IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Jun 25 2025, 9:05 am Troyon Ramon Scott, CLERK Appellant-Petitioner Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
June 25, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-PC-2482 Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71D03-2401-PC-1
Opinion by Judge Foley Judges Mathias and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 1 of 16 Foley, Judge.
[1] Troyan Ramon Scott (“Scott”) appeals the denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief (“PCR”) arguing he received ineffective assistance of both trial
counsel and appellate counsel. Concluding Scott identified ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, we reverse the denial of the PCR petition, vacate
Scott’s conviction, enhancement, and sentence, and remand for a new trial. 1
Facts and Procedural History [2] In January 2020, Scott was charged with murder, and the State sought a
sentence enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of the offense.
Scott maintained he acted in self-defense. The case proceeded to a jury trial on
April 11, 2022. Ahead of jury selection, the trial court addressed its intended
voir dire procedures, stating: “I want to make this record in regard to voir dire.”
Trial Tr. Vol. 2 p. 5. The judge explained that, during voir dire, the attorneys
would not be allowed to directly examine the prospective jurors. Rather, the
trial court would examine the prospective jurors while allowing input on lines
of questioning. See id. pp. 5–7, 15–18. In adopting these voir dire procedures,
the trial court expressed disagreement with this court’s recent decision in
Doroszko v. State, 185 N.E.3d 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) [Doroszko I], vacated on
transfer, Doroszko v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1151 (Ind. 2023) [Doroszko II].
1 Resolving the case on this basis, we do not address any claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 2 of 16 [3] Doroszko I involved an involuntary manslaughter conviction in the same court,
with the same judge, where—as here—the defendant was charged with murder,
the State sought a firearm enhancement, the defendant claimed self-defense,
and the judge prohibited counsel from directly examining prospective jurors.
See id.at 882–83. In Doroszko I, this court concluded the voir dire procedures
were erroneous because they did not comply with Trial Rule 47(D). Id. at 883–
86. However, this court concluded the error was harmless error because the
defendant “ha[d] not shown that he was prejudiced by the court’s voir dire
procedure[s].” Id. at 885. In determining the error was harmless, this court
identified ways the defendant might have established prejudice on appeal,
noting that the defendant (1) “d[id] not indicate what questions he would have
asked had he been allowed to directly question the prospective jurors, (2) “failed
to show that the court’s procedure adversely affected his ability to exercise his
peremptory challenges,” and (3) “d[id] not allege that any specific juror should
have been removed but was not.” Id. at 884. The Doroszko I decision was
handed down on March 29, 2022, such that Scott’s mid-April jury trial fell
within the timeframe to seek rehearing or file a petition to transfer in the case.
[4] Although the Doroszko I opinion was not yet certified, the trial court brought the
case up on the record, identified its applicability to the case at hand, and
expressed its disagreement with the opinion. See Trial Tr. Vol. 2 p. 5. The trial
court explained its alternate interpretation of Trial Rule 47(D) that the judge
believed authorized a trial court to conduct voir dire directly, so long as the
parties had the opportunity to propose that the trial court ask particular
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 3 of 16 questions. Id. at 5–7. The trial court eventually said: “I disagree with the ruling
in Doroszko [I], and I want to make that very clear.” Id. at 16. The trial court
noted that it anticipated “an issue down the road” before an appellate court,
and at one point addressed the State and said: “[I]f things don’t go [the State’s]
way, it doesn’t become an issue.” Id. at 15–16. Still addressing the State, the
trial court referred to Trial Counsel by name and said: “If things do go [the
State’s] way, I’m giving [Trial Counsel] an issue to appeal.” Id. at 16. The trial
court also said: “If I were a lawyer, I wouldn’t like my system either.” Id. at 18.
The trial court remarked that it “ha[d] to look at [voir dire] from a judge’s point
of view and not the attorneys’ point of view.” Id. Finally, the trial court
addressed Trial Counsel and said: “But I’ve given you an issue should things
not go your way.” Id. Trial Counsel responded: “Thank you.” Id. The trial
court ultimately followed the same voir dire procedures that were found to be
erroneous under Doroszko I and which prohibited the parties from directly
examining prospective jurors. Trial Counsel did not object to the procedures or
to the panel of jurors selected, and did not attempt to establish prejudice under
any of the methods outlined in Doroszko I.
