J-A30011-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
T.S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : J.F., A/K/A J.S. : : Appellant : No. 103 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order December 22, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 2129 OF 2007 G.D.
T.S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : J.F., N/K/A J.S. : : Appellant : No. 436 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 2129 of 2007 GD
R.F.-S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : T.S. : : : No. 530 WDA 2018 APPEAL OF: J.S., MOTHER OF R.F.- : S.
Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 492 OF 2018 J-A30011-18
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2018
The first of these consolidated appeals, Docket Number 103 WDA 2018
filed by J.F., also known as J.S. (“Mother”), pro se, is based upon a final
custody order dated December 22, 2017, concerning thirteen-year-old R.F.S.
(“Child”), the only child of Mother and T.S. (“Father”). The appeal at Docket
Number 436 WDA 2018, is from an order entered March 22, 2018, directing
Mother to cooperate with the Guardian ad Litem and court-appointed counsel
for Child. The third appeal, at Docket Number 530 WDA 2018, is based upon
a March 21, 2018 order dismissing Mother’s petition pursuant to the Protection
from Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101–6122 (“PFA Act”). For the following
reasons, we quash the appeal at 436 WDA 2018 and affirm the appeals at 103
WDA 2018 and 530 WDA 2018.
The appeal at 436 WDA 2018 is quashed because it is not from a final
order. It is well settled that an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order
or an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order
as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P.
312, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313). See
Pace v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 717 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa.
Super. 1998) (discussing the appealability of orders).
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
-2- J-A30011-18
The order on appeal in Docket 436 WDA 2018, which directs Mother’s
cooperation with the GAL and counsel for Child, is not a final order.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines final orders as follows:
(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a government unit or trial court.
(b) Definition of Final Order. A final order is any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
(2) RESCINDED
(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph (c) of this rule.
(c) Determination of finality. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim or when multiple parties are involved, the trial court or other governmental unit may enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and parties only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final order. . . .
Pa.R.A.P. 341 (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 341, an order is final
if it disposes of all claims and all parties or if a statute expressly defines it as
final. Clearly, as the March 22, 2018 order does not dispose of all claims and
all parties, it is not final, and we quash the appeal at 436 WDA 2018.1
1 If quashal of the appeal were not required, we would affirm on the Statement in Lieu of Opinion filed July 20, 2018.
-3- J-A30011-18
Concerning the appeals at Dockets 103 and 530 WDA 2018, our result
initially is guided by Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Conformance with Requirements”):
Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.
“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se
litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the
contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must,
to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training
will be his undoing.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211–1212 (Pa. Super.
2010). Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules set
forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160
A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
In the instant matter, the “briefs” filed by Mother, in all cases, and in
all respects, fail to conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
There are no statements of jurisdiction, no identification of the orders
appealed, no statements of the questions involved, no statements of the case,
no summaries of argument, no arguments of identified issues, and no
conclusions. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114–2119 (addressing specific requirements of
appellate briefs). Mother has included no citations to the notes of testimony.
Most egregious is Mother’s complete failure to identify issues on appeal in any
brief. Indeed, the guardian ad litem and counsel for Child have filed letters
-4- J-A30011-18
indicating that they were unable to file briefs in the case due to their inability
to identify issues raised by Mother.
“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on
behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa.
Super. 2014). “When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs,
when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a
court will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445
A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982); see also Commonwealth v. Rompilla,
983 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. 2009) (“Appellant’s failure to adequately develop
his arguments or support his bald assertions with sufficient citation to legal
authority impedes meaningful judicial review of his claims”); Stimmler v.
Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145, 153 n.9 (Pa. 2009) (argument portion
of brief must contain “sufficient citation to the record and legal authority,
together with analysis, to guide this Court in its review of the issue.”).
As we stated in Lechowicz v. Moser, 164 A.3d 1271, 1276–1277 (Pa.
Super.
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J-A30011-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
T.S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : J.F., A/K/A J.S. : : Appellant : No. 103 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order December 22, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 2129 OF 2007 G.D.
T.S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : J.F., N/K/A J.S. : : Appellant : No. 436 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 2129 of 2007 GD
R.F.-S. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : T.S. : : : No. 530 WDA 2018 APPEAL OF: J.S., MOTHER OF R.F.- : S.
Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 492 OF 2018 J-A30011-18
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2018
The first of these consolidated appeals, Docket Number 103 WDA 2018
filed by J.F., also known as J.S. (“Mother”), pro se, is based upon a final
custody order dated December 22, 2017, concerning thirteen-year-old R.F.S.
(“Child”), the only child of Mother and T.S. (“Father”). The appeal at Docket
Number 436 WDA 2018, is from an order entered March 22, 2018, directing
Mother to cooperate with the Guardian ad Litem and court-appointed counsel
for Child. The third appeal, at Docket Number 530 WDA 2018, is based upon
a March 21, 2018 order dismissing Mother’s petition pursuant to the Protection
from Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101–6122 (“PFA Act”). For the following
reasons, we quash the appeal at 436 WDA 2018 and affirm the appeals at 103
WDA 2018 and 530 WDA 2018.
