Trucks, Inc. v. United States

987 F. Supp. 1475, 80 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6625, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14993, 1997 WL 779111
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 10, 1997
Docket1:96-cv-00800
StatusPublished

This text of 987 F. Supp. 1475 (Trucks, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 1475, 80 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6625, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14993, 1997 WL 779111 (N.D. Ga. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER

COOPER, District Judge.

Plaintiff Trucks, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) brings this suit for a refund of employment taxes paid to Defendant United States of America (“Defendant”) for the years 1991, 1992 and 1993. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment [17-1 and 18-1] 1 and Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Revised Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [22-1],

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is in the business of hauling commercial freight by truck, primarily in the southeastern United States. Plaintiff employs both local and over-the-road (“OTR”) drivers to operate the tractor trailers used to transport the freight. The OTR drivers are regularly required to be away from home in connection with the performance of their duties. During the years at issue in this case, all of the trucks used by the OTR drivers had sleeper compartments.

For each trip taken by the OTR drivers, the drivers were required to submit to Plaintiff daily time logs and a trip envelope. The time logs reflected the number of hours the driver spent working, and the trip envelope contained the delivery receipt for the freight hauled and the original tickets for fuel purchased. The trip envelope also contained the name of the driver, the date and location of the trip origination, the trip destination, the number of miles driven, the states driven through, the number of gallons of fuel purchased, and the routes run.

*1477 During 1991,1992 and 1993, the wages and other compensation paid by Plaintiff to its OTR drivers were based upon the load revenue for the particular trip taken. Load revenue was calculated primarily on the basis of the number of miles driven, but a number of other factors were also taken into account, including the time required to unload and reload the trailer, the road and weather conditions for the geographic region involved, and the size and type of equipment used for the haul. Plaintiff paid its OTR drivers fourteen percent (14%) of the load revenue generated by each trip as wages, and a flat rate of six percent (6%) of the load revenue as a per diem expense reimbursement. On a weekly basis, the drivers were given settlement sheets, which reflected the load revenues generated for the week and the amounts allocated to wages and to the per diem expense reimbursement allowance. The expense reimbursement allowance was intended to cover the costs of meals, lodging and other incidental travel expenses while the OTR drivers were away from home. Plaintiff did not require its drivers to submit receipts or otherwise substantiate their expenses incurred on a trip. The same flat rate was paid to the drivers regardless of how much money was actually spent on meals and incidentals and regardless of whether the drivers actually incurred the cost of lodging rather than sleeping in their trucks.

For the years at issue, Plaintiff excluded from wages the amounts paid to its OTR drivers as reimbursement for travel expenses. The excluded payments totaled over $1.3 million for 1991, over $2.2 million in 1992, and over $34 for 1993. The Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) subsequently determined that these amounts were includa-ble as wages, and assessed additional employment taxes, penalties and interest. After paying a total of $12,000 towards the deficiency, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit for a refund of the amounts paid and an abatement of any and all other assessments made by Defendant against Plaintiff with respect to additional employment taxes, penalties and interest. In its Complaint, Plaintiff essentially contends that it is entitled to a refund and abatement because the expense reimbursements at issue were paid pursuant to an accountable plan. Defendant filed its Answer, and asserted a counterclaim for the unpaid balance of the assessments.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper only when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) Because summary judgment deprives the parties of a trial on the issues, the Court must be careful to ensure that only those claims for which there is no need for a factual determination as to any material fact are disposed of by the procedure. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In addition, a court evaluating a summary judgment motion must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.1988), Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir.1986), reh’g denied, 815 F.2d 66 (11th Cir.1987). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party need only present evidence from which the trier of fact might return a verdict in his favor. Samples, 846 F.2d at 1330. However, Rule 56 “[b]y its very terms, ... provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-8, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). The materiality of facts is governed by the substantive law Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that the factual issues “may *1478 reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

II. Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof

In a tax refund suit such as this, the “deficiency determinations [of the IRS] are presumed correct, and the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show that the [IRS’s] findings were erroneous. A taxpayer seeking a refund must show not only that the [IRS] erred, but must establish the correct amount of the refund due. The claim must be substantiated by something other than tax returns, uncorroborated oral testimony, or self-serving statements.” Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998, 106 S.Ct. 416, 88 L.Ed.2d 365 (1985) (citations omitted).

III.

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987 F. Supp. 1475, 80 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6625, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14993, 1997 WL 779111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trucks-inc-v-united-states-gand-1997.