Rel: November 7, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0114 _________________________
T.S.
v.
Houston County Department of Human Resources
Appeal from Houston Juvenile Court (JU-24-451.01)
EDWARDS, Judge.
In July 2024, the Houston County Department of Human Resources
("DHR") filed in the Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") a
petition seeking to have B.K. ("the child"), the child of T.S. ("the mother"),
declared dependent. In its petition, DHR averred that it "ha[d] confirmed CL-2025-0114
that the mother has history with [the Florida Department of Children
and Families] in Broward County, Florida[,] with the most recent being
in 2019." The petition also averred that the mother and the child had
been residing in a Dothan motel when DHR became involved with the
family.
On July 29, 2024, the juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem
for the child and held a shelter-care hearing, at which DHR proffered that
the evidence would show that the mother and the child had previously
resided in Broward County, Florida, and that they had been present in
Alabama for approximately one month. On July 30, 2024, after the
hearing, the juvenile court entered a shelter-care order, which stated that
the court was "assum[ing] emergency jurisdiction only." On September
11, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order requiring the child's
guardian ad litem to contact the "Broward County [Department of
Children and Families'] supervising attorney." On October 9, 2024, the
juvenile court entered what it entitled an "Order on Initial Appearance,"
in which the juvenile court stated that the "mother resides in [Alabama]
now."
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On January 16, 2025, at what was originally scheduled to be the
adjudicatory hearing on the dependency petition, the juvenile court
indicated that it had concerns that the question regarding its jurisdiction
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the
UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq., had not yet been
resolved. The juvenile-court judge telephoned a court in Broward
County, Florida, and spoke by telephone with a person that the juvenile-
court judge identified on the record as "Judge Schulman." The juvenile-
court judge reported to Judge Schulman the name and birthdate of the
mother and of the child, and Judge Schulman apparently verified that no
dependency, paternity, child-support, or custody case involving the child
existed in Broward County. Only the juvenile-court judge's side of the
conversation was recorded in the transcript; certain of the statements
allegedly made by Judge Schulman were reported by the juvenile-court
judge. The juvenile court entered an order continuing the trial to
February 3, 2025, and entered a separate order that stated, in pertinent
part, that "[t]he Court further notes that it contacted Judge [Schulman]
... on this date and confirmed that there are no cases regarding custody
of [the child] in Broward County. This Court has original jurisdiction."
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After the conclusion of the trial on February 3, 2025, the juvenile
court entered a judgment determining that the child is a dependent child.
On February 13, 2025, the mother timely filed both a postjudgment
motion directed to that judgment and a notice of appeal, which was held
in abeyance pending a ruling on her postjudgment motion. See Rule
4(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P. ("A notice of appeal filed after the entry of the
judgment but before the disposition of all post-judgment motions filed
pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55, and 59, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure,
shall be held in abeyance until all post-judgment motions filed pursuant
to Rules 50, 52, 55, and 59 are ruled upon ...."). The juvenile court denied
the mother's postjudgment motion on February 18, 2025.
Although neither party has raised the issue of this court's
jurisdiction over this appeal, this court can, and should, inquire into the
issue of jurisdiction ex mero motu. M.B. v. B.B., 244 So. 3d 128, 130 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2017); J.T. v. A.C., 892 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
"This court may not presume that a statutorily created court of limited
jurisdiction, such as the juvenile court, had subject-matter jurisdiction."
C.H. v. Lamar Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 324 So. 3d 391, 394 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2020). The juvenile court questioned its own jurisdiction over the
4 CL-2025-0114
issue of the custody of the child under the UCCJEA, and, based on the
information contained in the record, we are not satisfied that the juvenile
court had such jurisdiction.
