Tsidulko v. K & L Int'l Trading, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Tsidulko v. K & L Int'l Trading, Inc.

2017 NY Slip Op 1588, 148 A.D.3d 755, 48 N.Y.S.3d 493

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 1, 2017

Docket2015-10909

StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 1588 (Tsidulko v. K & L Int'l Trading, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tsidulko v. K & L Int'l Trading, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 1588, 148 A.D.3d 755, 48 N.Y.S.3d 493 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rothenberg, J.), dated October 8, 2015, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that none of the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine constituted a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]), and that, in any event, the alleged injuries were not caused by the subject accident (see generally Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and as to whether the alleged injuries were caused by the accident (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]; Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d at 787). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion.

Mastro, J.R, Leventhal, Hall and Cohen, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rothenberg, J.), dated October 8, 2015, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that none of the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine constituted a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]), and that, in any event, the alleged injuries were not caused by the subject accident (see generally Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and as to whether the alleged injuries were caused by the accident (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]; Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d at 787). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion.

Mastro, J.R, Leventhal, Hall and Cohen, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 1588, 148 A.D.3d 755, 48 N.Y.S.3d 493, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tsidulko-v-k-l-intl-trading-inc-nyappdiv-2017.

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