Trujillo v. American Airlines, Inc.

938 F. Supp. 392, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21221, 1995 WL 877428
District Court, N.D. Texas·Decided November 13, 1995·No. 3:94-cv-00533·Published·Cited by 11 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FITZWATER, District Judge.

The instant motion for summary judgment presents the question whether § 4(a) of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 1 as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (“ADA”), 2 preempts the claims of plaintiff Richard Trujillo d/b/a Pacific Jewelry Services (“Trujillo”) for recovery pursuant to the Texas Deceptive Trade Praetiees-Consumer Protection Act (“DTPA”), Tex.Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. §§ 17.41-17.63 (West 1987 & Supp.1995), negligence, and gross negligence. The court holds that these claims are preempted, and grants summary judgment dismissing the claims. 3

I

Trujillo sues defendant American Airlines, Inc. (“American”), contending that American is liable for the loss of a commercial package containing jewelry valued at $23,490. Trujillo alleges that the American employee who prepared the “Advance Air Waybill” (“Waybill”) failed to properly complete the Waybill by filling in the declared value portion of the form. Trujillo contends that he contacted American by telephone to request that it carry the package from Los Angeles International Airport to Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. Trujillo inquired whether he could insure the package and was initially quoted a price. He was later told that insurance was unavailable because a secondary carrier would deliver the package to its final destination. Trujillo alleges he was not advised that he could pay a higher shipping rate in exchange for American’s assuming greater liability for loss of the package, but that he did inform the employee who prepared the Waybill that the jewelry enclosed was worth $25,000. American denies that Trujillo declared the value of the package.

American moves for summary judgment, contending the ADA preempts plaintiffs state and common law claims. 4

II

Congress, acting within the authority granted it by the Supremacy Clause, may enact legislation that preempts state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 1664, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989). Preemption is most easily recognized when Congress dis places state law “by stating so in express terms.” Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). The key inquiry is whether Congress intended that federal law supersede state law. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1898, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986).

Here, Congress has explicitly provided that state law be preempted. Section 41713(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

A state ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this sub-part.

49 U.S.C. § 41713 (Supp.1995). The Supreme Court has construed the phrase “relating to” in § 41713(b)(1) broadly, and has held that “[sjtate enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline *394 ‘rates, routes or services’ are preempted” under the ADA. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). Thus a claim is preempted by the ADA’s express preemption provision if the claim relates to services that are not a part of the maintenance or operation of an aircraft. See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc).

Trujillo’s claims arise from American’s preparation of the Waybill and shipping of the package. Such acts have nothing to do with the operation or maintenance of an aircraft, which includes “using aircraft for the purpose of air navigation, including—the navigation of aircraft,” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32)(A) (Supp.1995), and piloting, 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(31) (Supp.1995). While it may be argued that actual shipment of the package concerned the operation and maintenance of the aircraft, plaintiff admits that “the loss occurred in this judicial district,” and bases his complaint on the fact that his package was never delivered, not that it was damaged in transit. In addition, his conversation with American’s agent regarding the Waybill did not occur incident to the operation of the aircraft. Because plaintiffs claims did not arise out of the operation and maintenance of an aircraft, the exception to preemption for personal injury and loss of property torts discussed in Hodges does not apply. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338. That is, the insurance requirement of 49 U.S.C. § 41112 (Supp.1995) does not imply that torts like those raised by Trujillo—those unrelated to the operation of an aircraft—are carved out of the broad preemption provision of § 41713(b)(1).

Trujillo’s claims are thus preempted if they relate to “services” within the meaning of § 41713(b)(1). It is clear that the acts Trujillo complains of—-preparation of the Waybill by telephone and delivery of the package— are services within the meaning of § 41713(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, has defined “services” as activities that “generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor from one party to another. If the element of bargain or agreement is incorporated in our understanding of services, it leads to a concern with the contractual arrangement between the airline and the user of the service.” Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336 (quoting Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir.1993)).

State causes of action are available to enforce bargains for services into which an airline voluntarily entered, American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 817, 824, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995), but may not be used to impose external requirements upon airlines in the provision of services to the consumer, id., at-, 115 S.Ct. at 826. Plaintiffs breach of contract claim was'the means by which he could enforce the agreement for services he made with American. He may not east his claims as ones for negligence or deceptive trade practices to extend his recovery beyond the terms of the contract.

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Trujillo v. American Airlines, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 392, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21221, 1995 WL 877428 (N.D. Tex. 1995).

938 F. Supp. 392 (Trujillo v. American Airlines, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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