T.S. v. D.K.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 30, 2025
• Docket: A-1362-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1362-23

T.S.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

D.K.,

Defendant-Respondent.

Submitted March 4, 2025 – Decided May 30, 2025

Before Judges Perez Friscia and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FM-07-0770-15.

T.S., appellant pro se.

D.K., respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM Plaintiff T.S.1 appeals from a Family Part order entered after a two day

hearing granting defendant D.K.'s motion to compel plaintiff to reimburse her

for one-half of the educational and medical expenses for their daughter, M.S.

(Mary), denying plaintiff's application for fifty percent parenting time with

Mary, and further denying his application to compel Mary to attend reunification

therapy. We affirm.

I.

In 2015, the parties were divorced by a Dual Final Judgment of Divorce

which incorporated a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). In 2017, the parties

modified the MSA by a consent order, which incorporated a Modification

Agreement (MA). The MA stated in pertinent part that "the parties shall share

the cost of the children's extra-curricular expenses in proportion to their pro rata

share of income." The MA stated the parties share of income to be fifty percent

each. The MA further defined extracurricular activities as "academic, sports,

music, religious and other activities relating to the children." In a 2020 consent

order the parties agreed to share equally in the children's unreimbursed medical

and extracurricular expenses.

1 We use initials and pseudonyms for the parties and child to protect the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(1) and (13). A-1362-23 2 In September 2022, defendant moved to enforce plaintiff's child support

obligation, to compel him to pay accrued child support arrears, and to reimburse

her for medical and educational related costs she incurred in 2022 for Mary.

Plaintiff filed a cross-motion seeking over twenty points of relief. In relevant

part concerning this appeal, he moved to compel Mary to attend reunification

therapy and for the court to grant him fifty percent of the available parenting

time with her.

The trial court heard argument on December 16, 2022. The court entered

an interim order on December 23. In its order, the court set out discovery

provisions, granted defendant's motion enforcing child support, ordered plaintiff

to pay defendant $2,283.22 in child support arrears within twenty days, denied

plaintiff's application to pay child support directly to the children, temporarily

ordered plaintiff and Mary to engage in family counseling, and reserved the

remaining issues for a plenary hearing on May 16, 2023. The trial court further

ordered defendant to provide plaintiff with a copy of all medical bills and

explanation of benefits (EOB) 2 forms within fifteen days, to exchange settlement

proposals, and participate in mandatory mediation prior to the hearing.

2 An Explanation of Benefits (EOB) is a document sent by a health insurance company to a customer after a medical claim has been processed.

A-1362-23 3 The parties were unable to resolve any of the contested issues through

mediation. On May 16 and July 18, the trial court convened a plenary hearing

Both parties were self-represented, and both testified. Concerning Mary's

medical expenses, defendant testified that pursuant to the court's order of

December 16, 2022, she provided plaintiff with both the medical bills and the

EOBs for 2022 totaling $1,364 and plaintiff's fifty-percent share equaling $682.

Defendant submitted an exhibit in evidence 3 which listed the medical bills

plaintiff incurred for Mary and the outstanding amount owed by plaintiff.

As to unreimbursed educational expenses, defendant testified she emailed

plaintiff on July 25, 2022 regarding the need to hire a financial aid consultant to

assist with obtaining maximum financial aid for Mary's college costs. Defendant

testified she exchanged emails with plaintiff regarding the college expense and

financial aid issues. She testified she provided plaintiff with the proofs showing

expenses totaling $1,650 and requested plaintiff to pay $825 for his one-half

share. She testified in the email exchange, she asked plaintiff whether he agreed

to hire a financial aid consultant. He responded that he agreed. Thereafter,

CMS.gov/medical-bill-rights/help/guides/explanation-of-benefits (last visited May 21, 2025). 3 Defendant did not include this exhibit in her appendix. A-1362-23 4 defendant hired a consultant to assist their daughter with the financial aid

applications.

Regarding Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) tutoring costs, defendant

testified she notified plaintiff about Mary's need for a tutor prior to hiring the

tutor. Defendant testified plaintiff initially failed to respond to her request but

after texting him three times and informing him she had to make a decision

concerning the hiring of a tutor, plaintiff responded with the message "so make

it." Plaintiff testified that he agreed Mary should engage in tutoring, but he had

no idea "from where or who because I have not been involved in the process."

