Opinion issued April 20, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-16-00967-CV ——————————— TRUE BLUE ANIMAL RESCUE, INC., Appellant V. WALLER COUNTY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 506th District Court Waller County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 16-10-23953
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal, appellant True Blue Animal Rescue, Inc.
challenges the trial court’s denial of its application for a temporary injunction
against appellee Waller County. Because True Blue did not meet its burdens to
plead a cause of action against Waller County and to produce some evidence establishing a probable right to relief, we affirm the denial of a temporary
injunction.
Background
Waller County seized 34 horses from Kathie Digilio, alleging that she had
treated them cruelly. The horses were placed in the care of True Blue Animal
Rescue, Inc.
After the seizure of the horses, Waller County brought divestiture
proceedings against Digilio under Texas Health and Safety Code Chapter 821, in a
Waller County justice court. While the divestiture proceedings were pending,
Waller County and Digilio entered into an agreement whereby some of the horses
would be returned to her, and she would pay $30,000 to True Blue for the care of
the horses. The justice court issued an order in accordance with this agreement.
True Blue filed suit against Waller County, complaining that the justice
court’s order was improper. In its petition, True Blue requested that the trial court
grant a temporary injunction against Waller County, enjoining enforcement of the
order. True Blue’s petition also included a claim, in the alternative, for breach of
contract against Waller County. This contract claim stemmed from Waller
County’s alleged breach of an agreement between it and True Blue regarding
possession of the horses and payment for their care and treatment.
2 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining Waller County
“from transferring any of the 34 horses involved in the Digilio seizure . . . so that
the status quo may be observed” and so that True Blue could assert its “rights
regarding the horses and the payment of its incurred costs of care for the horses.”
The trial court granted three extensions of the temporary restraining order.
Following the third extension, the court held a temporary-injunction hearing.
During the hearing, the court and parties discussed several disputed procedural
issues, including True Blue’s standing to sue, whether the State of Texas should
have been the proper defendant instead of Waller County, and whether mandamus
against the justice court was a more appropriate remedy for True Blue’s
complaints. The trial court made an oral “finding” that True Blue’s petition did
“not state a claim” that it could “grant relief on from True Blue’s standpoint.”
After the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the application for a
temporary injunction, without stating its reasons.
True Blue has appealed the denial of its application for a temporary
Analysis
True Blue contends that the trial court erred by denying its application for a
temporary injunction. “In general, a temporary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.” Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d
3 56, 57 (Tex. 1993). The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford
Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The status quo is “the last, actual,
peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy.” In re
Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004). To obtain a temporary injunction, the
applicant ordinarily must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of
action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a
probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at
204. With regard to proving a probable right to the relief sought, the applicant is
not required to prove that it will prevail on final trial. Instead, the only question
before the trial court is whether the applicant is entitled to preservation of the
status quo pending trial. INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 312
S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). The party
applying for a temporary injunction has the burden of production, which is the
burden of offering some evidence that establishes a probable right to recover. See
Millwrights Local Union No. 2484 v. Rust Eng’g Co., 433 S.W.2d 683, 685–87
(Tex. 1968); Intercontinental Terminals Co. v. Vopak N. Am., Inc., 354 S.W.3d
887, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). If an applicant does not
discharge its burden, it is not entitled to such extraordinary relief. See Millwrights,
433 S.W.2d at 685–87; Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 891.
4 The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction lies in the discretion of
the trial court, and the court’s ruling is subject to reversal only for an abuse of that
discretion. INEOS Grp., 312 S.W.3d at 848. A trial court abuses its discretion in
granting or denying a temporary injunction when it misapplies the law to the
established facts. Id. We review the evidence submitted to the trial court in the
light most favorable to its ruling, drawing all legitimate inferences from the
evidence, and deferring to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. Id.
Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion;
we do not reach the merits of the underlying case. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859,
861–62 (Tex. 1978); INEOS Grp., 312 S.W.3d at 848. When, as in this case, no
findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the trial court’s order must be
upheld on any legal theory supported by the record. See, e.g., Intercontinental
Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 898.
On appeal, True Blue raises several arguments as to why the district court
erred by denying its application for a temporary injunction. These arguments
primarily address various reasons which True Blue posits the trial court might have
relied upon erroneously to justify denying a temporary injunction. True Blue also
provides arguments regarding why the justice court’s order was incorrect. None of
True Blue’s arguments, however, address the burdens it had to meet in order to
demonstrate it was entitled to an injunction.
5 True Blue has not shown that it pleaded a cause of action against Waller
County. In fact, True Blue contends that it has abandoned the only cause of action
it asserted against Waller County, its claim for breach of contract, and on appeal it
does not rely upon such a claim to justify its request for temporary injunctive
relief.
Further, True Blue does not point to, or provide any argument regarding,
evidence adduced in the trial court indicating its probable right to relief against
Waller County. True Blue does argue that Waller County is the appropriate
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Opinion issued April 20, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-16-00967-CV ——————————— TRUE BLUE ANIMAL RESCUE, INC., Appellant V. WALLER COUNTY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 506th District Court Waller County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 16-10-23953
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal, appellant True Blue Animal Rescue, Inc.
challenges the trial court’s denial of its application for a temporary injunction
against appellee Waller County. Because True Blue did not meet its burdens to
plead a cause of action against Waller County and to produce some evidence establishing a probable right to relief, we affirm the denial of a temporary
injunction.
Background
Waller County seized 34 horses from Kathie Digilio, alleging that she had
treated them cruelly. The horses were placed in the care of True Blue Animal
Rescue, Inc.