[5] The jury found Scott guilty of murder and determined Scott used a firearm in
the commission of the offense. On May 20, 2022, the trial court sentenced
Scott to forty-five years for murder, enhanced by twenty years for the firearm
use, for an aggregate executed term of sixty-five years. Scott brought a direct
appeal, raising two issues: (1) whether the voir dire procedures resulted in
fundamental error and (2) whether the sentence was inappropriate. Scott v.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 4 of 16 State, No. 22A-CR-1229, 2022 WL 17333586, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 30,
2022). In the appellant’s brief, Scott’s appellate counsel (“Appellate Counsel”)
acknowledged that Trial Counsel had “failed to object to the jury panel.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 45. Appellate Counsel declined to argue that the
trial court’s remarks—including those about a potential issue for appeal—
served to preserve the issue, despite lack of a formal objection. Appellate
Counsel ultimately claimed the trial court committed fundamental error by
prohibiting Scott from directly questioning the prospective jurors about the
subject of self-defense. Id. at 45–48. Appellate Counsel asserted that the trial
court’s approach—which Appellate Counsel characterized as limited to
“ask[ing] the prospective jurors if they could follow the law concerning self-
defense”—resulted in prejudice because, “[w]hile any negative responses
certainly would give rise to a potential cause challenge, such superficial
questioning would not reveal information upon which to base an intelligent
decision to use a preemptory [sic] challenge.” Id. at 47. The State argued
waiver and disputed Scott’s claim of fundamental error. Appellate Counsel did
not file a reply brief to expound on waiver or discuss the effect of the court’s
remarks.
[6] On November 30, 2022, this court issued a memorandum decision affirming the
trial court. Although Scott had argued fundamental error, this court ultimately
addressed the issue of waiver, stating: “The record reveals that Scott did not
object to the trial court’s procedure for conducting voir dire or to the jury panel
before it was sworn” and “[a]ccordingly, Scott has waived his claim.” Scott,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 5 of 16 2022 WL 17333586, at *2. This court then addressed fundamental error,
concluding that, “even if the [trial] court erred by not permitting Scott or his
attorney to directly question the prospective jurors, Scott ha[d] not established
that any such error made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial.” Id. In a
footnote, this court referred to the procedural posture of Doroszko I, noting that
a petition to transfer had been filed, our Supreme Court “held oral argument on
September 15, 2022,” and, as of hand down, our Supreme Court “ha[d] not
ruled on the petition[.]” Id. at *1 n.1. In Scott’s direct appeal, there was a mid-
January 2023 deadline for filing a petition to transfer. Appellate Counsel did
not file a petition to transfer, and the opinion was certified on January 26, 2023.
[7] On February 1, 2023—less than a week after the opinion on direct appeal was
certified—the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer in Doroszko I, vacated the
Court of Appeals decision, and issued its decision in Doroszko II, ultimately
reversing the murder conviction where there had been a claim of self-defense.
201 N.E.3d 1151. Whereas, this court identified harmless error in Doroszko I,
our Supreme Court concluded the voir dire procedures—which were objected
to at trial—resulted in reversible error. Id. at 1158. The Court placed particular
emphasis on the importance of voir dire examination when self-defense is
claimed: “When a trial court completely forecloses voir dire examination
related to a defendant’s claim of self-defense, reversal is generally required.” Id.
at 1157. The Court characterized the issue of self-defense as a “central, hotly
contested aspect of the case” and explained that Rule 47(D) would not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 6 of 16 necessarily lead to reversal “where the error d[id] not relate to a central, hotly
contested aspect of the case, like [the] self-defense claim[.]” Id. at 1158.