In rebuttal, defendant testified that she kept plaintiff involved in the process

every step of the way, copying him on all emails exchanged with the tutor

including the time Mary spent with the tutor and the total costs incurred.

Defendant testified that the total cost of the tutoring was $1,875 with plaintiff's

one-half share being $937.50.

Regarding the costs for a college counselor, defendant testified that she

discussed the need for a college prep course with plaintiff and informed him of

her discussions with the counselor. She testified the cost of the college

counselor was $2,500, with plaintiff's one-half share totaling $1,250.

A-1362-23 5 Regarding the costs of college applications, defendant testified she

forwarded plaintiff the email exchanges with the college counselor which listed

the colleges Mary should apply to. Plaintiff's response to the emails was

"[o]kay. Looks good." Defendant testified that the total costs of the college

applications were $865 with plaintiff's one-half share being $432.50.

Defendant stated the total reimbursements she was requesting for all of

Mary's costs were $6,980. This total included unreimbursed medical expenses,

costs for the financial aid consultant, SAT tutor, college counselor and college

application fees. Defendant testified that plaintiff's one-half share was $3,445.

In response, plaintiff generally denied that he agreed to pay these costs. He

primarily asserted he never participated in the decision-making process

concerning the expenses and therefore should not be responsible to reimburse

defendant.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered the following:

1. Plaintiff shall pay [d]efendant the sum of $3[,]445 for reimbursement of the unreimbursed medical expenses, SAT [t]utoring, [c]ollege [a]pplication [f]ees, [f]inancial [c]onsultant and [c]ollege [c]ounselor [f]ees within [fifteen] days. If [p]laintiff fails to make payment as required, [d]efendant may forward a [c]ertification to the [c]ourt and a copy to [p]laintiff that funds were not reimbursed, and the court may issue a bench warrant.

A-1362-23 6 2. Defendant's application for contribution for the costs of driving school is denied.

3. Plaintiff's application for [fifty percent] parenting time and for [Mary] to attend reunification therapy is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff shall attend individual counseling to address his personal issues for a period of at least [six] months. Thereafter, [p]laintiff may make an application for [Mary] to attend reunification therapy and the court will decide the matter.

In its accompanying written decision, the court referenced the parties

MSA and the specific provision, which states "the parties shall share the cost of

the children's extra-curricular expenses in proportion to their pro rata share of

income." The court added that the parties later agreed by way of the consent

order of December 7, 2020 that the pro rata share was fifty percent each.

The trial court found on December 16, 2022, it had previously ordered

that

defendant shall provide a copy of each medical statement to [p]laintiff along with the [EOB] within fifteen [] days of the [o]rder. Plaintiff shall provide payment for all of the expenses he agrees with within ten [] days thereafter. Any disagreements shall be heard at the time of the [p]lenary [h]earing.

The court found based on the testimony of the parties, it's review of the emails

exchanged and its interview with Mary, that it was clear defendant had kept

A-1362-23 7 plaintiff informed and involved in all stages of the process and "even assisted at

times, with the handling of his relationship with [Mary]."

Concerning the expenses defendant was seeking reimbursement, the court

found "[d]efendant continued to advise [p]laintiff that he could reach out to any

expert selected for any information he needed. Plaintiff did not reach out to

anyone, but he was kept informed each step of the way with the exception of the

cost for driving school." The court stated in its decision "[w]hat was clear was

that [p]laintiff wanted to be involved however, he made sure his responses never

include that he would pay for anything." The court further found:

When asked about his consent to hire the [f]inancial [a]id [c]onsultant, [d]efendant asked him if he had any issue with hiring them and he responded "no". When asked about the SAT [t]utor, he said "[Mary] should get tutoring"[.] He told [d]efendant to "make" the decision. Plaintiff was invited to the [d]efendant's home on the night the [c]ollege [c]ounselor was going over to talk to [d]efendant and he failed to attend. When he was asked about the college application selection, he responded "ok looks good"[.] All of his responses clearly show[] that the [p]laintiff was kept advised and certainly consented to the expenditures.