After the seizure of the horses, Waller County brought divestiture
proceedings against Digilio under Texas Health and Safety Code Chapter 821, in a
Waller County justice court. While the divestiture proceedings were pending,
Waller County and Digilio entered into an agreement whereby some of the horses
would be returned to her, and she would pay $30,000 to True Blue for the care of
the horses. The justice court issued an order in accordance with this agreement.
True Blue filed suit against Waller County, complaining that the justice
court’s order was improper. In its petition, True Blue requested that the trial court
grant a temporary injunction against Waller County, enjoining enforcement of the
order. True Blue’s petition also included a claim, in the alternative, for breach of
contract against Waller County. This contract claim stemmed from Waller
County’s alleged breach of an agreement between it and True Blue regarding
possession of the horses and payment for their care and treatment.
2 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining Waller County
“from transferring any of the 34 horses involved in the Digilio seizure . . . so that
the status quo may be observed” and so that True Blue could assert its “rights
regarding the horses and the payment of its incurred costs of care for the horses.”
The trial court granted three extensions of the temporary restraining order.
Following the third extension, the court held a temporary-injunction hearing.
During the hearing, the court and parties discussed several disputed procedural
issues, including True Blue’s standing to sue, whether the State of Texas should
have been the proper defendant instead of Waller County, and whether mandamus
against the justice court was a more appropriate remedy for True Blue’s
complaints. The trial court made an oral “finding” that True Blue’s petition did
“not state a claim” that it could “grant relief on from True Blue’s standpoint.”
After the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the application for a
temporary injunction, without stating its reasons.
True Blue has appealed the denial of its application for a temporary
Analysis
True Blue contends that the trial court erred by denying its application for a
temporary injunction. “In general, a temporary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.” Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d
3 56, 57 (Tex. 1993). The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford
Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The status quo is “the last, actual,
peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy.” In re
Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004). To obtain a temporary injunction, the
applicant ordinarily must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of
action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a
probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at
204. With regard to proving a probable right to the relief sought, the applicant is
not required to prove that it will prevail on final trial. Instead, the only question
before the trial court is whether the applicant is entitled to preservation of the
status quo pending trial. INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 312
S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). The party
applying for a temporary injunction has the burden of production, which is the
burden of offering some evidence that establishes a probable right to recover. See
Millwrights Local Union No. 2484 v. Rust Eng’g Co., 433 S.W.2d 683, 685–87
(Tex. 1968); Intercontinental Terminals Co. v. Vopak N. Am., Inc., 354 S.W.3d
887, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). If an applicant does not
discharge its burden, it is not entitled to such extraordinary relief. See Millwrights,
433 S.W.2d at 685–87; Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 891.
4 The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction lies in the discretion of
the trial court, and the court’s ruling is subject to reversal only for an abuse of that
discretion. INEOS Grp., 312 S.W.3d at 848. A trial court abuses its discretion in
granting or denying a temporary injunction when it misapplies the law to the
established facts. Id. We review the evidence submitted to the trial court in the
light most favorable to its ruling, drawing all legitimate inferences from the
evidence, and deferring to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. Id.
Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion;
we do not reach the merits of the underlying case. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859,
861–62 (Tex. 1978); INEOS Grp., 312 S.W.3d at 848. When, as in this case, no
findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the trial court’s order must be
upheld on any legal theory supported by the record. See, e.g., Intercontinental
Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 898.
On appeal, True Blue raises several arguments as to why the district court
erred by denying its application for a temporary injunction. These arguments
primarily address various reasons which True Blue posits the trial court might have
relied upon erroneously to justify denying a temporary injunction. True Blue also
provides arguments regarding why the justice court’s order was incorrect. None of
True Blue’s arguments, however, address the burdens it had to meet in order to
demonstrate it was entitled to an injunction.
5 True Blue has not shown that it pleaded a cause of action against Waller
County. In fact, True Blue contends that it has abandoned the only cause of action
it asserted against Waller County, its claim for breach of contract, and on appeal it
does not rely upon such a claim to justify its request for temporary injunctive
relief.
Further, True Blue does not point to, or provide any argument regarding,
evidence adduced in the trial court indicating its probable right to relief against
Waller County. True Blue does argue that Waller County is the appropriate
defendant because the requested relief arises out of events involving the Waller
County District Attorney’s Office and a Waller County justice of the peace. But
True Blue fails to identify any evidence or provide any legal argument that would
indicate why Waller County would be responsible for the actions of those actors.
True Blue also contends that the trial court erred, during the temporary
injunction hearing, by excluding uncertified copies of orders issued by the justice
court. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005). We will not reverse the
denial of a temporary injunction unless “the trial court’s erroneous evidentiary
ruling probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” See Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 906 (Tex. 2000); see also ICON Benefit
Adm’rs II, L.P., v. Abbott, 409 S.W.3d 897, 906 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet.
6 denied); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1). True Blue does not argue that the excluded
orders would have demonstrated a probable right of relief against Waller County.
Even assuming that the trial court erred by excluding the orders, any such error
was harmless because True Blue still would have failed to meet its burdens to
show its entitlement to a temporary injunction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); ICON
Benefit Adm’rs II, 409 S.W.3d at 906–07.
Because True Blue did not discharge its burdens to plead a cause of action
and demonstrate a probable right to relief against Waller County, it was not
entitled to a temporary injunction. See Millwrights, 433 S.W.2d at 685–87;
Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 891. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying True Blue’s application for a temporary injunction.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the requested temporary injunction.
Michael Massengale Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Massengale.