Truong v. Saul

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 8, 2022
• Docket: 3:20-cv-02289
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 MINH T., Case No.: 20-cv-2289-AGS

5 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE FOR 6 v. AN AWARD OF BENEFITS (ECF 15) 7 Kilolo KIJAKAZI, Commissioner of Social Security, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Both sides agree that the Administrative Law Judge mishandled claimant’s Social 11 Security disability benefits claim and that the case must be remanded. The only question is 12 whether the remand should be for further proceedings or an award of benefits. 13 BACKGROUND 14 In 2012, after working for almost two decades as an electronics assembler, plaintiff 15 Minh T. began suffering chronic pain and left her job, never to return. The Social Security 16 Administration found her disabled—and entitled to benefits—as of 2015. But Minh 17 contends she became disabled three years earlier. In fact, for nearly a decade Minh and the 18 Administration have been locked in legal combat over the disputed timeframe of 19 February 15, 2012, to May 11, 2015. 20 During those disputed years, Minh was admitted to the emergency room seven times, 21 treated by at least six doctors, and diagnosed with fibromyalgia. (See AR 325, 422, 458, 22 513, 779, 823, 895, 949, 986, 1040, 1080, 1103.) In 2013, Minh filed for Social Security 23 disability benefits with a February 2012 onset date. (AR 65-66.) Although her claim was 24 at first denied, the Ninth Circuit later remanded for reconsideration of intervening 25 caselaw—Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2017)—concerning the analysis of 26 fibromyalgia claims. (AR 1407.) The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that the 27 Administrative Law Judge “improperly evaluated [Minh’s] physicians’ opinions and 28 [Minh’s] . . . testimony in various ways.” (AR 1409.) 1 On remand, as both parties concede, the ALJ again improperly rejected evidence 2 from Minh and her doctors. (See ECF 15, at 2; ECF 19.) In this appeal, both sides request 3 remand and differ only as to the type. 4 DISCUSSION 5 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or to award benefits “is 6 within the discretion of the court.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1236 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 That discretion is guided by the three-step “credit-as-true” rule. See Treichler v. Comm’r 8 of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100-02 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the Court asks whether 9 the ALJ failed to offer “legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence.” Id. at 1100. If so, 10 the Court next inquires whether “the record has been fully developed,” whether there are 11 “outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 12 made,” and whether “further administrative proceedings would be useful.” Id. at 1101 13 (citations omitted). Finally, if no outstanding issues remain, the Court may find “the 14 relevant testimony credible as a matter of law” and award benefits, so long as the record as 15 a whole “leaves not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. 16 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). 17 There is no dispute about the first step of the analysis: all parties—and the Court— 18 agree that the ALJ failed to offer sufficient reasons to reject both Minh’s testimony and her 19 treating physicians’ opinions. (See ECF 15, at 2; ECF 19.) 20 At the second step, the parties part ways. The Commissioner generally argues that 21 the record is incomplete, yet she has not pointed to any specific record gap or ambiguity 22 that would benefit from more factual development.1 (See ECF 15, at 5.). The record is 23

24 25 1 The Commissioner generally argues that an ALJ needs to “reassess” the evidence, redo the “five-step sequential evaluation process,” and, if necessary, fix an “appropriate 26 onset date.” (ECF 15, at 5.) But these are standard procedural steps that apply to any case, 27 not matters that require further factual development. The Commissioner also contends that there are “multiple conflicting opinions” (id. at 6), but again does not specify any further 28 1 already massive: the 1,613 pages include treatment notes from over a dozen doctors during 2 nearly fifty medical visits from 2012 to 2015, medical opinions from several treating 3 physicians, Minh’s testimony, and various function reports from Minh and her daughter. 4 (See AR 1-1613.) So, the record is fully developed. See Revels, 874 F.3d at 668-69 (holding 5 that the record was “fully developed” when it included “treatment notes from over fifty 6 medical visits from 2010 to 2012,” “additional medical records stretching back to 2002,” 7 “functional capacity assessments from two treating providers and two non-examining 8 doctors,” claimant’s “testimony about the severity of her symptoms, two function reports 9 filled out by [claimant], and function reports filled out by her mother and her father”). 10 But if there were any doubts about the value of further proceedings, they should be 11 resolved in Minh’s favor. After all, the Social Security Administration has already had two 12 bites at the administrative-proceedings apple. Both parties agree that this is the second time 13 the Commissioner has committed the same error. One purpose of the credit-as-true rule is 14 to avoid “an unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let’s play again’ system of disability benefits 15 adjudication.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 16 So, we turn, finally, to whether the improperly rejected testimony would require a 17 disability finding if credited as true. Minh’s treating physician Dr. Nadine Sidrick opined 18 that Minh was only able to “stand or walk” for “fifteen to twenty minutes without taking a 19 break.” (AR 918.) What’s more, Dr. Sidrick concluded that Minh was limited to sitting for 20 two hours, standing for two hours, and walking for two hours out of an “entire 8-hour 21 [work]day,” meaning she had to take a break to lie down for the other two hours (25% of 22 the workday). (See AR 919.) The vocational expert at both hearings determined that such 23 severe limitations would mandate a disability finding. (See AR 60 (expert responding, 24 “No” when asked if there was “[a]ny work” for a person “off task at least 15% of the day”), 25 AR 1331 (expert responding, “No, that eliminates all jobs,” when asked if a person could 26 work when “off task more than 15% of the day”).) So, if we credit Dr. Sidrick’s rejected 27 testimony as true on this record—which resolves any “conflicting opinions” (ECF 15, at 5- 28 6)—Minh was disabled during the closed period. 1 Thus, the credit-as-true rule permits an immediate award of benefits. Moreover, the 2 ||exceptional circumstances here favor that result. Minh first sought disability benefits 3 ||almost a decade ago. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 683 (9th Cir. 2017) (ruling 4 ||that the “exceptional facts” favored an “immediate payment of benefits” when claimant 5 “first sought benefits more than seven years ago; her claimed disability began almost a 6 || decade ago” (citation omitted)). In addition to her long wait in administrative purgatory, 7 ||Minh has already endured two rounds of administrative proceedings in which the 8 || Commissioner committed the same error each time. See Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. 9 || Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Delaying the payment of benefits by 10 |/requiring multiple administrative proceedings that are duplicative and unnecessary only 11 || serves to cause the applicant further damage—financial, medical, and emotional.’’). 12 CONCLUSION 13 It’s time for this case to end. The record amply supports Minh’s claimed disability 14 since 2012. This case is remanded for the immediate calculation and award of benefits. The 15 || Clerk is directed to issue a judgment and close this case. 16 REVERSED and REMANDED for award of benefits. 17 || Dated: June 8, 2022 18 — | 19 Hon. ndrew G. Schopler United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28