The court granted defendant's motion compelling plaintiff to reimburse

her for fifty percent of the unreimbursed medical expenses and educational costs

for Mary except for the driving school class costs she had requested. It ordered

plaintiff to reimburse defendant $3,445.

A-1362-23 8 Thereafter, the court denied plaintiff's cross-motion requesting to "spend

[fifty percent] of the time with him for parenting time." The court found, after

the interview with Mary, it was clear that she chose not to exercise parenting

time with plaintiff because of "his uncontrollable temper, his continued need to

try to persuade her to dislike her mother and the fact that his comments to her

are very hurtful are the primary reasons for their damaged relationship ."

The court conditionally granted plaintiff's request for reunification

therapy but required him to "first attend to his own individual matters before

any reunification therapy would be fruitful." The court ordered plaintiff to

attend individual counseling for a period of "at least [six] months . . . then file

an application with the court for reunification therapy with [Mary]."

On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred: (1) when it "ignore[d]" the

"ordered reunification therapy"; (2) by allowing all exhibits to be provided to

plaintiff the morning of the hearing; (3) by failing to consider the parties

financial circumstances when ruling on the defendant's application for

reimbursement; (4) in showing bias by considering text messages from before

the divorce proceedings twelve years ago; (5) by erroneously quoting him

regarding vacations without permitting him to explain the quotes at the plenary

hearing; (6) by ignoring his concern for Mary's underage drinking, tattoos and

A-1362-23 9 inappropriate parenting; and (7) in showing bias with regard to the college

counselor.

II.

Family courts maintain "special jurisdiction and expertise in family

matters," so "appellate courts should accord deference to family court fact-

finding." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "Discretionary

determinations, supported by the record, are examined to discern whether an

abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546,

564 (App. Div. 2017).

Our standard of review is that we will not disturb a trial judge's factual

findings when they are "supported by adequate, substantial and credible

evidence." Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974). We only "disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial

judge [when] we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to

offend the interests of justice." Ibid. (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen,

78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). However, "all legal issues are

reviewed de novo." Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis, 430

N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

A-1362-23 10 Because matrimonial and property settlement agreements are governed by

basic contract principles, courts should discern and implement the parties '

intentions. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013). "It is not the function of the

court to rewrite or revise an agreement when the intent of the parties is clear."

Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (citing J.B., 215 N.J. at 326).

"Accordingly, [MSAs] should be enforced so long as they are consensual,

voluntary, conscionable, and not the result of fraud or overreaching." Satz v.

Satz, 476 N.J. Super. 536, 551 (App. Div. 2023).

A.

Plaintiff's Application for Fifty Percent Parenting Time and Reunification Therapy

Initially, we address plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred by

denying his application for "fifty percent" of the parenting time with Mary and

denying his request to enforce reunification therapy.

In custody [and parenting time] cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration is the best interests of the children. . . . The court must focus on the "safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare" of the children. Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956). See also P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 215 (App. Div. 1999) ("In issues of custody and visitation '[t]he question is always what is in the best interests of the children, no matter what the parties have agreed to.'") . . . Custody issues are resolved using a

A-1362-23 11 best interests analysis that gives weight to the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).

[Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) (citations omitted).]

We conclude the court did not err in denying plaintiff's requests for fifty

percent parenting time with Mary and to compel her to participate in

reunification therapy. The court's reasoning was based on credible and

substantial evidence in the record to support its decision, including information

obtained from Mary's in camera interview. The court's finding that plaintiff has

an uncontrollable temper, his continued need to try to persuade Mary to dislike

defendant, and his hurtful comments to Mary through his texts and

communications supports its denial of plaintiff's fifty percent parenting time

request. We also note, on or about the date Mary was interviewed and at the

time of the court's decision, she had reached the age of eighteen, and her position

that she did not desire to have fifty percent parenting time with plaintiff was

required to be considered by the court as part of its parenting time analysis. See

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) (setting forth a "best interests" standard for custody

determinations including the consideration of the preference of the child when

of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision).

A-1362-23 12 We conclude the court’s decision to deny parenting time, as it was not in Mary’s

best interests, was amply supported by the record and not an abuse of discretion .

