Truick v. Truick

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Truick v. Truick

243 A.D.2d 572, 663 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9822

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 14, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 243 A.D.2d 572 (Truick v. Truick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Truick v. Truick, 243 A.D.2d 572, 663 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9822 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the appeal is from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Segal, J.), dated January 30, 1997, which, after a hearing, adjudged that the appellant had willfully violated an order of protection of the same court, dated July 26, 1996, on three separate occasions and directed his incarceration for consecutive periods of 90 days, 90 days, and 180 days.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court did not err in finding that he had violated the order of protection by committing harassing acts against his wife (see, Family Ct Act § 846-a). As the trier of fact, the Family Court’s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed where, as here, it is supported by the record (see, Matter of Irene O., 38 NY2d 776; Matter of Tibichrani v Debs, 230 AD2d 746).

In view of the appellant’s lack of diligence in securing documentary evidence and the attendance of witnesses, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his belated request for a continuance (see, Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270; People v Foy, 32 NY2d 473). In addition, the record demonstrates that the appellant’s attorney afforded him meaningful representation during the hearing (see, People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137; Matter of Kazmi v Kazmi, 201 AD2d 857).

Finally, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to sentence the appellant to consecutive terms of incarceration for violating the order of protection on three separate occasions (see, Family Ct Act § 846-a; Matter of Walker v Walker, 86 NY2d 624). Rosenblatt, J. P., Copertino, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the appeal is from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Segal, J.), dated January 30, 1997, which, after a hearing, adjudged that the appellant had willfully violated an order of protection of the same court, dated July 26, 1996, on three separate occasions and directed his incarceration for consecutive periods of 90 days, 90 days, and 180 days.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court did not err in finding that he had violated the order of protection by committing harassing acts against his wife (see, Family Ct Act § 846-a). As the trier of fact, the Family Court’s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed where, as here, it is supported by the record (see, Matter of Irene O., 38 NY2d 776; Matter of Tibichrani v Debs, 230 AD2d 746).

In view of the appellant’s lack of diligence in securing documentary evidence and the attendance of witnesses, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his belated request for a continuance (see, Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270; People v Foy, 32 NY2d 473). In addition, the record demonstrates that the appellant’s attorney afforded him meaningful representation during the hearing (see, People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137; Matter of Kazmi v Kazmi, 201 AD2d 857).

Finally, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to sentence the appellant to consecutive terms of incarceration for violating the order of protection on three separate occasions (see, Family Ct Act § 846-a; Matter of Walker v Walker, 86 NY2d 624). Rosenblatt, J. P., Copertino, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

243 A.D.2d 572, 663 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9822, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/truick-v-truick-nyappdiv-1997.

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