Trunkline LNG Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

194 F.3d 68, 338 U.S. App. D.C. 278, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25600, 1999 WL 819695
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedOctober 15, 1999
Docket98-1224
StatusPublished

This text of 194 F.3d 68 (Trunkline LNG Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trunkline LNG Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 194 F.3d 68, 338 U.S. App. D.C. 278, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25600, 1999 WL 819695 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge:

In 1977, Trunkline LNG Company (“Trunkline”) applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 1 for authority to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plant in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Although FERC granted that authority, the high cost of LNG eventually caused Trunkline to suspend its service. In 1996, Trunkline again sought approval for its LNG operations, as well as for rates that would permit it to recover depreciation expenses it had been unable to recover during the period of suspension. FERC granted Trunkline’s application, but conditioned its approval upon exclusion of the unrecov-ered depreciation from Trunkline’s rate base. FERC also conditioned its approval upon Trunkline filing a study of its costs and revenues within three years. Trunk-line appeals both conditions. We affirm.

Trunkline received authorization in 1977 to construct and operate the Lake Charles plant and to sell regasified LNG to a single customer, an affiliate known as Trunk-line Gas Company (Trunkline Gas). As a condition of authorization, FERC required Trunkline to file a tariff containing minimum bill provisions intended to allocate the risk of loss that would arise in the event of a suspension of service. Under the provisions of the minimum bill, in a period of interrupted service the customer would continue to pay rates that would permit Trunkline to recover its debt service and other nonequity-related fixed costs (interest and principal repayment, taxes, and fixed operating and maintenance expenses). It would not, however, be permitted to recover equity-related fixed costs (through depreciation expenses or otherwise) except to the extent that it actually provided service. 2 In the Commission’s view, this arrangement ensured that Trunkline would be able to finance the project’s construction, while equitably apportioning the risk of suspended or reduced operations between Trunkline’s stockholders and its customer. See Trunkline LNG Co., 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,-198, at 61,781 (1998) (order denying rehearing).

Trunkline commenced delivery of LNG in 1982. Due to the high cost of the LNG it was obtaining from Algeria, however, Trunkline suspended operations from mid-1984 through 1989. Although Trunkline’s customer received no service after the suspension, it continued to pay the nonequity fixed costs pursuant to the terms of the minimum bill. Pursuant to the same terms, Trunkline was unable to recover *70 $106.9 million in depreciation costs during this period.

On October 16, 1996, Trunkline filed the application at issue in this case, seeking a certifícate of public convenience and necessity under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717f. It once again sought authorization to provide terminall-ing services (receipt, storage, regasifieation, and delivery of LNG) at the Lake Charles plant, this time to customers other than Trunkline Gas. Trunkline’s proposed rates were predicated upon a rate base that included the $106.9 million in depreciation the company had been unable to recover from 1984 through 1989.

Although FERC granted Trunkline’s request for a certificate, it imposed two conditions. First, it required Trunkline to exclude the $106.9 million in unrecovered depreciation from its rate base. Inclusion of those costs, it said, would improperly permit Trunkline to earn a return on the depreciation expenses it did not recover because of the suspension of service. See Trunkline LNG Co., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,147, at 61,666 (1997) (order issuing certificate). FERC also directed Trunkline, within three years of the start of operations, “to make a Natural Gas Act section 4 rate filing to justify its existing rates or to propose alternative rates.” Id.

Trunkline sought rehearing with respect to the two conditions imposed on its certificate. The Commission denied rehearing, affirming its decision to exclude the depreciation costs but effectively modifying the three-year filing requirement. Rather than require Trunkline to make a filing justifying its rates or proposing new ones under NGA section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 717c, FERC simply directed Trunkline to file a cost and revenue study. The Commission indicated that it would review the study and only then determine whether it should exercise its authority to establish just and reasonable rates under section 5 of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717d. See 82 F.E.R.C. at 61,780.

II

We review FERC orders under the arbitrary and capricious standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Union Pac. Fuels, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 157, 161 (D.C.Cir.1997). We find nothing arbitrary or capricious about FERC’s decisions here.

Trunkline argues that the Commission’s refusal to allow it to include its lost depreciation charges in its rate base represents an unreasonable departure from the Commission’s longstanding practice of allowing utilities to earn a return on their investments. Trunkline contends that it never had the opportunity to recover the lost depreciation, and hence should not be denied that opportunity now.

What Trunkline’s analysis ignores, however, is that it did have the opportunity to recover that depreciation — if it had provided service from 1984 through 1989. Trunkline’s failure to recover is simply a consequence of its failure to provide that service, a possibility contemplated by the tariff in effect at the time. The risk allocation reflected in that tariff was not an unreasonable one. Trunkline’s shareholders obtained the benefit of being able to finance the Lake Charles plant and commence its operations, but bore the risk of losing part of their investment if business did not go well. Trunkline’s customer obtained the benefit of LNG service, but also bore part of the risk since it would have to continue to pay under the minimum bill even if it received no service.

Moreover, whatever the rationality of the original 1977 tariff, it is far too, late in the day to dispute that tariff now. The only question here is whether anything has changed that would make it unreasonable to require Trunkline to adhere to the terms of the arrangement originally struck in that year. In fact, nothing has changed. To the contrary, the subsequent interruption of service was precisely the circumstance the tariff anticipated, and the resulting preclusion of depreciation recovery flowed directly from the original risk alio- *71 cation formula. To permit Trunkline to recover its costs now would overturn that original allocation, permitting Trunkline’s shareholders to recover a return on their equity notwithstanding the terms of the original arrangement. 3

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194 F.3d 68, 338 U.S. App. D.C. 278, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25600, 1999 WL 819695, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trunkline-lng-co-v-federal-energy-regulatory-commission-cadc-1999.