The juvenile court recognized in its shelter-care order that its initial
exercise of jurisdiction over the custody of the child was "emergency" in
nature. The information provided to the juvenile court indicated that the
mother and the child had previously resided in Florida and that they had
resided at a motel in Dothan, Alabama, for approximately one month
before DHR became involved with the family. Thus, it appears that the
child's home state at the time of the commencement of the dependency
action was Florida. Nothing contained in the record on appeal indicates
that the juvenile court was informed that a Florida court (or any other
court) had entered a child-custody determination regarding the child or
that a child-custody proceeding had been commenced in Florida (or in any
other state). See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-204(b).
Temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is governed
by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-204, which provides:
"(a) A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to
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protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
"(b) If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under [the UCCJEA] and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under [Ala. Code 1975, §§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B- 201 through 30-3B-203. If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.
"(c) If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under [the UCCJEA], or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.
"(d) A court of this state which has been asked to make a child custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction
6 CL-2025-0114
pursuant to [§§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order."
An Alabama court facing a jurisdictional question under the
UCCJEA should, and in some cases must, communicate with a court of
another state that may have jurisdiction. Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-110.
Because the juvenile court had before it no information indicating that a
child-custody proceeding was pending in another state or that another
state had entered a child-custody determination, nothing in § 30-3B-
204(b) required that the juvenile court communicate with Judge
Schulman; the juvenile court was not precluded from doing so, and the
decision to do so was permissible and prudent. Once the juvenile court
discovered that no child-custody proceeding was pending in Broward
County, Florida, the juvenile court's shelter-care order, which was
properly issued under its temporary emergency jurisdiction, "remain[ed]
in effect."
7 CL-2025-0114
Although the juvenile court's communication with Judge Schulman
appeared to have satisfied the juvenile court that it had jurisdiction to
proceed with the dependency action, the record does not support a
conclusion that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under Ala. Code 1975,
§ 30-3B-201(a), to make an initial child-custody determination regarding
the child. Before a court of this state may enter a child-custody
determination other than one under § 30-3B-204, this court must have
jurisdiction under one of the subsections of § 30-3B-201(a), which is the
"exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination
by a court of this state." § 30-3B-201(b).
Section 30-3B-201(a) provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in [§] 30-3B-204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
"(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
"(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise
8 CL-2025-0114
jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under [Ala. Code 1975, §§] 30-3B-207 or 30-3B-208, and:
"a. The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
"b. Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
"(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under [§§] 30-3B-207 or 30-3B- 208; or
"(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3)."
Based on the information contained in the record, Florida appears
to be the home state of the child, and, although Broward County had no
pending child-custody proceeding involving the child and had not entered
a child-custody determination regarding the child, Florida's status as the
home state was unchanged at the time of the commencement of the
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dependency proceeding. Thus, the juvenile court is precluded from
exercising jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(4). The
juvenile court could possibly have exercised jurisdiction under § 30-3B-
201(a)(3) if Judge Schulman had "declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child...." However, the record does not
contain an indication that Judge Schulman "declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child...." § 30-3B-
201(a)(3). Thus, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to make an
initial determination of custody under any of the bases provided in § 30-
3B-201(a).
The only other potential ground for the juvenile court's exercise of
jurisdiction would be the "ripening" of the shelter-care order into a final
child-custody determination under § 30-3B-204(b). By now it is well
settled that "a juvenile court exercising temporary emergency
jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204 does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
dependency and award custody by virtue of the limited jurisdiction
provided to it." J.D. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 121 So. 3d
10 CL-2025-0114
381, 385 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). However, we have explained that a child-
custody determination made pursuant to a court's temporary emergency
jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204 can, in certain instances, ripen into a
final, as opposed to temporary, child-custody determination. See W.S. v.
Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2023-0794, Mar. 21, 2025]
___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). Specifically, § 30-3B-204(b)
provides:
"If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under [the UCCJEA] and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under [Ala. Code 1975, §§] 30-3B- 201 through 30-3B-203, a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B- 201 through 30-3B-203. If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under [§§] 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child."
As we explained in W.S., under § 30-3B-204(b), "to become a 'final
determination,' the emergency order providing for that temporary
disposition must provide, explicitly, that it is intended to be a final
custody determination." ___ So. 3d at ___.