[8] On January 18, 2024, Scott filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel. The petition primarily focused on whether Appellate Counsel was
ineffective for (1) failing to argue in the direct appeal that, despite no formal
objection, the trial court’s remarks served to preserve the voir dire issue and (2)
failing to file a petition to transfer. In a footnote, Scott alternatively argued that
“[i]f somehow the [voir dire] issue was not preserved for appeal, and [Trial
Counsel] should somehow have further objected to the [trial] [c]ourt’s handling
of the Rule 47(D) issue,” then “[Trial Counsel] provided ineffective assistance
of counsel and the result is the same,” i.e., under either theory “Scott was
prejudiced severely in his direct appeal with the application of the fundamental
error standard” regarding the voir dire issue. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 96.
[9] The post-conviction court held a hearing on June 7, 2024. At the hearing,
Scott’s counsel sought a summary disposition based on the written record,
asserting: “Because the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel is of counsel on
appeal, all the evidence is a matter of record in the transcripts, both in the trial
court and on appeal.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 4. The hearing concluded with no
presentation of evidence, with the parties subsequently submitting proposed
findings and conclusions. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 pp. 104–114 (Scott’s
proposed findings and conclusions), 115–23 (the State’s). Scott’s proposed
findings and conclusions focused on the performance of Appellate Counsel,
including counsel’s decision to argue fundamental error without claiming that,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 7 of 16 based on the trial court’s remarks at trial, the voir dire issue had been properly
preserved for appeal. The State’s proposed findings and conclusions also
focused on the performance of Appellate Counsel.
[10] On October 2, 2024, the post-conviction court denied Scott’s PCR petition. In
addressing the performance of Appellate Counsel, the post-conviction court
also discussed the performance of Trial Counsel. The court stated: “It was
incumbent on [Trial Counsel] to make a proper objection to the procedure and
the panel; he never did.” Id. at 9. The court then referred to Scott’s failure to
present testimony from Trial Counsel about counsel’s decision not to object to
the voir dire procedures under the circumstances, stating: “Whether [Trial
Counsel] took the [t]rial [c]ourt’s statement as creating an appealable issue is
unknown because [he] was never called as a witness.” Id. Scott now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [11] Scott claims the post-conviction court erred in denying his PCR petition,
reiterating his arguments about the performance of Appellate Counsel and
arguing in the alternative that he received ineffective assistance of Trial
Counsel. Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(5) provides that “[t]he petitioner has
the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence.” In ruling on a PCR petition, the post-conviction court “shall make
specific findings of fact[] and conclusions of law on all issues presented,
whether or not a hearing is held.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). However, to
the extent the findings are deficient, “remand for more specific findings is not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 8 of 16 warranted where the facts underlying the claims are not in dispute and the
issues are clear.” Shackelford v. State, 486 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ind. 1986).
[12] Here, Scott sought a summary disposition based on the written record. Under
Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g), the post-conviction court may grant a motion for
summary disposition “when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations of fact, and any affidavits submitted,
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” However, “[i]f an issue of material fact is raised,
then the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing as soon as reasonably possible.”
P-C.R. 1(4)(g). On appeal, we “review[] the grant of a motion for summary
disposition in post-conviction proceedings . . . the same way as a motion for
summary judgment.” Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. 2008). “Thus
summary disposition, like summary judgment, is a matter for appellate de novo
determination when the determinative issue is a matter of law, not fact.” Id.
[13] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution confers “the right to
the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686
(1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). As the
United States Supreme Court explained in Strickland, a landmark case on Sixth
Amendment claims: “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
[is] whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.” Id. The Strickland Court distilled these principles into a two-part test,
explaining that, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 9 of 16 claimant must establish that (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2)
“the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 466 U.S. at 687.
[14] To establish deficient performance, the claimant must prove “counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . .
. by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. To establish resulting prejudice, the claimant
must prove “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial,”
i.e., a trial with a reliable result. Id. In application, this means the claimant
must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
[15] Scott claims he received ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel, who did not
object to the voir dire procedures. As a threshold matter, the State argues Scott
waived this claim because the body of the PCR petition focused on a claim that
Appellate Counsel rendered ineffective assistance, with Scott addressing the
performance of Trial Counsel only as an argument in the alternative presented
in a footnote. The State also points out that, at the hearing, Scott discussed
only claims related to Appellate Counsel, at one point referring to a subpoena
for Appellate Counsel but not for Trial Counsel. The State further notes that, in
the proposed findings and conclusions, Scott again focused on the performance
of Appellate Counsel, declining to address the performance of Trial Counsel.
