Truax, T. v. Roulhac, T.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 24, 2014
Docket1797 EDA 2013
StatusUnpublished

This text of Truax, T. v. Roulhac, T. (Truax, T. v. Roulhac, T.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Truax, T. v. Roulhac, T., (Pa. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

J-A09022-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TRACY TRUAX IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v.

TANYA P. ROULHAC, WILDWOOD 115, INC. AND SILVIO VITIELLO

Appellees No. 1797 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered June 11, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s): 9958 Civil 2010

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2014

Tracy Truax appeals from the order entered June 11, 2013, in the

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, granting summary judgment in

favor of defendants, Wildwood 115, Inc. (Wildwood), and Silvio Vitiello

(Vitiello).1 Truax argues the trial court erred: (1) in determining that

Wildwood and Vitiello had, as a matter of law, taken reasonable precautions

property, and (2) in determining Wildwood and Vitiello did not owe a duty to

take reasonable measures to protect patrons from the foreseeable risk of a

____________________________________________

1 Roulhac has not been located or served for purposes of this lawsuit. Although the resolution of these motions for summary judgment terminated the cases against Wildwood and Vitiello only, the trial court certified the order as final, as, for all practical purposes, it terminated the entire matter. J-A09022-14

vehicle jumping the curb. After a thorough review of the submissions by the

parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm.

matter.

At all times material hereto, Defendant Silvio Vitiello was the sole owner of a parcel of commercial real estate located off Route 115 in Effort, Pennsylvania. Defendant Wildwood 115, Inc. was a tenant leasing space from Defendant Vitiello within

agreement, it enjoyed nonexclusive use in common of the parking lot of the premises.

On March 4, 2009, at approximately 10:38 p.m., [Truax] and

Defendant Tanya Roulhac was operating her van in an

[Truax] was walking south along the sidewalk in front of Madd

parking stop and entered the sidewalk, colliding with [Truax] with such force that her body was flung into the wall of the building. [Truax] lost consciousness, was airlifted to Lehigh Valley Hospital, and suffered serious leg injuries. Defendant Roulhac fled the scene of the accident and was later arrested.

The sidewalk on the premises was level with the parking lot and was separated by horizontal concrete parking stops. [Truax] alleges that these parking stops were inadequate and created a dangerous condition on the premises. She argues that Defendants[2] were negligent for failing to remedy this dangerous condition, namely by failing to install vertical bollards, curbs, ____________________________________________

2 Defendants here means the property and business owners, not the driver, Roulhac.

-2- J-A09022-14

rails or other safety devices. Defendants, conversely, allege that they satisfied their duty to [Truax] by complying with all applicable building codes and zoning ordinances and that it would be unreasonable and overly burdensome for a jury to overrule experts in determining what kind of safety devices are necessary. Further, Defendants argue that the events that led extraordinary that it would be oppressive to require Defendants to take steps to prevent such an occurrence. While Defendants filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment, the issues raised in both

thereof are nearly identical and will, thus, be addressed together.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/03/2012, at 3-4 (citations to record omitted).

We further note that Truax has agreed that the wheel stops 3 at issue

were five inches high. See .

judgment requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law[,] and our Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795, 797- view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of

Barnes v. Keller, 62 A.3d 382, 385 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Larrimore, 987 A.2d 732, 736 (Pa. Super. 2009) as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary Id. The rule governing summary judgment has been codified at Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2, which states as follows.

3 Throughout the certified record, these are referred to as either parking stops or wheel stops. We will refer to them as wheel stops.

-3- J-A09022-14

Rule 1035.2. Motion

After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law

(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or

(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.

-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order to survive. Babb v. Ctr. Cmty. Hosp., 47 A.3d 1214, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 412 (Pa. 2013). -moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof establishes the

Id.

Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine whether the record either establishes that the material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment should be denied.

Id. citing Reeser v. NGK N. Am., Inc., 14 A.3d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Jones v. Levin, 940 A.2d 451, 452-454 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

-4- J-A09022-14

Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636, 638-39 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In this matter, the non-moving party, Truax, bore the burden of

proving her allegations of negligence against Vitiello and Wildwood.

Our Supreme Court has set forth the elements of a cause of action based upon a negligence theory in Pennsylvania as follows:

(1) a duty or obligation recognized by the law requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks;

(2) defendant's failure to conform to the standard required;

(3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury;

(4) actual loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff.

, 59 A.3d 621, 638 (Pa. Super.

2012) (citation omitted).

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