11 CL-2025-0114
The juvenile court's shelter-care order does not explicitly state that
that order was intended to be a final custody determination. Lacking
such a statement, the shelter-care order could not have ripened into a
final custody determination under § 30-3B-204(b). Although the shelter-
care order remains in effect pursuant to § 30-3B-204(b), the juvenile court
had no basis upon which to exercise initial child-custody jurisdiction to
enter the dependency judgment.
Because the juvenile court did not acquire subject-matter
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA (other than temporary emergency
jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204, which it exercised when entering the
shelter-care order), the juvenile court's dependency judgment was
entered without jurisdiction and is void. See J.B. v. A.B., 888 So. 2d 528,
532 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (explaining that a judgment containing a child-
custody determination is void if the court entering it lacked jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal based on the
voidness of the dependency judgment. As noted, under § 30-3B-204(b),
the juvenile court's shelter-care order remains in effect until such time
as a child-custody determination is entered by a Florida court or until the
shelter-care order "ripens," provided that the juvenile court amends that
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order to reflect its intent that the shelter-care order become a final
custody determination upon Alabama's becoming the child's home state.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Fridy and Bowden, JJ., concur.
Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
Hanson, J., dissents, with opinion.
13 CL-2025-0114
HANSON, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the Houston Juvenile Court
("the juvenile court") had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Ala.
Code 1975, § 30-3B-201(a), which is part of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-
3B-101 et seq.
The record shows that on July 29, 2024, the Houston County
Department of Human Resources ("DHR") filed a dependency petition,
alleging that B.K. ("the child") was dependent and in need of care and
supervision. In the petition, DHR stated:
"a. [DHR] became involved with the family on July 26, 2024, when Adult Protective Services [('APS')] initially received a report regarding an unresponsive 19-year-old male, [B.A.], who appeared to be suffering from malnutrition. When [Emergency Medical Services] arrived, [B.A.'s] sugar level was at 30. Once APS responded to Motel 6, [two] children were located. There was a total of [seven] people residing in Motel 6 all sleeping on [one] bed. [T.S.] is the mother to [a] 14-year- old, [B.K.,] and to the 19-year-old, [B.A.]. The mother is cognitively delayed and receives a[] [Supplemental Security Income] check. [B.A.] is currently in [the Critical Care Unit] for Neglect and Pneumonia. There are also marks on the 19- year-old, but the cause of the marks is unclear at this time and may or may not be a result of abuse. [The child] also appears to be cognitively delayed but this has not been confirmed. [The child] is not currently enrolled in school and allegedly attended an online school possibly in the 8th grade.
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[DHR] has confirmed that the mother has history in Broward County, Florida with the most recent being in 2019. [DHR] assumed custody of this child on July 26, 2024, at 5:22 p.m.
"b. The unknown father has abandoned the child by voluntarily and intentionally relinquishing custody of this child and by continuing to withhold his presence, care, love, protection and maintenance and has failed to perform the duties of a parent preceding the filing of this Petition.
"c. [DHR] has ongoing concerns about the protective capacities of the mother and the mother's ability to protect the child from dangerous or injurious situations."
