Tucker Meuse v. Whyte

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 16, 2022
DocketCivil Action No. 2021-2871
StatusPublished

This text of Tucker Meuse v. Whyte (Tucker Meuse v. Whyte) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tucker Meuse v. Whyte, (D.D.C. 2022).

Opinion

FILED MAR. 16, 2022 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Court for the District of Columbia

AMANDA D. TUCKER MEUSE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 21-2871 (UNA) ) CLIFFORD WHITE, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, purports to bring this qui tam action under the False Claims

Act (“FCA”), see 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-32. “The False Claims Act prohibits false or fraudulent

claims for payment from the United States.” U.S. ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 807 F.3d 281,

286 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); see United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys.,

Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing FCA as “an anti-fraud statute that prohibits

the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims to the federal government”). It authorizes a

private individual, as a relator, “to bring [a qui tam] action in the Government’s name, and to

recover a portion of the proceeds of the action, subject to the requirements of the statute.” U.S.

ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

In federal courts such as this, plaintiffs “may plead and conduct their own cases

personally or by counsel[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The United States is “the real party in interest”

in a qui tam action, Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176, 2015 WL 512896, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 4,

2015), and pro se parties may not pursue a claim on behalf of the United States, see Idrogo v.

Castro, 672 F. App’x 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (concluding “district court correctly held

that pro se plaintiffs . . . may not file a qui tam action pursuant to the False Claims Act”); Walsh

1 v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 75 F. Supp. 3d 256, 263 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[I]t is well-settled that a

qui tam action may not be brought by a pro se plaintiff.”). To the extent plaintiff intends to bring

another sort of claim, her complaint neither makes her intention clear nor articulates a viable

legal claim.

The Court will grant plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the

complaint and this civil action without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this

Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: March 16, 2022 /s/ AMIT P. MEHTA United States District Judge

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States Ex Rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp.
659 F.3d 1204 (D.C. Circuit, 2011)
Walsh v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, Na
75 F. Supp. 3d 256 (District of Columbia, 2014)
United States Ex Rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp.
807 F.3d 281 (D.C. Circuit, 2015)
Idrogo v. Castro
672 F. App'x 27 (D.C. Circuit, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Tucker Meuse v. Whyte, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tucker-meuse-v-whyte-dcd-2022.