Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co.

109 F. Supp. 3d 344, 2015 WL 3617098
District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided June 9, 2015·No. Civil Action Nos. 12-11935-PBS, 12-12326-PBS, 12-12330-PBS·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PATTI B. SARIS, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants move for summary judgment of invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 5,686,738 (the '738 patent), which relates to a two-step method of preparing gallium-nitride (GaN) films, a common component of blue-colored light-emitting diodes (LEDs). The invalidity dispute involves the “non-single crystalline buffer layer” limitation in all asserted patent claims. The Court has construed the claim limitation “non-single crystalline” to mean “polycrystalline, amorphous or a mixture of polycrystalline and amorphous.” Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd., 23 F.Supp.3d 50, 62 (D.Mass.2014). Defendants argue that all asserted claims1 of the '738 patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶1 and 2 on the grounds that (1) the patent’s specification has no written description of a “non-single crystalline” limitation; (2) the disclosure does not enable a person skilled in the art to ipake and use the invention; and (3) the term “non-single crystalline” is indefinite. The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying technology. See id. at 53-57. After hearing (Docket No. 1065), Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issued patents are presumed valid under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282. As [347]*347a result, the party challenging the validity of patent claims bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the patent is invalid. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed.Cir.2003).

In deciding a case on summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and makes all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir.2001). “When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the record evidence through the prism of the evidentiary standard of proof that would pertain at a trial on the merits.” Id. “Thus, a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Written Description of “Non-Single Crystalline” Limitation

Defendants argue that the '738 patent’s specification does not contain an adequate written description of a GaN buffer layer that is “amorphous, polycrystalline or a mixture of amorphous and polycrystalline.” Defendants contend that the specification does not expressly teach a non-single crystalline buffer layer for a completed device, pointing out that the specification never mentions the terms “non-single” or “polycrystalline.” While they acknowledge that the specification describes an “amorphous” buffer layer, Defendants contend that it mentions “amorphous” to describe an intermediate state that is crystallized during the second step: as such, there is no amorphous buffer in the completed device. Defendants submitted extrinsic evidence to support their core contention that the patent’s inventor, Dr. Theodore Moustakas, actually invented a “single crystalline” buffer layer, but added the modifier “non-single crystalline” on the suggestion of the Patent and Trademark Office examiner. Docket No. 881-3, Yoches Deck, Ex. 8C, Excerpts from File History of the '738 Patent, at 11-12. Defendants argue this was an opportunistic change unsupported by the specification.

A patent’s written description “must convey with reasonable clarity ... that, as of the filing date sought, [the patentee] was in possession of the invention, and demonstrate that by disclosure in the specification of the patent.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1122 (Fed.Cir.2008) (internal quotation omitted). Assessing such “possession as shown in the disclosure” requires “an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2010) (en banc). A “mere wish or plan” for obtaining the claimed invention is not an adequate written description. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed.Cir.1997). The sufficiency of a patent’s written description is ordinarily a question of fact, but “[a] patent also can be held invalid [as a matter of law] for failure to meet the written-description requirement based solely on the face of the patent specification.” Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2011).

The specification of the '738 patent states that the buffer layer is amorphous at “the low temperatures of the nucleation [348]*348step” and “can” be “crystallized” by heating. '738 patent at 2:40-42. In the description of the preferred embodiment, the patent states, “The buffer is the only part of the film which is highly defective.”2 '738 patent at 4:49-50. As defense counsel conceded, the term “crystallized” includes a polycrystalline buffer layer, so the specification does disclose a polycrystalline buffer. Dkt. No. 1029, Ex. 22, Piner Depo. 44:5-6, 45:9-12 (pointing out that there can also be a polycrystalline layer with amorphous regions). Plaintiffs emphasize the word “can” to argue that the specification does not require that the amorphous layer ever crystallize. The plain meaning of “can” is “to be able to; to have the ability, power or skill to” or “to have the possibility.” Random House Unabridged Dictionary 302 (2d ed.1993). Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Piner, a professor of Physics and Material Sciences, Engineering and Commercialization at Texas State University, testified that “the '738 patent discloses that the buffer layer may be purely amorphous.” Dkt. No. 945-2, Piner Decl. ¶ 35. Dr. Piner added that, in his own research, he has “directly observed a monocrystalline GaN growth layer ‘on’3 a 100% amorphous buffer layer.” Id. at ¶ 37. Consistent with this plain meaning, Piner testified that “can crystallize” does not mean “must be crystallized.” Id. at ¶ 35.

Despite this, Defendants argue that the patent specification does not adequately describe a completely amorphous buffer layer in the completed device.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co., 109 F. Supp. 3d 344, 2015 WL 3617098 (D. Mass. 2015).

109 F. Supp. 3d 344 (Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related