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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05096-KKE-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 PIERCE COUNTY, et al., Noting Date: May 16, 2025 13 Defendants. 14
15 This prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been referred to 16 United States Magistrate Judge David W. Christel. Plaintiff Timmy B. Tchabold, proceeding pro 17 se and in forma pauperis, filed this action challenging the conditions of confinement at Pierce 18 County Jail (“PCJ”) in 2008 and 2013. Dkts. 4, 6.1 Plaintiff failed to respond to an order 19 directing him to show cause why his claims are not untimely and barred under the applicable 20 21 22 1 Initially, the complaint was docketed as a “proposed complaint” attached to Plaintiff’s IFP application. 23 Dkt. 1-1. After IFP status was granted, the Clerk’s Office entered the complaint in a separate docket entry. Dkt. 6. Although the complaint’s separate docket entry appears on the docket after the Court’s show cause order, it is not a 24 new filing by Plaintiff. Compare Dkt. 1-1 with Dkt. 6. 1 statute of limitations. Dkt. 5. The undersigned recommends this action be dismissed for failure to 2 state a claim and failure to comply with a court order. 4 Plaintiff, an inmate currently confined at Washington State Penitentiary, filed this action
5 challenging the conditions of confinement at Pierce County Jail (“PCJ”). Dkt. 6. Although 6 Plaintiff organizes his claims into three separate counts, each similarly alleges he was subject to 7 unsanitary conditions during two periods of pretrial detention at PCJ occurring in 2008 and 2013. 8 Id. at 10–43. Plaintiff also alleges he was not provided an effective grievance process and was 9 denied access to cleaning products during both periods of pretrial detention. Id. Plaintiff seeks 10 $1,000,000 in damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 44. 11 After reviewing the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court declined to serve 12 the complaint and, instead, ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his claims should not be 13 dismissed as untimely and barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. 5. The Court 14 advised Plaintiff that failure to respond or show cause by April 23, 2025, would result in a
15 recommendation this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at 5. The deadline for 16 Plaintiff to show cause has elapsed with no response received from him. See docket. 18 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen 19 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 20 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 21 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 22 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 23 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Barren v.
24 1 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal on these grounds counts as a “strike” 2 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 3 The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 4 97, 106 (1976). However, even pro se pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the
5 speculative level and must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 6 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 7 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 9 The Court previously outlined the law regarding limitations periods and tolling doctrines 10 for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions filed in the State of Washington: 11 The Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not include a provision limiting the time in which a § 1983 civil rights action must be brought. Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 12 (9th Cir. 1981). In the absence of an explicit statutory limitations period, federal courts look to the law of the forum state to determine the limitations period 13 applicable to § 1983 actions.2 Montgomery v. West, No. 23-15728, 2024 WL 2843637, at *1 (9th Cir. June 5, 2024). Under Washington law, Plaintiff had three 14 years from the date his conditions of confinement claims accrued to file a § 1983 action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2); Rose, 654 F.2d at 547 (three-year 15 statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising in Washington State). 16 While the duration of the limitations period is derived from state law, federal law determines when a claim accrues. See W. Ctr. For Journalism v. 17 Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000); Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986). A § 1983 claim “accrues when the 18 plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 761–62 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotations 19 and citations omitted). “[A]s long as a plaintiff has notice of the wrongful conduct, it is not necessary that [they] have knowledge of all the details or all of the persons 20 involved in order for [their] cause of action to accrue.” W. Ctr. For Journalism, 235 F.3d at 1157 (quotations and citations omitted). 21 The final step in determining whether a § 1983 claim is time barred is 22 application of statutory and equitable tolling. The Court looks to the law of the
23 2 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is affirmative defense raised by an opposing party; even so, it may be grounds for sua sponte dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint where the defense is complete and obvious from 24 the face of the pleadings. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228–30 (9th Cir. 1984). 1 forum state to determine whether the time for filing a § 1983 action has been tolled. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). Washington law allows for 2 statutory tolling in various circumstances, but none appears to be applicable here. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code. § 4.16.190 (statute tolled by personal disability 3 including confinement in pretrial detention); Wash. Rev. Code. § 4.16.200 (statute tolled by death); Wash. Rev. Code. § 4.16.220 (statute tolled as to person in United 4 States military service).
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05096-KKE-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 PIERCE COUNTY, et al., Noting Date: May 16, 2025 13 Defendants. 14
15 This prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been referred to 16 United States Magistrate Judge David W. Christel. Plaintiff Timmy B. Tchabold, proceeding pro 17 se and in forma pauperis, filed this action challenging the conditions of confinement at Pierce 18 County Jail (“PCJ”) in 2008 and 2013. Dkts. 4, 6.1 Plaintiff failed to respond to an order 19 directing him to show cause why his claims are not untimely and barred under the applicable 20 21 22 1 Initially, the complaint was docketed as a “proposed complaint” attached to Plaintiff’s IFP application. 23 Dkt. 1-1. After IFP status was granted, the Clerk’s Office entered the complaint in a separate docket entry. Dkt. 6. Although the complaint’s separate docket entry appears on the docket after the Court’s show cause order, it is not a 24 new filing by Plaintiff. Compare Dkt. 1-1 with Dkt. 6. 1 statute of limitations. Dkt. 5. The undersigned recommends this action be dismissed for failure to 2 state a claim and failure to comply with a court order. 4 Plaintiff, an inmate currently confined at Washington State Penitentiary, filed this action
5 challenging the conditions of confinement at Pierce County Jail (“PCJ”). Dkt. 6. Although 6 Plaintiff organizes his claims into three separate counts, each similarly alleges he was subject to 7 unsanitary conditions during two periods of pretrial detention at PCJ occurring in 2008 and 2013. 8 Id. at 10–43. Plaintiff also alleges he was not provided an effective grievance process and was 9 denied access to cleaning products during both periods of pretrial detention. Id. Plaintiff seeks 10 $1,000,000 in damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 44. 11 After reviewing the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court declined to serve 12 the complaint and, instead, ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his claims should not be 13 dismissed as untimely and barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. 5. The Court 14 advised Plaintiff that failure to respond or show cause by April 23, 2025, would result in a
15 recommendation this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at 5. The deadline for 16 Plaintiff to show cause has elapsed with no response received from him. See docket. 18 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen 19 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 20 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 21 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 22 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 23 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Barren v.