[16] Critically, Indiana courts adhere to principles of notice pleading espoused in
Trial Rule 8(F), which states: “All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice, lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 10 of 16 procedural points.” Thus, in the post-conviction case of State v. Lopez, we
determined the State did not waive an affirmative defense—despite limited
language about the defense in a responsive pleading—because the “language
was specific enough to alert the court and [the petitioner] under the notice
pleading requirement that the State was asserting the affirmative defense[.]”
676 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.
[17] In this case, Scott included a footnote addressing the performance of Trial
Counsel. The footnote specifically asserted that “[i]f somehow the [voir dire]
issue was not preserved for appeal, and [Trial Counsel] should somehow have
further objected to the [c]ourt’s handling of the Rule 47(D) issue, then [Trial
Counsel] provided ineffective assistance of counsel” because “Scott was
prejudiced severely in his direct appeal with the application of the fundamental
error standard.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 96 n.1. Scott added: “Either
[Appellate Counsel] or [Trial Counsel] w[as] ineffective, and [Scott] is entitled
to a new trial as a result of that prejudicial ineffectiveness.” Id. Adhering to
principles of notice pleading, we conclude that regardless of what was said
during the brief PCR hearing or the content of Scott’s proposed findings and
conclusions, the footnote in the petition provided adequate notice of a claim of
ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel such that Scott did not waive the claim.
[18] As to the merits, we begin by observing that the written judgment did not
explicitly address Scott’s claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective.
Nevertheless, neither party argues remand for additional findings is necessary
and, as our discussion herein illustrates, the nature of the claim is clear and the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 11 of 16 material facts are ultimately not in dispute. See Flanders v. State, 955 N.E.2d
732, 738 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (proceeding with review despite deficient
findings, noting “[n]either party argue[d] that remand for factual findings [was]
necessary”), trans. denied. Thus, we proceed to the merits of the ineffective
assistance claim.
[19] The record from Scott’s jury trial established that, despite the trial court
explicitly referencing its disagreement with Doroszko I and indicating it was
giving “an issue to appeal” by conducting voir dire in a manner inconsistent
with Doroszko I—a recent published decision determining the same judge’s voir
dire procedures were erroneous in violation of Trial Rule 47(D)—Trial Counsel
did not object to the procedures. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 p. 16. Moreover, although
Scott argued in the alternative that Appellate Counsel was ineffective for failing
to argue the issue was nonetheless preserved due to the judge’s remarks, on
direct appeal, we expressly determined otherwise, stating: “The record reveals
that Scott did not object to the trial court’s procedure for conducting voir dire or
to the jury panel before it was sworn” and “[a]ccordingly, Scott has waived his
claim.” Scott, 2022 WL 17333586, at *2. In post-conviction proceedings, there
has been no contention this court erred in determining the lack of objection led
to waiver.
[20] In general, the “law of the case” doctrine “mandates that when an appellate
court decides a legal issue, both the trial court and the court on appeal are
bound by that determination” in subsequent proceedings in the same case.
Varner v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1039, 1042–43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 12 of 16 This doctrine generally applies in post-conviction proceedings. See id. (“The
post-conviction court . . . was bound by [that] decision on . . . direct appeal.”).
Thus, to review the denial of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
we need not independently evaluate the effect of the judge’s remarks, and focus
instead on whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object.
[21] Although the instant judgment did not squarely address Scott’s claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the post-conviction court nevertheless
appeared to acknowledge some deficiency in Trial Counsel’s performance.
Indeed, the court stated: “It was incumbent on [Trial Counsel] to make a proper
objection to the procedure and the panel; he never did.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
2 p. 9. The court also suggested Trial Counsel might have had a strategic
reason not to object, stating: “Whether [Trial Counsel] took the [t]rial [c]ourt’s
statement as creating an appealable issue is unknown because [he] was never
called as a witness.” Id. However, under the circumstances, testimony from
Trial Counsel was not necessary to establish deficient performance.
