Tucker v. REES-MEMPHIS, INC.

17 So. 3d 122, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 117, 2009 WL 514215
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
DecidedMarch 3, 2009
Docket2007-CA-01776-COA
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 17 So. 3d 122 (Tucker v. REES-MEMPHIS, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tucker v. REES-MEMPHIS, INC., 17 So. 3d 122, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 117, 2009 WL 514215 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

¶ 1. Pamela Tucker raised products liability claims for failure to warn and defective design against two separate manufacturers of industrial equipment after their products were involved in an explosion, which will be described in greater detail, that occurred at her place of employment. The Alcorn County Circuit Court granted summary judgment against Tucker after it found that her expert was not qualified to give an opinion regarding whether the warnings at issue were adequate. Subsequently, the circuit court allowed the manufacturers to designate an expert after the expiration of an agreed scheduling order, and the circuit court granted summary judgment against Tucker’s defective-design claims. Aggrieved, Tucker appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Vernon Smith Manufacturing, Inc., (“Smith”) is a cabinet manufacturing company in Alcorn County, Mississippi. Smith purchased an industrial sander manufac *124 tured by Timesavers, Inc. At a separate time and place, Smith purchased a dust collection system from Rees-Memphis, Inc. That dust collection system consisted of covered barrels, and it was used in conjunction with the sander. That is, Rees-Memphis’s dust collection system collected and stored sawdust produced by Timesavers’ industrial sander. However, the sander and the dust collection system were not part of a package.

¶ 3. In July 2001, Smith employees used the sander on lacquered wood. Tucker, a Smith employee, smelled “something kind of funny,” but it did not smell like smoke. A supervisor suspected that the dust barrels were full, so he ordered two employees to empty them. When the employees removed the top of one of the dust barrels, the sawdust inside combusted and caused an explosion. Tucker suffered severe burns over most of her body. 1

¶ 4. Soon afterward, mechanical engineer Jeffrey Shenefelt, Ph.D., inspected the sander and the dust collection system. Dr. Shenefelt later reported that the dust collection system was too close to the sander and that it was “not a good idea to place a dust collection system adjacent to a machine because your [sic] placing a possible ignition source (machine) too close to a fuel supply (dust).”

¶ 5. Dr. Shenefelt also reported that he found “a danger sticker on the machine indicating that dust can explode and thus material that may cause sparks should not be sanded.” Dr. Shenefelt found “two additional danger stickers, four warning stickers and a notice on the sander.” Further, Dr. Shenefelt found “no warning about sanding materials that are lacquered.” According to Dr. Shenefelt, “this [was] a shortcoming on the sander manufacturer.” As for the cause of the explosion, Dr. Shenefelt reported the following:

I believe as the sanding of the lacquered boards proceeded, lacquer built up on the first belt. As the lacquer built up, the belt became very smooth. The smooth belt in turn did not remove material, but melted the lacquer off the wood becoming increasingly smooth and thus generating heat. The heat generated between the first belt and the lacquered wood was sufficient to cause the lacquer to burn and thus produce smoke. Meanwhile, the second belt continued to remove enough lacquer and wood for the employees to conclude there was not a problem within the sander. This situation is one the manufacturer of the sander should have anticipated and therefore a warning should have been placed on the machine to inform users that sanding finished wood could “gum” up the sanding belts and produce extreme heat.

¶ 6. Dr. Shenefelt then investigated the dust collection system and the area adjacent to the sander. Dr. Shenefelt was “concerned by the lack of warnings on the system.” That “concern[ed][him] greatly because [he felt] a person should be warned not to open a dust collection system if a fire is suspected.” Dr. Shenefelt opined that “this type of warning would have been the best way to prevent the accident from occurring.”

¶ 7. On May 13, 2002, Tucker filed her complaint. Tucker claimed that Rees-Memphis negligently designed, constructed, and manufactured the dust collection system. Tucker also claimed that Rees-Memphis failed to adequately warn people of the defects in and dangerous propensities of the dust collection system. That is, Tucker claimed Rees-Memphis failed to place proper warning labels on the dust *125 collection system. Finally, Tucker claimed Rees-Memphis breached the express and implied warranties of merchantability. Tucker raised similar claims against Time-savers, including the claim that Timesav-ers failed to adequately warn operators of the dangers that accompanied using the sander on lacquered wood.

¶ 8. Rees-Memphis and Timesavers denied liability. On December 13, 2002, Tucker, Rees-Memphis, and Timesavers entered an agreed scheduling order. The agreed scheduling order set forth discovery deadlines as well as deadlines for the designation of expert witnesses. The agreed scheduling order also provided that the deadlines could not be extended — even by agreement — without the circuit court finding that there was good cause for an extension. Tucker later designated Dr. Shenefelt as an expert witness.

¶ 9. Timesavers subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. Among a litany of other arguments, Timesavers argued that summary judgment was appropriate because Dr. Shenefelt: (a) did not cite authority or guidelines that required placing a warning sticker on the sander that alerted operators to avoid sanding lacquered wood, (b) was not qualified to testify regarding the adequacy of warnings because he is a mechanical engineer and not an expert on warnings, and (c) admitted that warning labels are clearly attached to the sander.

¶ 10. On September 12, 2005, Tucker filed a motion for a continuance to respond to Timesavers’ motion for summary judgment. Within that motion, Tucker stated that a trial on the matter had been continued “due to problems [Tucker] was having with Dr. Jeff Shenefelt, her designated expert.” Tucker also mentioned that her attorney consulted with Dr. Richard Forbes of Mississippi State University and anticipated retaining Dr. Forbes once he had an opportunity to review “pertinent material.” The circuit court granted Tucker’s motion for continuance.

¶ 11. Approximately two weeks later, Tucker filed a motion to reopen designation of experts. According to Tucker, her attorney sought to substitute mechanical engineer Richard Forbes, Ph.D., for Dr. Shenefelt. Tucker reported that Dr. She-nefelt had moved several times since she originally designated him as an expert, and her attorney had been diligently, but unsuccessfully, trying to communicate with him.

¶ 12. Timesavers opposed Tucker’s motion. According to Timesavers, Tucker’s attempt to reopen designation of experts was a clandestine tactic to manufacture genuine issues of material fact in an effort to defeat Timesavers’ motion for summary judgment. The circuit court was not persuaded by Timesavers’ argument. It ultimately granted Tucker’s motion to reopen designation of experts and allowed Tucker to designate Dr. Forbes as an expert witness.

¶ 13. Dr. Forbes shared Dr.

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17 So. 3d 122, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 117, 2009 WL 514215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tucker-v-rees-memphis-inc-missctapp-2009.