Trustees of Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson

63 Mass. 544
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1852
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 63 Mass. 544 (Trustees of Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trustees of Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, 63 Mass. 544 (Mass. 1852).

Opinion

Shaw, C. J.

This was one of several real actions, depending on the same facts and principles ; and the parties to the others have agreed to abide by the decision in this.

The case comes before the court upon a report of the chief justice, before whom the cause was brought to trial at Northampton.. The evidence being given in, by agreement of parties, the case was taken from the jury without a verdict, to be submitted to the whole court upon the evidence to be reported. It was further agreed, that upon the grounds to be stated by the court, one or more commissioners should be appointed, to make surveys, draw a plan, and make a division of the land, conformably to the principles announced by the court, and under such direction as they might give, and report thereon to the court; and when the report should' be accepted, judgment in this and the other cases to be rendered accordingly.

The land in controversy is newly-made land, formed in what was formerly the bed of Connecticut Eiver, lying between the towns of Hatfield and Hadley. It has been gradually formed, in consequence of a change in the bed of the river, in the manner hereafter stated. The demandants, trustees of an incorporated academy, are owners of a tract of land in Hadley, on the east side of Connecticut Eiver, known as the school meadow land, bounded formerly by a curved line projecting considerably into the river. As long ago as 1805 or 1806, the water, in high freshets, began to find its way across the school meadow land. This increased from year to year, until the current was formed that way; and in 1825 a great portion, if not the main body of the stream, passed that way, thus taking a more direct line across, instead of following the former bend of the river. This continued to increase until it became the main channel, and the current through the old passage ceased. The new channel, thus formed, cut off and insulated the most projecting part of the school meadow land; the part, thus left, remained unchanged in position, and became an island, forming the right bank of the new stream as far as it extended.

In the mean time land began to form in various places in the old bed of the river thus deserted by the current, between [546]*546the school meadow lands, thus insulated, on the east side, and the Hatfield shore on the west. The old channel, or deepest part of the rive»’ ^efore the change, was not in the middle of the river, buc nearest the Hatfield shore.

There was some conflicting evidence as to the place at which the alluvial land began to form; it being contended by the demandants that it began to form on the upper part of the island, and extended over towards and near the Hatfield shore. On the contrary, it was contended by the tenant that it began to' form near the Hatfield shore, and extended thence into the river. But this was considered immaterial, the chief justice being of opinioh and proposing to instruct the jury, that the demandants, as riparian proprietors, could not claim any of the land in controversy, being the land newly formed between the island and Hatfield shore, more northerly, that is higher up river, than their land extended before the formation of the land in controversy, and if it had so extended since the change in the course of the river, that fact might be inquired into by the commissioners to be appointed.

Several rulings and proposed instructions to the jury are specified in the report, which it is not necessary here to state, because they were substantially adopted, and are restated in the opinion of the full court.

The tendency of the evidence was, to show that in all that part of the river bed, which had become stagnant by the. change of current, sediment began to settle and accumulate, shoals and islets arose, detached, at first, but gradually uniting with each other; when above water, vegetation came in, and ultimately land was formed, which was available for use and valuable.

The question is, whose property are the lands thus newiy formed, and upon what legal principles shall the right of property in them be ascertained ?

It appears to be well settled by the law, both of this country and of England, and founded on the rule of the civil law, that on rivers not navigable, the right of the proprietors of the land on each side extends to the thread of the river, or middle [547]*547line of the stream. This is taken to be the law in this commonwealth, subject to certain rights of the public to use the water for boating and rafting, and subject also to regulations in regard to fisheries. These modifications or exceptions are not applicable to the present question.

This question arises respecting the right of the riparian proprietors to certain lands formed in the bed of Connecticut River, between Hadley and Hatfield. This land, it appears by the case, was formed on a part of the soil which formerly constituted the deep bed and channel of the river, where the main current of water formerly flowed, in consequence of the river having changed its course and taken a new channel on the Hadley side. The effect of this has been, that the main body of the water has for some years flowed in a new channel, by means of which the water on the old bed of the river became stagnant, deposits of earth and sand were formed in various parts of it, which have gradually risen above the surface and united with each other so as to become valuable land. The question is, whose is this land ?

It has been repeatedly settled, both in this state and in Connecticut, that the Connecticut River, though valuable for the purposes of boating and rafting, yet, so far as riparian proprietorship is concerned, is considered a river not navigable, as that term is used in the common law. Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481; Bardwell v. Ames, 22 Pick. 333.

The general rule, as a rule of the common law of England, was long since laid down as unquestionable by Lord Holt, who says, in the case of Rex v. Wharton, Holt, 499, that a river, of common right, belongs to the proprietors of the land between which it runs, to each that part nearest his land. This has been frequently, if not uniformly, adopted as the established rule. Bac. Ab. tit. Prerogative; Sir John Davies’s R. 155. And the same rule has been repeatedly declared and adjudged in this commonwealth. It is derived mainly from the rule, that the riparian proprietor is owner of the soil under the water, and by the general law of property becomes entitled as of right to all accessions.

The general rule is recognized and established in thi, [548]*548commonwealth, in the leading case of Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 4 Pick. 268. It is a case which goes far to settle principles which must govern the present. It recognizes the rule of the common law, that the property in the soil of rivers not navigable, subject to public easements, belongs to those whose lands border upon them; and from this right of property in the soil in the bed of the river the court deduce the right of property in an island, which gradually arises above the surface and becomes valuable for use as land. Assuming the thread of the river, as it was immediately before such island made its appearance, this rule assigns the whole island, or bare ground formed in the bed of the river, if it be wholly on one side of the thread of the river, to the owner on that side ; but if it be so situated that it is partly on one side and partly on the other of the thread of the river, it shall be divided by such line, and held in severalty by the adjacent proprietors.

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Bluebook (online)
63 Mass. 544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trustees-of-hopkins-academy-v-dickinson-mass-1852.