Troup County v. Henderson

121 S.E.2d 65, 104 Ga. App. 29, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 598
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedJune 26, 1961
Docket38872
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 121 S.E.2d 65 (Troup County v. Henderson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Troup County v. Henderson, 121 S.E.2d 65, 104 Ga. App. 29, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).

Opinion

Bell, Judge.

1. This is another in a long series of heart attack by exertion cases to come before this court. The question for decision is whether there is sufficient evidence to authorize the findings of fact as established by the board.

The deceased’s wife testified that he always complained about his arms hurting, but that ¡he never did go to a doctor; that he *31 complained of pains in his chest, thinking he had indigestion, and ate peppermint candy all the time.

The supervisor testified that the deceased began work on the morning of his death around 9:30, and cut bushes with a bush blade having a handle similar to an axe; that during the time the deceased had worked he had complained about indigestion “once in a while”; that he would take mints for this condition and hit his chest; that cutting the bushes on the morning in question required swinging the blade a good many times; that the bushes were small; that the bush axe weighed about three pounds; that two or three hours of swinging it would be a “good bit of exercise.” On cross-examination this witness testified that the deceased had not complained on the day of his death, but had done so several days earlier; that the deceased was laughing and talking while he was eating, and gave no indication he was feeling bad at all. Upon redirect examination, the witness testified that on the day of his death the deceased was not working at his regular job, which was running the grader.

The death certificate stated the death was caused by “acute coronary occlusion.” The first medical witness to testify, Dr. (W), who signed the death certificate, testified that this was his diagnosis; that he only saw the deceased dead in the undertaker’s parlor; and that he based his conclusion as to the cause of death “on the history I got from the coroner and the undertaker.” The following hypothetical question was answered by Dr. (W): “Q. Doctor, I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. Assuming Rufus Henderson, the deceased, was a negro man fifty-three years of age at the time of his death and who for some time prior to his death complained to his wife Maggie Henderson of indigestion and pain in his chest and for years before his death Rufus had worked as a laborer for Troup County, Georgia, and on October 21, 1959, the day of his death, worked as a laborer and his job on the morning before his death at twelve-thirty was clearing a right of way consisting of bushes which he cut with a bush ax for approximately two and a half hours, now after this exertion Rufus sat down to eat his lunch and after completing his lunch dropped dead, Doctor would the exercise and the exertion that Rufus engaged in on the mom *32 ing of October 21, 1959, the day of his death, contribute to, aggravate or precipitate the heart attack which caused his death? A. In my opinion that type of exercise all [or?] work, had this condition existed before he did, it would contribute to it.” On cross-examination Dr. (W) testified that it was difficult to answer whether the exertion of the deceased on the morning in question had anything to do> with his death, and that he was not saying that it did but that it could have, and that the deceased probably had a pre-existing heart condition. He further testified that the lunch of shine bone, candied yams, and a pop drink the deceased had eaten “would have been—had more effect that [sic] the exertion.” Dr. (W) had never treated the deceased, and the first time he saw him was at the undertaking establishment after his death. He further testified: “Q. Doctor, wouldn’t it be more likely that if a man was—had eaten dinner and had slept for ten or fifteen minutes, you couldn’t say that the exertion that he had made prior to the time of his lunch could in any have brought it on? A. In my opinion, no, if he had slept fifteen minutes certainly he had rested well and going to bring it on should have brought it on before then.” Furthermore, “Q. Your opinion is that he died of a heart attack? A. That is my opinion.”

Dr. (W) also testified that the exercise the deceased had had on the morning in question would have aggravated his heart condition “if he had a heart condition,” and that it was problematical whether the deceased died of a heart attack as “there was not a post done”; and that complaints of indigestion and of pain in the arms could indicate more than one thing, “could indicate hypotension, or arthritis, myalgia, influenza, or pettic [sic] ulcer or any of the intestinal conditions.”

Dr. (M) testified that it was possible for a person to have a heart condition without any complaints; that it would be possible for a person who complained of indigestion to have a heart condition and not know it; that the most likely diagnosis when a person who had symptoms of indigestion and pain in his chest for years and who suddenly drops dead would be a cardiac condition. In answer to the same hypothetical question which was asked of the previous medical witness, this doctor stated *33 that assuming the deceased had a heart attack the exercise and exertion could have contributed to, aggravated, or precipitated the attack. On cross-examination, this witness testified he had, to 'his knowledge, never examined the deceased; that due to the fact that the deceased had been doing exercise all his life either in the chaingang, working in work camps, or construction companies, he would have less tendency to be affected by exercise than a man who sat behind a desk; the meal he had eaten could have aggravated the deceased; that if exercise contributed to the attack, the attack could have come later after he had eaten lunch and slept for fifteen minutes; and that it is all very hypothetical as to what caused the attack. On redirect examination he said the exercise would be more aggravating, assuming the man had a heart attack, than the eating of the ham bone; from all these conditions that he knew the deceased could have died from cerebral hemorrhage, cerebral thrombosis, embolism to the cerebral arteries, a heart condition other than a coronary, a heart failure or pulmonary “dema”; it could have been a rupture of the blood vessel of the aorta, which is often found in colored people; that exercise could affect aneurism; that it would have been a respiratory—collapse of the lung, a rupture of the pleura when the lung suddenly collapses. On redirect examination, he stated that violent exercise of three hours would aggravate some of these conditions which were possible causes of the death; the aneurism usually happens after exercise, but he didn’t think it would have any influence on a cerebral thrombosis but exercise might do it some good; he did not think it would affect the cerebral hemorrhage—“folks that have strokes are not generally engaged in heavy work when strokes occur.” “Q. In your opinion then, the exercise and exertion he engaged in on the morning of October 29 the day of his death, assuming he had a heart attack, is this your opinion it did aggravate this condition that caused his death? A. If what you tell me is true, yes, sir.” Following this he testified that no actual determination of the cause of death could be made unless there had been a post mortem or autopsy performed.

A fellow employee, Wilbur Strozier, testified that the de *34

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Bluebook (online)
121 S.E.2d 65, 104 Ga. App. 29, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 598, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/troup-county-v-henderson-gactapp-1961.