Tse v. Chin

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedMarch 11, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00088
StatusUnknown

This text of Tse v. Chin (Tse v. Chin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tse v. Chin, (W.D. Wash. 2022).

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 B.K. TSE, CASE NO. C22-0088-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 ARNOLD CHIN, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 This matter comes before the Court upon sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s complaint 16 (Dkt. No. 6) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an application to 17 proceed in forma pauperis with his complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 3, 2022, the Honorable 18 Michelle L. Peterson, United States Magistrate Judge, granted Plaintiff’s motion. (Dkt. No. 5.) 19 Summons has not yet issued. 20 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is 22 “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] 23 monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun 24 v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are 25 not limited to prisoners.”). This power to sua sponte dismiss the complaint may be invoked “at 26 any time” the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. 1 Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 2 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a 3 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that 4 is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The factual allegations must 5 be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint may be dismissed if it lacks a cognizable legal theory 7 or states insufficient facts to support one. Zixiang v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). 8 The Court holds pro se plaintiffs to less stringent pleading standards than represented 9 plaintiffs and liberally construes a pro se complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 10 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Nevertheless, section 1915(e) “not only permits but 11 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” 12 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1229. When dismissing a complaint under section 1915(e), the Court gives 13 pro se plaintiffs leave to amend unless “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 14 complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 15 Cir. 1995). 16 Here, it is clear that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 17 granted. Although the Court construes his pleadings liberally, even a “liberal 18 interpretation. . . . may not supply elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. 19 of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). 20 Plaintiff filed a pro se “Third-Party Complaint” form. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1.) But a third- 21 party complaint does not commence a new action. Rather, it allows a defendant to become a sort 22 of plaintiff itself (called a “third-party plaintiff”) by serving a summons and complaint on a non- 23 party who the third-party plaintiff believes should be held responsible for all or part of the claim 24 against the third-party plaintiff (i.e., the original defendant) in an existing action. See Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 14(a)(1). This complaint ostensibly should have been filed and served in an existing case 26 1 where Plaintiff is the original defendant.1 2 Further, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks supporting facts or a cognizable legal theory. Plaintiff 3 states that “[c]ondominium sold at one half market value due to damages incurred by unauthorized 4 Third-Party Defendant of fraudulent security clearance.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4.) This is all but 5 incomprehensible because it is not clear what events Plaintiff is describing, if any, what parties he 6 alleges were involved in such acts, or how this information entitles Plaintiff to relief. As it is 7 absolutely clear the complaint could not be cured by amendment, the Court declines to grant leave 8 to amend it. See Cato, F.3d at 1106. 9 Based on the forgoing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. 10 DATED this 11th day of March 2022. A 11 12 13 John C. Coughenour 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 1 The form includes reference to the number “KCSC 07-28633-2sea,” which could be a King County Superior Court case number, but there is not enough information for the Court to 26 conclusively discern its relevance. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4.)

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Related

Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Zixiang Li v. John F. Kerry
710 F.3d 995 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Cato v. United States
70 F.3d 1103 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
Tse v. Chin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tse-v-chin-wawd-2022.