The appeal at 436 WDA 2018 is quashed because it is not from a final
order. It is well settled that an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order
or an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order
as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P.
312, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313). See
Pace v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 717 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa.
Super. 1998) (discussing the appealability of orders).
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
-2- J-A30011-18
The order on appeal in Docket 436 WDA 2018, which directs Mother’s
cooperation with the GAL and counsel for Child, is not a final order.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines final orders as follows:
(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a government unit or trial court.
(b) Definition of Final Order. A final order is any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
(2) RESCINDED
(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph (c) of this rule.
(c) Determination of finality. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim or when multiple parties are involved, the trial court or other governmental unit may enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and parties only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final order. . . .
Pa.R.A.P. 341 (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 341, an order is final
if it disposes of all claims and all parties or if a statute expressly defines it as
final. Clearly, as the March 22, 2018 order does not dispose of all claims and
all parties, it is not final, and we quash the appeal at 436 WDA 2018.1
1 If quashal of the appeal were not required, we would affirm on the Statement in Lieu of Opinion filed July 20, 2018.
-3- J-A30011-18
Concerning the appeals at Dockets 103 and 530 WDA 2018, our result
initially is guided by Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Conformance with Requirements”):
Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.
“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se
litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the
contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must,
to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training
will be his undoing.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211–1212 (Pa. Super.
2010). Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules set
forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160
A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
In the instant matter, the “briefs” filed by Mother, in all cases, and in
all respects, fail to conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
There are no statements of jurisdiction, no identification of the orders
appealed, no statements of the questions involved, no statements of the case,
no summaries of argument, no arguments of identified issues, and no
conclusions. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114–2119 (addressing specific requirements of
appellate briefs). Mother has included no citations to the notes of testimony.
Most egregious is Mother’s complete failure to identify issues on appeal in any
brief. Indeed, the guardian ad litem and counsel for Child have filed letters
-4- J-A30011-18
indicating that they were unable to file briefs in the case due to their inability
to identify issues raised by Mother.
“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on
behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa.
Super. 2014). “When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs,
when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a
court will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445
A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982); see also Commonwealth v. Rompilla,
983 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. 2009) (“Appellant’s failure to adequately develop
his arguments or support his bald assertions with sufficient citation to legal
authority impedes meaningful judicial review of his claims”); Stimmler v.
Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145, 153 n.9 (Pa. 2009) (argument portion
of brief must contain “sufficient citation to the record and legal authority,
together with analysis, to guide this Court in its review of the issue.”).
As we stated in Lechowicz v. Moser, 164 A.3d 1271, 1276–1277 (Pa.
Super. 2017):
The Rules of Appellate Procedure require the argument section of an appellate brief to include “citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). It is not the role of this Court to develop an appellant’s argument where the brief provides mere cursory legal discussion. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 604 Pa. 176, 985 A.2d 915, 925 (2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906, 131 S.Ct. 250, 178 L.Ed.2d 165 (2010); see also In re C.R., 113 A.3d 328, 336 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 760, 125 A.3d 1197 (2015) (“This Court will not consider an argument where an appellant fails to cite to any legal authority or otherwise develop the issue.”).
-5- J-A30011-18
Thus, because the defects in Mother’s briefs are so substantial that they
impair our ability to conduct a meaningful review, we could dismiss the
appeals. In consideration of the nature of the case, however, and in light of
our conclusion that Mother’s list of “failures” in the cases, see Mother’s Brief
in Docket 103 WDA 2018 at 3–11 and Mother’s Brief in Docket 530 WDA 2018
at 2–7, may be construed as issues she is attempting to raise, we have
examined the record certified to us on appeal to determine their merit.
We reject Mother’s bald assertions and conclude that the thorough,
detailed, and comprehensive opinions of the trial courts address Mother’s
identified “failures,” and we rely on those opinions in affirming these cases.
See Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 3/29/18, in Docket 103 WDA 2018; PFA
Court Opinion, 6/19/18 in Docket 530 WDA 2018.2
The order of December 22, 2017, in Docket 103 WDA 2018 is affirmed.
The appeal of the order of March 22, 2018, in Docket 436 WDA 2018 is
quashed. The order of March 21, 2018, in Docket 530 WDA 2018 is affirmed.3
2 We direct the parties to attach a copy of the trial court opinions in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
3 There are two outstanding motions in these appeals. Father’s Application to Strike Inadmissible Exhibits Beyond Record filed October 22, 2018, is DENIED as moot. Father’s Cumulative Response to Appellant’s Filings filed October 23, 2018, is DENIED as moot.
-6- J-A30011-18
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/26/2018
-7- Circulated 11/16/2018 04:11 PM