Troy Sykes v. Newsom, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TROY SYKES, Case No. 1:23-cv-01738-FRS (BAM) (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 13 v. ACTION 14 NEWSOM, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 15 Defendants. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE 16 TO PROSECUTE 17 (ECF No. 11) 18 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 19 20 I. Background 21 Plaintiff Troy Sykes (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 22 pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 23 On January 20, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to comply 24 with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 and failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. 25 (ECF No. 11.) The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to file a first amended 26 complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (Id.) The Court expressly 27 warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in a 28 recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 1 for failure to state a claim. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise 2 communicate with the Court, and the deadline to do so has expired. 3 II. Failure to State a Claim 4 A. Screening Requirement 5 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 6 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 8 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 9 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 10 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 12 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 14 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 15 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 16 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 17 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 18 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 19 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 20 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 21 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 22 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 23 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 24 Plaintiff is currently housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga, California. The 25 events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Avenal State 26 Prison (“ASP”) in Avenal, California. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Gavin Newsom, 27 Governor; (2) Scott Macomber, Secretary of CDCR; and (3) Martin Gamboa, Warden, ASP. 28 /// 1 Plaintiff sets forth a single claim, for overcrowding in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Newsom as Governor is responsible for state agencies following 3 federal mandates, Defendant Macomber as Secretary of CDCR is responsible to ensure CDCR 4 complies with all state and federal policies, and Defendant Gamboa as Warden of ASP must 5 follow state law and federal mandates to ensure the safety and health of the inmates at ASP. 6 Defendants are all violating the federal mandate that state prison populations be at 137.5% of 7 maximum capacity. Every building, every day that Plaintiff has been housed at ASP since May 2, 8 2022, has been over this limit. 9 Plaintiff alleges a long list of injuries as a result of overcrowding, including: denial of 10 schooling due to lack of funding and space, ASP’s inability to follow state generated food menus, 11 overtaxed infrastructure, closure of F-Yard chowhall due to mold, poor air quality due to 12 overburdened ventilation system, long waits to receive medications, and long waitlists for 13 schooling and rehabilitative programs. 14 Plaintiff seeks full compliance of CDCR statewide at fully operational institutions to be 15 under 137.5% capacity, at each institution, as well as monetary damages. 16 C. Discussion 17 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 and 18 fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 1. Supervisory Liability 20 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue any defendant, based solely upon his or her 21 supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 22 the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. 24 City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 25 Cir. 2002). 26 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 27 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 28 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. 1 Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established 2 when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably 3 should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at 4 570. Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 5 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 6 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 7 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other 8 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). When a defendant holds a supervisory 9 position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be 10 specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 11 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement 12 of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 13 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 14 As currently pled, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any defendant based on their 15 supervisory role. Although Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are in violation of federal 16 mandates regarding state prison populations, as discussed below, the Court finds that a failure to 17 follow these mandates (which Plaintiff has not identified) does not itself violate the Constitution 18 or any other federal rights. 19 2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 20 Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. 21 R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 22 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so 23 long as (1) the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and 24 occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); 25 Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). The “same transaction” requirement 26 refers to similarity in the factual background of a claim. Id. at 1349. Only if the defendants are 27 properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court review the other claims to determine if they may 28 be joined under Rule 18(a), which permits the joinder of multiple claims against the same party. 1 Plaintiff may not raise different claims against different defendants in a single action. For 2 instance, Plaintiff may not, in a single case, assert a claim related to his inability to obtain 3 schooling, apparently due to overcrowding, while simultaneously asserting a claim related to the 4 presence of mold throughout a building. Unrelated claims belong in different suits. Merely 5 because Plaintiff alleges, without factual support, that all of his claimed injuries are related to 6 overcrowding at the same institution, does not make every injury or incident related. Separate 7 unrelated claims must be filed in separate lawsuits. 8 3. Eighth Amendment – Overcrowding 9 Overcrowding, by itself, is not a constitutional violation. Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 10 F.3d 540, 545 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1248–49 (noting that 11 overcrowding itself not Eighth Amendment violation but can lead to specific effects that might 12 violate Constitution), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 13 (1995); see Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 1989) (allegations of 14 prison overcrowding alone are insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.); see 15 also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 348–49 (double-celling of inmates by itself does not inflict 16 unnecessary or wanton pain or constitute grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of 17 Eighth Amendment). An overcrowding claim is cognizable only if the plaintiff alleges that 18 crowding has caused an increase in violence, has reduced the provision of other constitutionally 19 required services, or has reached a level rendering the institution no longer fit for human 20 habitation. See Balla, 869 F.2d at 471; see, e.g., Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 21 1987) (per curiam) (as amended) (reversing district court’s dismissal of claim that overcrowding 22 caused increased stress, tension, and communicable disease among inmate population); Toussaint 23 v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming that Eighth Amendment violation may 24 occur as result of overcrowded prison conditions causing increased violence, tension, and 25 psychiatric problems). 26 While Plaintiff alleges that overcrowding has caused him a variety of injuries and resulted 27 in a variety of other failings at ASP, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable 28 claim. First, it is not clear which of the listed injuries, if any, were personally experienced by 1 Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not claim that he has experienced long waits for his medications, or that 2 he has suffered any further injury than waiting in a long line to receive his medication. 3 Further, aside from Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, it does not appear that all of the 4 listed injuries are the result of overcrowding. For example, the existence of moldy, rusty water 5 running down the walls from cracked pipes, causing further mold to grow, does not appear related 6 to Plaintiff’s claims of overcrowding. Even assuming that each and every injury alleged is a 7 direct result of overcrowding at ASP, the Court does not find that the crowding has “reached a 8 level rendering the institution no longer fit for human habitation” such that Plaintiff could state a 9 cognizable claim for overcrowding. 10 4. Injunctive Relief 11 Insofar as Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against officials at ASP, any such request is now 12 moot because Plaintiff is no longer housed at that facility. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 13 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (prisoner’s claims for injunctive relief generally become moot 14 upon transfer) (citing Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding 15 claims for injunctive relief “relating to [a prison’s] policies are moot” when the prisoner has been 16 moved and “he has demonstrated no reasonable expectation of returning to [the prison]”)). 17 Further, requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of 18 the Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief 19 [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 20 Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 21 right.” In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must 22 be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires 23 preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. 24 § 3626(a)(2). Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction 25 that goes beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ 26 about issuing a preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law 27 clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Amer. Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th 28 Cir. 1986), quoting Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984). 1 III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 4 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 5 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 6 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 7 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 8 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 9 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 10 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 11 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 12 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 13 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 14 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 15 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 16 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 17 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 18 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 19 B. Discussion 20 Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the 21 Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his 22 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 23 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a 24 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 25 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against 26 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 27 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 28 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 1 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 2 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 3 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 4 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 5 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s January 20, 2026 screening 6 order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a 7 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 8 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 11.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal 9 could result from his noncompliance. 10 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 11 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 12 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in 13 this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion of evidence 14 or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. 15 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 16 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 17 District Judge to this action. 18 Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY 19 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to 21 prosecute this action. 22 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 23 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 24 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file 25 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 26 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages 27 or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in 28 the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be 1 considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 2 result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 3 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 4 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 Dated: March 9, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8

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