Troxler v. Southern Railway Co.

124 N.C. 189
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedMarch 21, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 124 N.C. 189 (Troxler v. Southern Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Troxler v. Southern Railway Co., 124 N.C. 189 (N.C. 1899).

Opinion

Clark, J.

The plaintiff was injured in attempting to couple cars of the defendant on which there were no auto-[191]*191matie car-couplers, but in lieu thereof skeleton draw-beads of unequal height. The Court below held that the absence of automatic couplers, in general use, was negligence, per se, and refused to submit an issue whether the injury was not caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant, and refused to instruct the jury, as prayed, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence if he could by proper care have coupled the cars by hand without accident.

The duty to furnish proper and safe appliances is that of the common master, and injury caused by their absence can not be atributed to the negligence of a fellow-servant. Troxler v. R. R., 122 N. C., 902; Wright v. Railway, Ibid, 959. It has been heretofore held in Greenlee v. Railroad, 122 N. C., 977, that failure of a railroad company to equip its freight cars with modern self-coupling devices is negligence, per se, continuing up to the time of an injury sustained by an employee in coupling cars by hand, and renders the company liable, whether such employee was negligent in the manner of making the coupling, or not. The same ruling had been previously made as to the duty of furnishing automatic car-couplers on passenger trains in Mason v. Railroad, 111 N. C., 482, decided in 1892. Where the negligence of the defendant is a continuing negligence (as the failure to furnish safe appliances, in general use, when the use of such appliances would have prevented the possibility of the injury,) there can be no contributory negligence which will discharge the master’s liability. This has been repeatedly held. Norton v. Railroad, 122 N. C., 911; McLamb v. Railroad, Ibid, at p. 873; Cone v. R. R., 81 N. Y., 206. The failure to provide the necessary appliances is the causa causans. The defendant, however, frankly asks us to reconsider and overrule Greenlee’s case. That case was the expression of no new doctrine, but the affirmation of one [192]*192as old. as the law, and founded on the soundest principles of justice and reason, to-wit: That when safer appliances have been invented, tested and have come into general use, it is negligence, per se, for the master to expose his servant to the hazard of life or limb from antiquated and defective appliances which have been generally discarded by the intelligence and humanity of other employers. Witsell v. Railroad, 120 N. C., 557. This must be so, if masters owe any duties to their employees, and unless economy of expenditures on the part of the railroad management is to be deemed superior-to the conservation of the lives and limbs of those employed in their operation.

In the Twelfth Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1898), published by authority of the United States Government, upon returns made by the railroad companies themselves, it is stated (at p. 88) : “Since the enactment of the law in 1893 (requiring automatic couplers) therehas been a decreasing, number of casualties. There were 1,034 fewer employees killed and 14,062 fewer injured during the year ending June 30, 1897, than during the same period in 1893. The importance of this subject will be realized when the yearly casualties to railway employees are compared with those which occurred during the recent war. In the Spanish-American War there were 298 killed and 1,645 wounded. In-1897 there were 1,693 men killed and 27,667 injured from all causes in railway service. Erom coupling and uncoupling cars alone 219 less were killed and 4,994 less were injured in 1897 than in 1893, when the law was enacted. The number of such employees killed has been reduced one-half, and the number of injured also practically reduced one-half. The reduction in the number of accidents from all causes largely exceeded (by nearly three to one) in a single year the entire casualties resulting from the prosecution of the late war.”

[193]*193Thus in four years — from 1893 to 1897 — notwithstanding the increase of thousands of miles of railways, and many thousands of employees, and the further fact that the railroad corporations have been able to procure from the Inter-State Commerce Commission an extension of the time at which the law of Congress, imposing a penalty for operating any cars without self-couplers, will come into force, the shadow of the law has procured so general an attachment of these self-couplers, that 5,213 fewer employees were killed and wounded in coupling and uncoupling cars in 1897 than in 1893. Can it, therefore, be seriously contended that the absence of such safety appliances is not negligence per se, rendering the railroad company liable for damages ? As these appliances have been patented, and more or less in use for over thirty years, it should not have required an act of Congress to enforce their universal adoption. Failure to adopt them, after being so long and widely known and used, was negligence in the defendant, upon the principles of the common law. Witsell’s case, supra. The Act of Congress imposing a penalty for failure to add the appliances after January 1, 1898, in no wise affected the right of any employee to recover for damages, sustained by the negligence of any railroad company to attach them. The action of the Inter-State Commerce Commission, in éxtending the date at which such Act should come into force (by virtue of authority given in the Act) could not set aside the principle of law that failure to adopt such appliances was negligence per se, nor have any other effect than to postpone the date at which the United States Government would impose the prescribed penalty upon all railroads engaged in inter-state commerce failing to equip all their cars with automatic couplers, a penalty which is imposed irrespective whether any accidents, occur from such failure or not.

[194]*194The indifference of railroad companies shown in not adopting these life and limb saving appliances is all the greater, since their cost is comparatively small. Indeed the Inter-State Commerce Commission, in the above-cited Report (page 89), state that, considering the less expense required in repairs, they are an actual saving. They say: “Figures submitted by one of the leading railroad companies indicate that the adoption of the automatic coupler will result in saving a very large sum annually, in comparison with the expense incurred in former years, in applying and maintaining the linlc-and-pin type; and this does not take into account the reduced cost to the roads, which must result from fewer suits for damages by injured employees. And further, that there being too much slack in the old pin-and-link for the brake to act economically or successfully, the automatic coupler makes the requirements of railroad operation better, as well as minimizes the danger to employees.”

In Witsell v. Railroad, 120 N. C., 557 (at p. 562), it is said: “If an appliance is such that the railroads should have it, the poverty of the company is no sufficient excuse for not having it.” But not only, as above, the use of self-couplers would be' an actual economy to the defendant, but that it is amply able to put on these appliances, if it were not, is shown by the published report of the defendant company that its gross earnings for the year 1895 (when this injury was inflicted) were over seventeen millions of dollars, and its net earnings, over and above all expenses, were more than five millions of dollars (Poor’s R. R. Manual, 1898, p.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Baker v. J. H. Hudson Drilling Co.
1930 OK 402 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1930)
Lee v. Southern Railroad
180 N.C. 413 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1920)
Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co.
97 S.E. 27 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1918)
Parks v. Burk Tannery Co.
94 S.E. 715 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1917)
Smith v. Charlotte Electric Railroad
92 S.E. 382 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1917)
McNeill v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
83 S.E. 704 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1914)
Montgomery v. Carolina & N. W. Railroad
80 S.E. 83 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1913)
Dermid v. Southern Railway Co.
148 N.C. 180 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1908)
Stewart v. Railroad
53 S.E. 877 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1906)
Pressly v. Yarn Mills.
51 S.E. 69 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1905)
Stewart v. . R. R.
50 S.E. 312 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1905)
Bottoms v. Railroad
49 S.E. 348 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1904)
Elmore v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.
44 S.E. 620 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1903)
Orr v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.
44 S.E. 401 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1903)
Fleming v. Southern Railway Co.
42 S.E. 905 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1902)
Elmore v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad
41 S.E. 786 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1902)
Witsell v. . R. R.
27 S.E. 125 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1897)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
124 N.C. 189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/troxler-v-southern-railway-co-nc-1899.