TrustLabs, Inc. v. An

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 23, 2021
• Docket: 3:21-cv-02606
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 TRUSTLABS, INC., Case No. 21-cv-02606-CRB

9 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 10 v. DISMISS OR QUASH

11 DANIEL JAIYONG AN, 12 Defendant.

13 Plaintiff TrustLabs, Inc. is suing Defendant Daniel Jaiyong An. TrustLabs 14 attempted to serve Jaiyong by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with 15 Jaiyong’s mother at Jaiyong’s parents’ home in Frisco, Texas. See Certificate of Serv. 16 (Dkt. 9) at 1. Jaiyong now moves to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction or to 17 quash TrustLabs’ service of the summons and complaint. See Mot. to Quash (Dkt. 13) at 18 6. The Court denies his motion. 19 In June 2020, while employed as CEO and President of TrustLabs, Jaiyong sent a 20 text message to Tom Shields, who was not working at TrustLabs but would later become 21 Chairman of TrustLabs’ Board of Directors. Jaiyong Supp. Decl. (Dkt. 17 at 11) ¶ 2; Obj. 22 to Reply at 2.1 The message stated: “i’m [in] [F]risco visiting parents and then [T]aiwan 23 when borders open up[.]” Id.; Reply (Dkt. 17) Ex. A. Later that month, Jaiyong changed 24 his home address to 6897 Parker Creek Place, Frisco, Texas 75035—his parents’ 25 address—in “Justworks,” a “human resources support system that TrustLabs uses to 26

27 1 According to TrustLabs, Shields was neither a TrustLabs employee nor a TrustLabs Board 1 manage all payroll-related and employee benefit functions.” Arpilleda Decl. (Dkt. 15-3) 2 ¶ 4. Jaiyong then emailed TrustLabs’ “Head of People” Anna Arpilleda, stating “hey anna 3 changed my address to texas in justworks” and asking whether “we’re good from a CA tax 4 perspective.” Arpilleda Decl. ¶ 7; Arpilleda Decl. Ex. B. Jaiyong’s June 30, 2020 paystub 5 displayed the Texas address as Jaiyong’s home address. Arpilleda Decl. ¶ 8; Arpilleda 6 Decl. Ex. C. 7 In July 2020, TrustLabs asked Jaiyong to resign as CEO and President. Compl. ¶ 1. 8 According to TrustLabs, Jaiyong responded by deleting the company’s internal Slack 9 messaging system. Id. ¶ 16–17. TrustLabs sent Jaiyong a notice of termination and 10 demanded that he return his TrustLabs laptop, tablet, and iPhone. Id. ¶ 22. Jaiyong mailed 11 the items to TrustLabs from the Texas address. See Moore Decl. (Dkt. 15-2) ¶ 3; Moore 12 Decl. Ex. A. In December 2020, Jaiyong posted “Moved to Taipei, Taiwan” on his 13 Facebook account. See Reply Ex. B. Jaiyong’s Facebook profile is “linked” to the 14 profiles of at least five people who are “associated with and/or employees of TrustLabs,” 15 including Shields. Jaiyong Supp. Decl. ¶ 4. Jaiyong received his 2020 W-2 tax form at the 16 Texas address. See Arpilleda Decl. ¶ 5; Arpilleda Decl. Ex. D. 17 In April 2021, TrustLabs sued Jaiyong, asserting claims under the Computer Fraud 18 and Abuse Act and the Stored Communications Act. See Compl. ¶ 6. On April 23, 2021, 19 TrustLabs filed its certificate of service, which indicates that a copy of the summons and 20 Complaint was left at the Texas address with Jaiyong’s mother. See Certificate of Serv. at 21 1. TrustLabs also mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to Jaiyong at the same 22 Texas address. Id. In May 2021, Jaiyong moved to quash for improper service of 23 summons. See Mot. to Quash. 24 Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs service of an individual 25 within a judicial district of the United States. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). As relevant here, 26 such an individual may be served by: 27 (1) following state law for serving a summons . . .; or (2) doing any of the following: 1