An affidavit from Leslie Sasnett, a DHR social worker, was
attached to the dependency petition and included the following
averments:
"[B.K.] is a child in the care of [DHR];
"[DHR] became involved with the family on July 26, 2024, when Adult Protective Services [('APS')] initially received a report regarding an unresponsive 19-year-old male, [B.A.], who appeared to be suffering from malnutrition;
"When [Emergency Medical Services] arrived, [B.A.'s] sugar level was at 30;
"Once APS responded to Motel 6, [two] children were located;
"There was a total of [seven] people residing in Motel 6 all sleeping on [one] bed;
15 CL-2025-0114
"[T.S.] is the mother to [a] 14-year-old, [B.K.,] and to the 19 year-old, [B.A.];
"The mother is cognitively delayed and receives a[] [Supplemental Security Income] check;
"[B.A.] is currently in [the Critical Care Unit] for neglect and pneumonia;
"There are also marks on the 19-year-old, but the cause of the marks is unclear at this time and may or may not be a result of abuse;
"[The child] also appears to be cognitively delayed but this has not been confirmed;
"[The child] is not currently enrolled in school and allegedly attended an online school possibly in the 8th grade;
"[DHR] has confirmed that the mother has history in Broward County, Florida with the most recent being in 2019;
"[DHR] assumed custody of this child on July 26, 2024 at 5:22 p.m.;
"The unknown father has abandoned the child by voluntarily and intentionally relinquishing custody of this child and by continuing to withhold his presence, care, love, protection and maintenance and has failed to perform the duties of a parent preceding the filing of this petition;
"[DHR] has ongoing concerns about the protective capacities of the mother and the mother's ability to protect the child from dangerous or injurious situations."
16 CL-2025-0114
On July 29, 2024, the juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem
for the child. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered a shelter-
care order on July 30, 2024, transferring custody of the child to DHR.
DHR asserted that the mother and her adult daughter, Bi.J., both had a
history with the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") in
Broward County, Florida. Bi.J.'s case in Florida involved medical neglect.
DHR suggested that the mother and Bi.J. were trying to avoid DCF. The
juvenile court, in compliance with § 12-15-315, Ala. Code 1975, set the
matter for a permanency hearing. Before the hearing, DHR filed a report
in the juvenile court recommending that the child remain in foster care
with a permanency plan of returning the child to the mother after service
referrals had been made.
On October 9, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing at which the
mother and the child were present. At the hearing, the juvenile court
asked how long the mother had resided in Alabama, and the mother
responded that she had been in Alabama for three months. The mother
said that she intended on living in Alabama and that she had not had
any contact with DCF in Florida. The juvenile court noted that a shelter-
care hearing had been held in July and that the court had exercised
17 CL-2025-0114
emergency jurisdiction. The mother stated that she had not attended
that hearing because no one had told her about it. A DHR representative
explained that DHR had informed the mother of the shelter-care hearing
the week before when the mother had had a supervised visit with the
child and that the mother also had been notified of the hearing by
telephone. The mother explained that she thought the hearing was an
online hearing. The DHR representative explained that a taxicab had
been sent to the mother's hotel room to transport the mother to the
shelter-care hearing. The juvenile noted that the mother and the child
had been served. The juvenile court set the matter for a pretrial
conference on December 12, 2024.
On December 12, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing, which was
a combined hearing regarding the child and N.S., the infant child of Bi.J.,
the mother's adult daughter. N.S. was living with the mother, the child,
Bi.J., Br.J. (the mother's other adult daughter), B.A., and the mother's
boyfriend. A DHR employee explained that the child was currently at a
30-bed group home in Fairfield and that she was attending school on the
campus. The juvenile court set a hearing for January 16, 2025.
18 CL-2025-0114
At the hearing on January 16, 2025, the juvenile court questioned
whether it had jurisdiction. The juvenile court noted that the court had
received an email from DCF indicating that there had been no
"communication yet between the judges" regarding jurisdiction. The
juvenile court then had a telephone conversation with Judge Schulman
of the Broward County Juvenile Court ("the Florida court"). The juvenile
court's portion of the conversation indicated that the Florida court stated
that there were no pending cases regarding the child. The juvenile court
confirmed birth dates and the correct spelling of the names of the parties
involved. The juvenile court asked if Florida wanted the children
(referring to the child and N.S.) back or if the juvenile court could "handle
it." The juvenile court stated:
"THE COURT: We've got the father as unknown. Do you have a father on that one? Oh so, it's not -- yeah. Got you. Okay. But no dependency? Okay. Since I have -- right. I think you're right. Perfect. That's I think how we found out about y'all, but we weren't sure about the jurisdiction issue. Perfect. She has got no case. Thank you. Thank you so much. Bye-bye. I recorded that, at least my end of it. But there are no dependency cases on either child in Broward County. She says their DCF might have been investigating the mother or the situation, but never filed anything. So, at this point, Judge Schulman in Broward County said we get to keep them. So, we're here today with jurisdiction."
