frequently recognized. See Schwegman v. Richards, 184 Ark. 968, 43 S. W. (2d) 1088, and cases there cited. And that such a contract, having been fully performed, although orally made, will be enforced, was expressly decided in the case of Speck v. Dodson, 178 Ark. 549, 11 S. W. (2d) 456. See, also, other cases to the same effect there cited.

• If there was involved only the question of the value of services rendered deceased, this.would be a matter within the jurisdiction of the probate court to he determined therein upon presentation to the administrator of a claim, or demand against the estate, to be paid, if allowed, in the usual course of administration, unless judgment were recovered in a suit at law upon this demand, which judgment itself would have to he filed for classification, and paid in the usual course of administration. So that the question presented for our review is whether there was a contract for the execution of a will. Before considering this question of fact it may be said that, while such contracts will he enforced in equity, in proper cases, the testimony requiring and permitting that action must he clear and convincing. See McKie v. McClanahan, 190 Ark. 41, 76 S. W. (2d) 971, and cases there cited.

We proceed to consider whether the testimony meets this requirement. The testimony is voluminous and in irreconcilable conflict, and it must suffice to summarize it. Appellees’ case rests chiefly upon their own testimony and that of Felix Headstream, John P. Morrow and Richard Linebarger. Other witnesses testified in appellees ’ behalf, that testimony being to the effect that Swaim had lived with appellees for about six years before his death; that he was much addicted to drink, and was frequently drunk; that he was reputed to be rich and to have large sums of money, that robbers on one occasion subjected him, without effect, to -torture to compel him to disclose the whereabouts of his money, and that he was thereafter afraid to live on the south side of the river near and opposite Batesville, where his farm was located, and that Swaim had stated on numerous occasions that he was living with appellees and intended to fully compensate them, but none of these witnesses stated how he intended to do so.

Headstream testified that Swaim said, in referring to his property: "I have it fixed so the ones that are taking care of me I am taking care of them. ’ ’ He did not say how, nor in what manner, he had done or would do so.

Morrow testified that Swaim told him he was living with appellees, and that he made their house his home and they were taking care of him; hut he did not say how be was going to take care of tbem. Allen Swaim gave similar testimony, and, when asked, “Did he say how they would he paid,” answered, “No, he said they would he paid, would he paid good for their trouble.”

Mrs. Wycough testified that she and her husband kept the county jail from January 1, 1931, to March 16, 1931, and Swaim wanted to live with them in the jail for protection, hut the sheriff would not consent. They then rented a house from John Parker with the understanding that they would 'board Parker for the rent. Swaim came to her and said that he needed a home, and he wanted her to take care of him and Parker, and that if she would do so “he would take care of me at his death,” and that she accepted his proposition, and did everything she could to make him a good home. She did his laundry, kept his room, waited upon him when he was drunk, as he frequently was, at which times he suffered from sinking spells, and she nursed him when he was sick. Swaim paid practically nothing for these services, and she relied upon his promise to take care of her at his death, and that Swaim told her that he would see that she was taken care of. She and her husband had no children, and they were required to give up their social life to a large extent to care of Swaim. He spent most of his time with them, and could have spent all of his time there had he pleased to do so. Swaim lived with her and her husband as a member of the family.

Wycough’s testimony corroborated that of his wife as to their attention to Swaim, whom he had known all his life, and from whom he had frequently borrowed money until about eight years before Swaim’s death. He testified that Swaim asked him to rent Parker’s house, and that if he would do so and take care of him for the remainder of his life he would give him what he had at his death. The agreement was that they would board Swaim, take care of him during his illness, and do his washing, all of which they performed.

Much testimony was offered as to the state of Swaim’s feeling towards his relatives. Swaim was 68 years old when he died -without ever having married. It was shown that a sister, who owned considerable property, died testate, and left him only a hundred dollars, which he refused to accept, and that he was very bitter about this discrimination against him.

Upon the death of Swaim no will was found, and it is not contended that one was ever made. The contention is that it was agreed that one should be made, under which Swaim would devise all of his property to the Wycoughs. No reason is shown why Swaim should not have made a will, had he intended to do so. There was no question about his testamentary capacity until a few days before his death. He was a competent business man and had accumulated an estate worth about thirty thousand dollars, consisting of about sixteen thousand dollai's in money and notes secured 'by mortgages, and a small farm. Swaim was in bad health, and stated to one of his friends that he knew “he wouldn’t be here for long.

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Bluebook (online)
109 S.W.2d 939, 194 Ark. 840, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 239, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tucker-v-wycough-ark-1937.