[22] In general, a “strong presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.” Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind. 2001)
(quoting Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 730 (Ind. 2001)). Indeed, “counsel’s
performance is presumed effective, and a petitioner must offer strong and
convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.” Ben-Yisrayl, 729 N.E.2d at
106. Isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics do not necessarily
amount to ineffective assistance. Clark v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 13 of 16 1996), cert. denied. At the same time, when examining the performance of
counsel, we apply an objective standard of reasonableness “based on prevailing
professional norms.” Woodson v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1035, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied. Therefore, the petitioner can establish deficient
performance of counsel—regardless of any subjective strategy or tactic—if the
record establishes that no reasonable attorney would have performed the way
counsel performed. See McBride, 595 N.E.2d 260, 262–63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(noting we generally “will not second guess questions of strategy and tactics
unless the choice readily appears to have been so poor that no reasonable
lawyer would have been tempted by it”).
[23] Here, the trial court openly acknowledged it was not adhering to Doroszko I—a
recent published decision that not only (1) determined the voir dire procedures
were erroneous but also (2) provided guidance on how to develop the record to
identify prejudice from the procedures, to avoid an appellate determination that
the error was harmless. Doroszko I involved the same trial court and judge, the
same voir dire procedures, and the same charge and affirmative defense. Even
though Doroszko I was not certified at the time of Scott’s jury trial, where trial
counsel is aware of an appellate decision that so clearly addresses erroneous
voir dire procedures involving the same judge, the same charge, and the same
defense, we fail to conceive of a reasonable professional strategy or tactic that
would support failing to object to the erroneous procedures and develop the
record to demonstrate prejudice as specifically suggested in Doroszko I.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 14 of 16 [24] Critically, even if Trial Counsel believed the trial court’s remarks served to
preserve the voir dire issue, Doroszko I indicated that, without developing a
record regarding prejudice, the error would be declared harmless error.
Doroszko I telegraphed precise ways counsel could attempt to avoid harmless
error and make some showing of prejudice from the Rule 47(D) violation.
Indeed, the Doroszko I Court explained it was declaring the error harmless
because, in the case at hand, counsel failed to (1) “indicate what questions he
would have asked,” (2) “show that the court’s procedure adversely affected his
ability to exercise his peremptory challenges,” or (3) “allege that any specific
juror should have been removed but was not.” 185 N.E.3d at 884–85. Despite
this specific roadmap from Doroszko I, Trial Counsel did not address prejudice,
which meant Scott would be limited to claiming fundamental error on appeal.
[25] We conclude Scott met his burden of establishing counsel’s performance was
deficient under the circumstances, even without presenting counsel’s testimony.
Moreover, it is easy to see how Scott was prejudiced as a result. Had Trial
Counsel objected to the erroneous voir dire procedures and addressed the
prospect of prejudice as outlined in Doroszko I, the direct appeal would have
involved review for whether the error was harmless instead of the more
exacting fundamental error standard. Furthermore, in appellate briefing, Scott
would have had the opportunity to elaborate on the issue of prejudice. The
combination of a more favorable appellate standard and the opportunity to
develop the issue of prejudice in a case factually and legally parallel to Doroszko
I was sufficient to undermine confidence in the appellate outcome. It is also
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 15 of 16 worth noting that counsel’s development of the record would have positioned
the case differently for any potential petition to transfer.
[26] All in all, we conclude the record before the post-conviction court established
deficient performance and resulting prejudice such that the post-conviction
court erred in denying Scott’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
When an appellate court identifies error in the denial of a PCR petition, we
afford relief on appeal, reversing the conviction involved. See, e.g., Doroszko II,
201 N.E.3d at 1158 (reversing a murder conviction and remanding for a new
trial). We, therefore, reverse the denial of the PCR petition, vacate Scott’s
conviction, sentence enhancement, and sentence, and remand for a new trial.
[27] Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Donald J. Schmid Law Offices of Donald J. Schmid LLC South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PC-2482 | June 25, 2025 Page 16 of 16