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(Emphasis added.)
The juvenile court also entered an order noting that the court had
contacted the Florida court and that there were no pending cases against
the mother in Broward County, Florida. The juvenile court stated in its
order that it had "original jurisdiction."
At a hearing that began on January 16, 2025, and was continued
on February 3, 2025, the juvenile court heard testimony from the mother,
a DHR caseworker, and the child. On February 5, 2025, the juvenile
court entered a judgment stating that, based on clear and convincing
evidence, the child was dependent pursuant to § 12-15-102(8), Ala. Code
1975, because the testimony presented indicated that the mother did not
have the protective capacity to provide for the child. The juvenile court
noted in its judgment that there was no legal father of the child. On
February 13, 2025, the mother filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
the judgment, arguing that the judgment was against the preponderance
of the evidence, that DHR had not established facts sufficient to
demonstrate dependency, and that the facts showed that the mother was
in a position to care for the child. On February 18, 2025, the juvenile
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court denied the postjudgment motion. The mother timely filed a notice
of appeal.
The UCCJEA governs subject-matter jurisdiction over child-
custody actions, including actions involving allegations of dependency.
See § 30-3B-102(4), Ala. Code 1975 (defining a "child custody proceeding"
as "[a] proceeding in a court in which legal custody, physical custody, or
visitation with respect to a child is an issue" and including within that
term proceedings for "divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency,
guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection
from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear"); H.T. v. Cleburne
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 163 So. 3d 1054, 1062 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).
"The UCCJEA recognizes four categories of subject- matter jurisdiction: (1) initial child-custody jurisdiction, see § 30-3B-201, Ala. Code 1975; (2) continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-custody determination, see § 30-3B- 202, Ala. Code 1975; (3) jurisdiction to modify another state's child-custody determination, see § 30-3B-203, Ala. Code 1975; and (4) temporary emergency jurisdiction to protect a child present in this state, see § 30-3B-204, Ala. Code 1975."
Ex parte R.B., 409 So. 3d 620, 625 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).
Pursuant to its emergency jurisdiction, the juvenile court, in the
present case, made a child-custody determination when it awarded DHR
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custody of the child on July 30, 2024, to alleviate an emergency regarding
the child's safety and welfare while in Alabama. See § 30-3B-204(a), Ala.
Code 1975. The mother, who is cognitively delayed, and the child had
been living in Florida before arriving in Alabama two weeks to a month
earlier. The child's adult sibling was found in the same living quarters
to be unresponsive, "cold to the touch," and possibly malnourished. At
the time the juvenile court exercised its emergency jurisdiction over the
child, the child was in an inappropriate living situation, residing in a
hotel room with five adults and one infant and only a single bed.
Although emergency jurisdiction is generally intended to be temporary
and for a short period, a juvenile court may continue to exercise its
authority as long as the underlying reasons for the emergency continue
and a child-custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a
state having jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201 through § 30-3B-203, Ala.
Code 1975. See § 30-3B-204.
Section 30-3B-204 provides:
"(a) A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of
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the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
"(b) If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under [the UCCJEA] and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, [Ala. Code 1975,] a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203. If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.
"(c) If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under [the UCCJEA], or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B- 203, any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B- 201 through 30-3B-203. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.
"(d) A court of this state which has been asked to make a child custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-
23 CL-2025-0114
203, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order."
A juvenile court with temporary emergency jurisdiction cannot
adjudicate a child's dependency unless and until it first complies with §
30-3B-204. See G.S. v. R.L., 259 So. 3d 677, 681-82 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)
(holding that a juvenile court acted beyond its temporary emergency
jurisdiction by making dependency findings when a child's grandmother
notified the court that a Tennessee court might have made a child-
custody determination but the juvenile court failed to contact that court
to resolve the jurisdictional issue).
