Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher

10 Abb. N. Cas. 235
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 15, 1882
StatusPublished

This text of 10 Abb. N. Cas. 235 (Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 10 Abb. N. Cas. 235 (N.Y. 1882).

Opinion

Danforth, J.

The validity and binding obligation of the covenant cannot be questioned by the defendant (70 N. Y. 440). Moreover, it appears that he bought with notice, not only of the agreement, but of this action. He, therefore, could not take the property without performing the obligation attached to it, and must be deemed to have taken it at his own peril, to the extent of such judgment as might be rendered in the action. It is claimed in his behalf that the business charged in the complaint to have been carried on, does not come within the prohibition of the covenant. This question was not raised upon the former trial, and of coarse there is nothing in our decision (70 N. Y. supra) to prevent its litigation upon the trial then ordered and now under review’.

[238]*238The words are very plain ; they include “any kind of manufactory, trade or business whatsoever,” upon the premises. The complaint shows their occupation in part by “a real estate and insurance broker or agent,” and in part by “sign and fresco painters,” while the finding of the trial judge—and this is somewhat more important—shows that “ the business of a tailor or milliner, of a newspaper agent, express carriers, a tobacconist, as well as that of an insurance agent,” were carried on by permission of the defendant at the time of the trial.

It would be a useless waste of time to argue that these vocations for employment or profit—whether described in the complaint, or found by the court— have no relation to the exclusive use to which the premises were set apart. In such a suit as this, the relief which the court can give must depend upon the condition of things at the time of the trial. We have no doubt that the conclusion of the trial judge was right upon the point presented, and agree with him that these several trades or businesses were violations, not only of the spirit, but also of the letter of the covenant.

Now, having before us a covenant binding the defendant, and his breach of it, if there is nothing more, then the usual result must follow, viz. : an injunction to keep within the terms of the agreement; for the case would come under the rule laid down in Tipping v. Eckersley (2 K. & J. 264, 270), thus: “If the construction of the instrument be clear and the breach clear, then it is not a question of damage, but the mere circumstance of a breach of covenant affords sufficient ground for the court to interfere by injunction.” Indeed, this has in substance been recognized in the decision before made by us (70 N. Y. supra). It was then, however, suggested that another trial might disclose objections not before us, and it is now [239]*239claimed by the appellant, that there has been such an entire change in the character of the neighborhood of the premises as to defeat the object and purpose of the agreement, and that it would be inequitable to deprive the defendant of the privilege of conforming his property to that character, so that he could use it to his greater advantage, and in no respect to the detriment of the plaintiff.

The agreement before us recites that the object which the parties to the covenant had in view was “to provide for the better improvement of the lands, and to secure their permanent value.” It certainly is not the doctrine of courts of equity to enforce by its peculiar mandate every contract, in all cases, even where specific execution is found to be its legal intention and effect. It gives or withholds such decree according to its discretion, in view of the circumstances of the case, and the plaintiff’s prayer for relief is not answered where, under the circumstances, the relief he seeks would be inequitable (Peters v. Delaplaine, 49 N. Y. 362; Margraf v. Muir, 57 Id. 155; Mathews v. Terwilliger, 3 Barb. 50; Radcliffe v. Warrington, 12 Ves. 331).

If for any reason, therefore, not referable to the defendant, an enforcement of the covenant would defeat either of the ends contemplated by the parties, a court of equity might well refuse to interfere, or if in fact the condition of the property by which the premises are surrounded has been so altered “that the terms and restrictions ” of the covenant are no longer applicable to the existing state of things (1 Story Eq. Jur. 10 ed. § 750). And so, although the contract was fair and just when made, the interference of the court should be denied, if subsequent events have made performance by the defendant so onerous that its enforcement would impose great hardships upon him, and cause little or no benefit to the plaintiff (Willard v. [240]*240Taylor, 8 Wall. 557; Thompson v. Harcourt, 2 Brown Parl. Cas. 415; Davis v. Hone, 2 Schoales & Lef. 341; Bailey v. De Crespigny, 4 L. R., Q. B. 180; Clarke v. Rochester, L. & N. F. R. R. Co., 18 Barb. 350).

There is, no doubt, difficulty in embodying these principles in any general rule applicable alike to all cases, but in any given instance a court can more easily determine whether it should interfere, or leave the plaintiff to his remedy at law.

In Clarke v. Rochester, L. & N. F. R. R. Co. (supra), there was a duty imposed by statute upon the defendant to construct a farm-crossing, and the plaintiff sued in equity for its performance. He succeeded at special term, but the general term dismissed his compla'nt, so far as it demanded equitable relief, yet allowed it to stand for assessment of damages. This result was reached, because the expense to the defendant in constructing the crossing “would much exceed the value of it to the plaintiff,” and so in the opinion of the court there was not only an absence of proof that the enforcement of the performance of the duty would be equitable, but it was affirmatively proved that it would be inequitable.

There the plaintiff’s case was within the statute (L. 1850, c. 140, §§ 50, 49, 44), requiring railroad corporations to erect farm-crossings for the use of the proprietors of land adjoining such railroad—and so the court held—but also that a refusal to perform did not, as of course, entitle the plaintiff to the interposition of a court of equity. In Willard v. Taylor, supra, the court refers to cases where a claim had, in the discretion of the court, been denied, because of some irregularity or unfairness in the terms of the contract, by reason of which injustice would have followed a specific performance, and to others which show that the same discretion is exercised when the contract is fair in its terms, if its enforcement, from subsequent events, [241]*241or even from collateral circumstances, would work the same result, or even hardship, to either of the parties.

In that case, although relief was granted, it was upon reasons which do not concern the one in hand, and it was also said that it was “ not sufficient to call forth the equitable interposition of the court; that the legal obligation under the contract to do the specific thing desired may be perfect, but it must also appear that the specific performance will work no hardships or injustice.” In Thompson v. Harcourt, supra, the irregularity of the bargain related exclusively to the time when performance was demanded. In Bailey v. De Crespigny, supra, we find a case whose facts come near to those before us.

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Related

Willard v. Tayloe
75 U.S. 557 (Supreme Court, 1870)
Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch
70 N.Y. 440 (New York Court of Appeals, 1877)
Peters v. . Delaplaine
49 N.Y. 362 (New York Court of Appeals, 1872)
Mathews v. Terwilliger
3 Barb. 50 (New York Supreme Court, 1848)
Clarke v. Rochester, Lockport & Niagara Falls Railroad
18 Barb. 350 (New York Supreme Court, 1854)

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Bluebook (online)
10 Abb. N. Cas. 235, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trustees-of-columbia-college-v-thacher-ny-1882.