Truman Tommy Matthews v. State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 4, 2001
• Docket: 07-01-00147-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO. 07-01-0147-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL B

MAY 4, 2001

______________________________

TRUMAN TOMMY MATTHEWS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee _________________________________

FROM THE 155^TH DISTRICT COURT OF WALLER COUNTY;

NO. 98-05-9372; HON. DAN R. BECK, PRESIDING _______________________________

ABATEMENT AND REMAND

_______________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., and QUINN and JOHNSON, JJ.

Upon a plea of not guilty, Truman Tommy Matthews (appellant) was convicted by a jury of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Appellant subsequently appealed the conviction. The record of the court clerk was filed on April 16, 2001 and the reporter's record is due on May 18, 2001. On May 2, 2001, we received a letter dated April 29, 2001, from the court reporter informing this Court that neither appellant nor anyone on his behalf has made financial arrangements for the preparation of the reporter's record.

Accordingly, we now abate this appeal and remand the cause to the 155th District Court of Waller County (trial court) for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court shall immediately cause notice of a hearing to be given and, thereafter, conduct a hearing to determine the following:

1. whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal;

2. whether appellant is indigent, entitled to the appointment of counsel; and

3. whether the appellant is entitled to the preparation of a free reporter's record.

The trial court shall cause the hearing to be transcribed. Furthermore, the trial court shall execute findings of fact and conclusions of law answering the aforementioned issues and cause same to be included in a supplemental clerk's record. Finally, the trial court shall file the supplemental clerk's record and the transcription of the hearing with the Clerk of this Court by June 4, 2001. Should further time be needed by the trial court to perform these tasks, then same must be requested before June 4, 2001.

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.

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NO. 07-09-0276-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL B

MAY 4, 2010

DARRON T. MOORE,

                                                                                         Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                                         Appellee

____________________________

FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2007-414,858; HONORABLE BRADLEY S. UNDERWOOD, PRESIDING

Memorandum Opinion

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

         Darron T. Moore was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver.  On appeal, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction and the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

            Background

            Law enforcement officers with the Drug Enforcement Agency received a tip from a confidential informant that two individuals had a quantity of cocaine in a certain motel room at the Sunset Motel in Lubbock.  They obtained a search warrant and executed it within 72 hours on December 8, 2006.  As they approached the room, they observed a white female nearing the door.  A black female opened the door of the room.  When the black female saw that police officers were outside the room, she shut the door.  As the officers entered the room, the black female was sitting on the bed.  Apppellant was seen completely naked with his hand in the toilet of the bathroom.  Two bags of cocaine were extracted from the swirling toilet. 

            Issues 1 and 2 – Legal and Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

            In his first two issues, appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the drugs belonged to him.  The standards by which we review the sufficiency of the evidence are discussed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  To convict appellant of the charged offense, the State had to prove that appellant intentionally and knowingly possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver.  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §481.115(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009).  Thus, it had to prove that appellant’s connection with the drug was “more than just fortuitous.”  Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).  Furthermore, his mere presence at the site where the drugs were found, without more, is insufficient to establish actual care, custody, or control of the narcotics.  See Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 

            Courts have developed numerous factors found to be useful in determining whether the accused’s link to the contraband was more than mere fortuity.   Although not exclusive, the list includes whether 1) the accused was present when the search was conducted, 2) the contraband was plainly visible by those present, 3) the drugs were near the defendant, 4) the defendant was under the influence of the substance found, 5) the defendant possessed other contraband or drug paraphernalia when arrested, 6) the defendant made any incriminating statements, 7) the defendant attempted to flee, 8) the defendant made furtive gestures, 9) the contraband emitted a recognizable odor at the time, 10) other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present, 11) the defendant had the right to exclusive or joint possession of the place where the drugs were found, 12) the place where the drugs were found was enclosed, 13) the accused attempted to conceal the contraband, and 14) the accused was familiar with the type of contraband.  Kyte v. State, 944 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1997, no pet.); Hurtado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738, 743 n.1 (Tex. App.–Houston [1^st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).  The number of factors established is not as important as the degree to which they tend to link the defendant to the offense.  Wallace v. State, 932 S.W.2d 519, 524 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1995, pet. ref’d). 

            Here, the jury was presented evidence of 1) a tip from a confidential informant disclosing that cocaine was present in that particular motel room in the possession of a black male known as “Dizzy” and a black female known as “Nookie,” 2) appellant being discovered in the motel room at a motel commonly known for drug distribution, 3) appellant being naked in the bathroom in the presence of the drugs, 4) appellant having his hand in the toilet where the drugs were found, 5) the black female in the room having perceived the presence of the officers and shutting the door in their face, 6) the toilet where the drugs were located having been flushed, and 7) the amount of drugs present constituting more than that of mere personal use.  As previously stated, the number of factors established is not as important as the degree to which they tend to link the accused to the drugs.  The aforementioned evidence constitutes sufficient indicia to enable jurors to rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly and intentionally had care, custody, and control of the narcotics.  Moreover, that appellant attacked the credibility of the officers executing the affidavit does not render that verdict manifestly unjust.  Appellant’s first two issues are overruled.

            Issue 3 – Motion to Suppress

            In his third issue, appellant claims the trial court should have suppressed the evidence found as a result of execution of the search warrant.  We overrule the issue for appellant uttered “no objection” when the evidence was offered by the State.  Having said that, he waived any complaint he may have had.   Brown v. State, 183 S.W.3d 728, 741 (Tex. App.–Houston [1^st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).

            Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                    Brian Quinn

                                                                                    Chief Justice