Generally, the purpose of a child-custody determination made
pursuant to the emergency-jurisdiction provisions of § 30-3B-204 is to
protect the child until the state that has jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201
through § 30-3B-203, Ala. Code 1975, enters an order. See Official
Comment to § 30-3B-204. Section 30-3B-204(b) provides that an
emergency custody determination may become a final custody
determination if there is no existing custody determination and no
24 CL-2025-0114
custody proceeding is filed in a state with jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201
through 203, if the temporary order so provides, and if Alabama becomes
the child's home state. Id. Section 30-3B-204(c) concerns the temporary
nature of the emergency order when there is a prior custody order that is
entitled to enforcement under the UCCJEA or when a subsequent
custody proceeding is filed in a state with jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201
through § 30-3B-203. Id. Under 30-3B-204(c), the emergency order
remains in effect only so long as is necessary for the person who obtained
the determination under § 30-3B-204(c) to present a case and obtain an
order from the state with jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201 through § 30-
3B-203. That period must be specified in the order. Section 30-3B-204(d)
requires communication between the court of the state that is exercising
emergency jurisdiction and the court of another state that is exercising
jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201 through § 30-3B-203. The pleading rules
of § 30-3B-209, Ala. Code 1975, apply, and, therefore, a person seeking a
temporary emergency-custody determination is required to inform the
juvenile court of any proceeding concerning the child that has been
commenced elsewhere. Id.
25 CL-2025-0114
In order to determine whether the juvenile court in this case had
jurisdiction to enter a child-custody determination to address the child's
dependency, we need to first determine whether another state had
jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201, § 30-3B-202, or § 30-3B-203. Section 30-
3B-202 concerns continuing jurisdiction, and § 30-3B-203 concerns a
juvenile court's jurisdiction to modify another state's child-custody
determination, neither of which are applicable in this case. Accordingly,
we must turn to § 30-3B-201, which sets forth four separate bases for
jurisdiction: home-state jurisdiction pursuant to § 30-3B-201(a)(1);
significant-connection jurisdiction pursuant to § 30-3B-201(a)(2); more-
appropriate-forum jurisdiction (in which jurisdiction has been declined
by all courts having home-state or significant-connection jurisdiction)
pursuant § 30-3B-201(a)(3); and last-resort or default jurisdiction (in
which no court of any other state would have jurisdiction) pursuant to §
30-3B-201(a)(4). See Ex parte R.B., 409 So. 3d at 625-26.
Regarding home-state jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201(a), § 30-3B-
102(7), Ala. Code 1975, defines "home state," in pertinent part, as
"[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody
26 CL-2025-0114
proceeding. … A period of temporary absence of the child or any of the mentioned persons is part of the period."
Here, the child had been in Alabama for two weeks to a month
before DHR became involved with the family. It was undisputed that,
before residing in Alabama, the family had lived in Florida. Florida was
the child's home state at the time of DHR's involvement. Cf. W.S. v.
Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2023-0794, Mar. 21, 2023]
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2023) (holding that neither Alabama nor
Florida was the child's home state when neither parent ever lived in
Alabama, there was no evidence indicating that either intended to live
in Alabama, the mother testified that she had no connection to Alabama
other than driving to Alabama once her labor started so that she could
give birth to child in Alabama, and the dependency petition was initiated
in Alabama within days of the child's birth). Because Alabama is not the
child's home state, we must determine if it was permissible for the
juvenile court to proceed along one of the other three pathways by
exercising significant-connection, more-appropriate-forum, or last-resort
jurisdiction.