24 1 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal on these grounds counts as a “strike” 2 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 3 The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 4 97, 106 (1976). However, even pro se pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the
5 speculative level and must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 6 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 7 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 9 The Court previously outlined the law regarding limitations periods and tolling doctrines 10 for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions filed in the State of Washington: 11 The Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not include a provision limiting the time in which a § 1983 civil rights action must be brought. Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 12 (9th Cir. 1981). In the absence of an explicit statutory limitations period, federal courts look to the law of the forum state to determine the limitations period 13 applicable to § 1983 actions.2 Montgomery v. West, No. 23-15728, 2024 WL 2843637, at *1 (9th Cir. June 5, 2024). Under Washington law, Plaintiff had three 14 years from the date his conditions of confinement claims accrued to file a § 1983 action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2); Rose, 654 F.2d at 547 (three-year 15 statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising in Washington State). 16 While the duration of the limitations period is derived from state law, federal law determines when a claim accrues. See W. Ctr. For Journalism v. 17 Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000); Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986). A § 1983 claim “accrues when the 18 plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 761–62 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotations 19 and citations omitted). “[A]s long as a plaintiff has notice of the wrongful conduct, it is not necessary that [they] have knowledge of all the details or all of the persons 20 involved in order for [their] cause of action to accrue.” W. Ctr. For Journalism, 235 F.3d at 1157 (quotations and citations omitted). 21 The final step in determining whether a § 1983 claim is time barred is 22 application of statutory and equitable tolling. The Court looks to the law of the
23 2 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is affirmative defense raised by an opposing party; even so, it may be grounds for sua sponte dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint where the defense is complete and obvious from 24 the face of the pleadings. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228–30 (9th Cir. 1984). 1 forum state to determine whether the time for filing a § 1983 action has been tolled. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). Washington law allows for 2 statutory tolling in various circumstances, but none appears to be applicable here. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code. § 4.16.190 (statute tolled by personal disability 3 including confinement in pretrial detention); Wash. Rev. Code. § 4.16.200 (statute tolled by death); Wash. Rev. Code. § 4.16.220 (statute tolled as to person in United 4 States military service). Equitable tolling is available in Washington “when justice requires.” Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash.2d 193, 206 (1998). “The predicates for 5 equitable tolling are bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant and the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff.” Id. Washington state courts apply 6 equitable tolling “sparingly” and do not permit equitable tolling of claims that are untimely because of a plaintiff’s “garden variety” excusable neglect. State v. 7 Robinson, 104 Wash.App. 657, 667 (2001) (internal quotations omitted); see also Redlin v. United States, 921 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The doctrine [of 8 equitable tolling] is not available to avoid the consequence of one’s own negligence and does not apply when a late filing is due to claimant’s failure to exercise due 9 diligence in preserving his legal rights.”). 10 Dkt. 5 at 3–4 (footnote in original). 11 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was subject to unsanitary conditions during both 12 periods of his pretrial detention at PCJ in 2008 and 2013. Dkt. 5 at 10–43. Given the nature of his 13 claims, Plaintiff either knew or had reason to know of the injuries giving rise to his unsanitary 14 conditions of confinement claims as they occurred. In other words, because Plaintiff experienced 15 these allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement in real time, his § 1983 claims 16 concerning those conditions accrued in 2008 and 2013. Thus, under the applicable 3-year 17 limitations period, the final dates for Plaintiff to file a timely § 1983 action challenging the 18 alleged unsanitary conditions at PCJ expired in 2011 and 2016 respectively. Because Plaintiff did 19 not file this action until February 2025, his claims are time-barred unless statutory or equitable 20 tolling applies. Plaintiff’s allegations, however, do not support application of statutory or 21 equitable tolling such that Plaintiff’s more than 9-year delay in filing would be excused. In 22 addition, Plaintiff has failed to show cause why his claims are not barred by the applicable 23 limitations period and the deadline to do so has elapsed. See docket. 24 1 Therefore, the undersigned concludes this § 1983 action is untimely and barred under the 2 applicable three-year limitations period. 4 For the above stated reasons, the undersigned recommends this action be dismissed with
5 prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to comply 6 with a court order. Dismissal on the recommended grounds constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915(g). 8 Objections to this Report and Recommendation, if any, should be filed with the Clerk not 9 later than fourteen (14) days from the date on which this Report and Recommendation is signed. 10 Failure to file objections within the specified time may affect your right to appeal. Objections 11 should be noted for consideration on the District Judge’s motions calendar fourteen (14) days 12 from the date they are filed. Responses to objections may be filed by the day before the noting 13 date. If no timely objections are filed, the matter will be ready for consideration by the District 14 Judge on May 16, 2025.
15 Dated this 1st day of May, 2025. 16 A 17 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24