Truitt v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

45 F. Supp. 2d 812, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5110, 1999 WL 221791
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedMarch 9, 1999
DocketCiv. 98-6160-JO
StatusPublished

This text of 45 F. Supp. 2d 812 (Truitt v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Truitt v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 45 F. Supp. 2d 812, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5110, 1999 WL 221791 (D. Or. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT E. JONES, District Judge.

Claimant Judy Truitt seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her application for supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) under §§ 1602 and 1604(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.

This court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Following a careful review of the record, the Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Claimant filed an application for SSI on February 25, 1995. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. On December 11, 1996, a hearing was held before the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in which claimant (represented by attorney Brent Wells), Steven A. Task, M.D., internal medicine expert, Larry S. Hart, Pd.D., medical expert in psychology, and a vocational expert testified. On February 26, 1997, the ALJ issued a finding of no disability and denied the benefits sought. Claimant’s initial Request for Review was denied by the Commissioner on April 2, 1998. On June 1, 1998, the Appeals Council vacated that decision to consider additional evidence. Nonetheless, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on June 1, 1998, when the Appeals Council again declined review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir.1993). The court must weigh “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir.1986). The Commissioner’s decision must be upheld if it is a rational interpretation of the evidence, even if there are other possible rational interpretations. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1989).

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ employed a five-step “sequential evaluation” process in evaluating claimant’s disability, as required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. The ALJ determined that claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 30, 1995.

Second, the ALJ found that claimant has severe low back pain and fibromyalgia, but that she does not "have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to one listed in the Listing of Impairments at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ also found that claimant’s alleged somato-form disorder and depression imposed only slight limitations and were therefore non-severe. (Tr. 19-20, 23-26.)

*814 In the next step of the evaluation, the ALJ determined that claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light exertional work. The ALJ found claimant’s subjective complaints not to be fully credible in light of the objective medical evidence.

Based upon the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that the claimant is able to perform the full range of light work and her impairments did not prevent her from returning to her past relevant work as either a cashier or light production assembly worker. These jobs all exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Based on these determinations, claimant was found not to be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act, and her application for benefits was denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Claimant was born on July 1, 1945. She has 11 years of education. Her work history includes semi-skilled work experience as a cashier and sedentary to light unskilled work as a light production assembly worker. Her last date of substantial gainful employment was January 30, 1995. Claimant has engaged in work activity since her application date as a caregiver for senior citizens on a part-time basis. This work was for monetary amounts that are presumptively not substantial gainful activity. Claimant alleges inability to work as of January 30, 1995, based on low back pain, fibromyalgia, depression and so-matoform disorder.

Medical History

Claimant asserts she initially injured her lower back while on the job December 7, 1993. (Tr. 67, Tr. 114.) On January 11, 1994 claimant saw Dr. William R. Ferguson regarding her back pain. Dr. Ferguson attempted to treat claimant until January 26, 1995. Dr. Ferguson opined, “[a]t this point in time this is a very difficult patient. She obviously shows no inclination to go back to her job. She has no inclination to work in a work hardening program and to get better.” (Tr. 154.) He also noted that there was no evidence of underlying significant disease. (Tr. 154.)

On February 23, 1994 claimant was referred to Dr. K. Clair Anderson, an orthopedist, who diagnosed her with probable lumber sprain and strain 1 and recommended physical therapy. (Tr. 229.) Dr. Clair saw claimant again on March 16, 1994, and noted she was going to have to work more vigorously with her physical therapy. (Tr. 230.) Dr. Clair strongly advised that claimant participate in a work hardening program because it was the only treatment he thought would make a significant change. Claimant said she was uncertain she wanted to participate in the program. (Tr. 231.) In his March 22, 1994 report, Dr. Clair noted claimant “may have a very mild sclerosis. Otherwise, I don’t appreciate any significant bony abnormality.” 2 (Tr. 232.)

On April 26, 1994, claimant saw Dr. Frank Lahman, a psychologist. Dr. Lahman opined that claimant tended to overstate the severity of her pain. (Tr. 145.) He noted

In spite of the severity of the pain complaints reported, the profile was suggesting very little actual psychic distress from these problems and a likelihood that she has adapted well to the role of pain patient with strong needs for dependency being one of the major driving forces behind this approach to meeting life’s demands.

(Tr. 145.)

Dr. Lahman diagnosed claimant with So-matoform. Pain Disorder.

*815 In January 1995, claimant began seeing Dr. Rose Miller. On February 10, 1995, Dr.

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45 F. Supp. 2d 812, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5110, 1999 WL 221791, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/truitt-v-commissioner-of-the-social-security-administration-ord-1999.