27 CL-2025-0114
Section 30-3B-201(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that if a court
of another state declines to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
Alabama is the more appropriate forum and the child and a parent or
person acting as a parent has a significant connection to Alabama and
substantial evidence is available in Alabama concerning the care,
protection, training, and personal relationships of the child, Alabama
courts may exercise significant-connection jurisdiction. Here, the only
connection between Alabama and the family was the family's short
residency in Alabama while possibly avoiding Florida's DCF. The
family's brief time in Alabama was not sufficient to confer significant-
connection jurisdiction on the juvenile court. Cf. W.S., ___ So. 3d ___
(holding that the mother and the father lacked a significant connection
with Alabama when the parents' only connection with Alabama was the
child's birth in Alabama while the mother was attempting to flee Florida
authorities and that the child lacked a significant connection with
Florida when the child had never lived in Florida and nothing indicated
that substantial evidence was available in Florida regarding the child's
care).
28 CL-2025-0114
The third basis for exercising jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201(a) is
applicable when a court of another state having subject-matter
jurisdiction over a child declines to exercise that jurisdiction because an
Alabama court is the more appropriate forum under § 30-3B-207 or § 30-
3B-208, Ala. Code 1975, to determine the child's custody. See § 30-3B-
201(a)(3). Here, the Florida court having home-state jurisdiction declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the child. Cf. C.R.B. v. Jackson Cnty. Dep't
of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2024-0504, Aug. 29, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ.
App. 2025) (holding that Alabama juvenile court was not a more
appropriate forum under § 30-3B-201(a)(3) when there were no actions
involving the children pending in any court of another state and no court
of another state had declined to exercise jurisdiction). The juvenile court
contacted the Florida court because Florida's DCF had been involved
with the family in 2019. At a hearing, DHR suggested that the mother
and Bi.J. were trying to avoid a current investigation by DCF. The family
had been living outside Broward County for a year while living in north
Florida. The child was taking online classes while in north Florida and
had not been enrolled in school. It appears that DCF had not commenced
any cases involving the family. Additionally, the Alabama juvenile court
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was familiar with the facts underlying the pending dependency petition,
including the emergency situation necessitating DHR's actions, which
supports the juvenile court's being the more appropriate forum.
Accordingly, I believe the juvenile court had jurisdiction pursuant to §
30-3B-201(a)(3). Had the family not had a history with DCF, then the
juvenile court would not have had jurisdiction unless the provisions of §
30-3B-204 were met.
One of the purposes of the UCCJEA is to facilitate cooperation
between courts in different states in issuing custody and visitation
orders. Ex parte Siderius, 144 So. 3d 319 (Ala. 2013). See also In re State
ex rel. M.C., 94 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Colo. App. 2004) ("[T]he UCCJEA also
seeks to eliminate the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction over custody
disputes by more than one state."); In re Interests of A.A.-F., 310 Kan.
125, 136, 444 P.3d 938, 948 (2019) ("The UCCJEA's drafters prioritized
the jurisdictional grounds to help assure that only one state at a time
exercises jurisdiction, thus avoiding conflicting orders."); Nevares v.
Adoptive Couple, 384 P.3d 213, 217 (Utah 2016) ("[T]he UCCJEA
promotes a framework wherein a single state is vested with jurisdiction
to make child custody determinations and a uniform set of rules to
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determine which state is best positioned to adjudicate custody
disputes."); In re Custody of A.C., 165 Wash. 2d 568, 574, 200 P.3d 689,
691 (2009) ("The UCCJEA arose out of a conference of states in an
attempt to deal with the problems of competing jurisdictions [issuing]
conflicting interstate child custody orders, forum shopping, and the
drawn out and complex child custody legal proceedings often encountered
by parties where multiple states are involved. ... Most states have
adopted the UCCJEA in order to reduce conflicting orders regarding
custody and placement of children." (citations omitted; footnote omitted));
In re NC, 294 P.3d 866, 872 (Wyo. 2013) ("The dominant objective of the
[UCCJEA] is 'to eliminate the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction over
custody [determinations]' " and to provide a uniform set of rules to
determine which state is best positioned to adjudicate custody disputes.).
Considering the facts and circumstances in this case, especially the
juvenile court's communication with the Florida court and the purpose of
the UCCJEA, I believe the juvenile court had jurisdiction to address the
child's dependency; therefore, I respectfully dissent.