2 (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; [or] 3 (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s 4 dwelling or usual place of abode with someone 5 of suitable age and discretion who resides there . . . . 6 Id. 7 “Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as a party 8 receives sufficient notice of the complaint.” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat 9 Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988). Service of process is 10 sufficient if it is “reasonably calculated” to apprise the defendant of the pendency of the 11 action. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 12 Whether a place is a person’s “dwelling or usual place of abode” for purposes of 13 Rule 4(e)(2)(B) is a “highly fact-specific” inquiry. Craigslist, Inc. v. Hubert, 278 F.R.D. 14 510, 515 (N.D. Cal. 2011). A person may have more than one “dwelling or usually place 15 of abode,” but each must bear “sufficient indicia of permanence.” Id. (quoting Stars’ 16 Desert Inn Hotel & Country Club, Inc. v. Hwang, 105 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1997); Nat’l 17 Dev. Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 930 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1991)). Some examples 18 demonstrate how these rules work in practice. On the one hand, “a defendant who has 19 repeatedly represented to . . . the plaintiff that one residence is his place of usual abode 20 may be estopped from later contesting that said residence was the proper location for 21 service of process.” Id. And when a defendant continues to receive mail at the address, 22 lists the address on a vehicle registration, and uses the address on financial records, that is 23 enough to make the address the defendant’s usual place of abode. See id. at 516. By 24 contrast, mere receipt of a package at an address is insufficient to establish that the address 25 is the defendant’s usual place of abode. See Agricola ABC, S.A. de C.V. v. Chiquita Fresh 26 North America, LLC., No. 10cv772-IEG(NLS), 2010 WL 4809641, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27 19, 2010). 1 Jaiyong argues that he was not properly served because he had moved to Taiwan in 2 December 2020, such that his parents’ home in Texas was not his usual place of abode. 3 See Mot. to Quash, at 3, 5. He argues that TrustLabs should have been aware that the 4 Texas address was not his usual place of abode based on Jaiyong’s text message and 5 Facebook post. See Reply at 5.2 TrustLabs argues that the Texas address was Jaiyong’s 6 usual place of abode based on Jaiyong’s changed address in JustWorks, his mailings from 7 the Texas address, and his receipt of the W-2 form at the Texas address. See Opp’n at 5. 8 TrustLabs also argues that Jaiyong’s text message and Facebook post are inadmissible 9 because they are irrelevant hearsay and were first submitted with Jaiyong’s reply brief. 10 See Obj. to Reply. 11 The Court concludes that Jaiyong was properly served. Here, the Texas address 12 bore “sufficient indicia of permanence” to constitute Jaiyong’s usual place of abode. 13 Craigslist, 278 F.R.D. at 515. Jaiyong changed his address in JustWorks to the Texas 14 address in June 2020, sent a package from the Texas address to TrustLabs in July 2020, 15 and received mail from TrustLabs at the Texas address. See Opp’n at 5. Although 16 TrustLabs served Jaiyong roughly ten months after he took affirmative steps representing 17 that the Texas address was his usual place of abode , Jaiyong also received his 2020 W-2 18 tax form at the Texas address, implying that the Texas address was still his usual place of 19 abode. In any event, the relatively brief lapse of time between Jaiyong’s conduct and 20 service of process is not enough to defeat the inference that the Texas address was his 21 usual place of abode. Jaiyong never directly informed anyone at TrustLabs that he was no 22 longer residing at the Texas address. At a minimum, serving Jaiyong at the Texas address 23 was reasonably calculated to apprise Jaiyong of this lawsuit and to give Jaiyong sufficient 24

25 2 Jaiyong also argues that TrustLabs cannot invoke state law for serving a summons, see Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 4(e)(1), because TrustLabs did not exercise reasonable diligence as required under California law, see Reply at 4. The Court need not address California law for serving a summons 27 because the Court concludes that service was proper under Rule 4(e)(2)(B). And the Court need 1 notice of the complaint. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Direct Mail Specialists, 840 F.2d at 2 || 688.7 3 Assuming that Jatyong’s text message and Facebook post are admissible, they do 4 || not change the Court’s conclusions. Jaryong’s text message “yea 1’m [in] [F]risco visiting 5 || parents and then [T]aiwan when borders open up” did not clearly indicate anything. It 6 || could have meant that Jatyong was merely planning a trip to Tatwan. As for the December 7 || 2020 Facebook post, Jaiyong argues only that five people associated with TrustLabs, 8 || including Shields, could have seen the post. See Reply at 2. It remains a mystery what 9 || roles the other four people had at TrustLabs, when they assumed those roles, when Shields 10 || assumed his role, and whether TrustLabs employees actually saw or were likely to see 11 || Jaiyong’s post.* Further, because a person can have two or more usual places of abode, «3 12 || see Stars’ Desert Inn Hotel, 105 F.3d at 524, the Court finds that Jatyong’s Facebook post

& 13 || did not clearly signal that the Texas address was no longer one of his usual places of

14 |} abode. Oo 2 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Jaryong’s motion to quash. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. iE

2 17 Dated: July 23, 2021 CHARLES R. BREYER Z 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 2) 3 Actual notice is not dispositive, but the Court notes that Jaryong acknowledges that he received 26 || actual notice of the lawsuit. See Reply at 8. * TrustLabs states that Shields did not become Chairman of the Board until sometime after Jaiyong 77 || sent the text message. Obj. to Reply at 2. Jaiyong states that Shields is “now” Chairman of TrustLabs’ Board of Directors. Reply at 1. Regardless, the Court concludes that the Facebook 4g || post does not overcome other evidence indicating that the Texas address was one of Jaiyong’s usual places of abode at the time of service.