The court also relied on these same factual findings to deny plaintiff's

request for reunification therapy and conditionally denied this relief based on

plaintiff engaging in and completing his own individual counseling prior to any

reunification therapy taking place. We find no error in this determination as

there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court's finding. In

addition, upon plaintiff's satisfactory completion of individual therapy, he would

be permitted to re-apply for reunification therapy with Mary.

B.

Defendant's Challenge to the Order Requiring Plaintiff to Reimburse Defendant for Medical and Educational Expenses

We now turn to plaintiff's argument contending the trial court erred by

ordering him to reimburse defendant one-half of Mary's medical and educational

expenses. Plaintiff argues the court erred by not considering each parties'

current financial circumstances before ordering him to reimburse defendant one-

half of the medical and educational costs. Related to this point on appeal, we

note the following colloquy occurred at the end of the hearing between the court

and plaintiff regarding the proportions of costs each party would pay:

A-1362-23 13 THE COURT: You told me it wasn't an issue of not being able to afford the expense.

PLAINTIFF: Right, these specific expenses, yes.

THE COURT: These specific–expenses.

PLAINTIFF: Okay . . . I think both of us were confused in terms of college or not.

We conclude plaintiff waived his argument that the trial court erred by not

considering the parties current financial circumstances before ordering him to

pay a one-half proportion of the medical and educational expenses claimed by

defendant. At the hearing, plaintiff agreed he could afford to pay one-half of

the costs requested by defendant but asserted because he did not participate or

have any input in the decision to incur the costs he should not be required to

reimburse defendant any amount. Since the court's finding that plaintiff was

notified and agreed to pay one-half the costs was supported by sufficient

evidence in the record including defendant's testimony and the documents she

moved into evidence, we conclude the court did not err by requiring plaintiff to

reimburse defendant one-half of the medical and educational expenses. In

addition, the record clearly exhibits plaintiff was informed by the court that it

was only ruling on defendant's motion compelling him to reimburse one-half of

the medical and educational costs already paid by her, not for future college

A-1362-23 14 costs. Therefore, we discern no error in the trial court's determination requiring

the parties to pay one-half of Mary's expenses.

C.

Plaintiff's Remaining Contentions on Appeal that the Court's Bias Towards Him and Its Evidentiary Rulings were Errors that Require Reversal

"[J]udges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be

perceived as partial." DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 514 (2008) (emphasis

omitted). "[B]ias is not established by the fact that a litigant is disappointed in

a court's ruling on an issue." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 186 (1997). "[T]he

belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable." Id. at

279. Here, we perceive no bias by the trial court against plaintiff by considering

text messages exchanged between the parties twelve years prior to the hearing

and by considering evidence related to defendant's notice to him concerning the

college counselor. Those issues were relevant to the plaintiff's request for one-

half of the parenting time with Mary and the defendant's motion for

reimbursement from him. Therefore, the court's consideration of this evidence

was appropriate and clearly was not biased.

Based on our careful review of the record, we further conclude that the

court treated the parties equally concerning the directives issued to them during

A-1362-23 15 the hearing, in its application of the rules of evidence and in its general demeanor

toward both. We perceive no partiality or bias towards either party by the court.

Therefore, we determine plaintiff's contentions that the trial court exhibited bias

towards him lack merit.

Defendant also contends that the court erroneously quoted his testimony

related to vacations without permitting him to explain the quotes at the plenary

hearing and ignored his concern for Mary's underage drinking, tattoos and

inappropriate parenting which errors require reversal. Those contentions lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

We add only that our standard of review of a trial court's evidentiary rulings is

for abuse of discretion. Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008). We conclude

the trial court's determinations regarding these fact-sensitive issues were not an

abuse of discretion. The issue of primary custody was not in dispute and there

was limited, if any, relevance to this evidence concerning the parenting time and

reunification therapy issues plaintiff raised in his cross-motion. We further

conclude our prior determination upholding the court's finding that plaintiff

agreed that he could afford to pay one-half of the expenses makes his financial

ability to take vacations irrelevant to our review on appeal.

Affirmed.

A-1362-23 16