Trisha S. Hoover v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

• Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 1:23-cv-00237
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TRISHA S. HOOVER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) VS. ) C.A. No. 1:23-CV-237 ) PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT ) OF CORRECTIONS, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

U.S. D.J. Susan Paradise Baxter I. Introduction

On August 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a four-count Complaint, alleging: (1) discriminatio and retaliation on the basis of sex; (2) discrimination and retaliation for engaging in union activi (3) retaliation for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissio (“EEOC”), and the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association (“PSCOA”) and; (4) breach of contract. See generally ECF No. 1. Only the first three claims remain all of which ar brought before this Court under Title VII.

Defendant moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 33. This motion is now fully briefe and ripe for disposition.

II. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn primarily from Defendant’s Concise Statement and

]

Plaintiff's response thereto. See ECF Nos. 36, 52. Where disputes exist, they are noted where relevant.

This case arises from allegations of discrimination and retaliation brought by Trisha S| Hoover against her employer, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). During th relevant time period, Plaintiff worked as a sergeant and canine (K-9) handler. ECF No. 52 § 6. Shi was the only female K-9 handler in the western region and she was a union representative. Id. § 2, 30. Her annual performance reviews were generally positive. /d. at □ 34.

As of August of 2022, Plaintiff reported to Lieutenant Burger, who was supervised b Acting Captain Berfield. Both Burger and Berfield were subordinate to Director Barnacle.

Within the DOC, “Side Agreements” govern certain positions, including K-9 handlers, whose responsibilities include the care and maintenance of their assigned dogs.! According to th K-9 Drug Interdiction Unit Side Agreement, daily schedules are to be distributed two weeks i advance. ECF No. 36-2.

Over the course of a weekend in early September 2022, there were a series o communications regarding the scheduling of K-9 units for Monday morning. On Friday and Saturday, September 9 and 10, 2022, Burger emailed schedule changes for the upcoming wor week, directing all K-9 handlers in the western region to report to State Correctional Institution a

The Side Agreement provides that a K-9 handler’s day begins when he or she departs from her residence and the workday ends upon return to their residence. Jd. The Side Agreement provides sixteen hours of compensatory time for off-duty dog care. Jd. The Side Agreement permits, with a minimum of 24-hour notice, management may flex the start time of a Handler by two hours before the start of the shift. Jd. Shift hours are considered 0800-1600. ECF No. 36-2. Flex start time can start as early as 0600 ending at 1400 or as late as 1000 ending at 1800. Jd. Anytime required beyond the shift is considered overtime. ECF No. 55-5 p. 55:25.

Somerset (“SCI-Somerset”) on the following Monday, September 12, 2022. ECF No. 52 at § □ 10, 11.

On the morning of Sunday, September 11, 2022, Plaintiff was informed separately of th need for a K-9 unit at SCI Forest on September 12, 2022. ECF No. 36-3. The same day, Plaintifi responded to Burger’s emails stating: “Sgt. Rosenberger and myself were scheduled to be at SC Forest on Monday September, 12"... I will be going to SCI Forest on Monday...” ECF No. 36-3. At the same time, Plaintiff also emailed various supervisory and union-related personnel, includin Burger and Berfield, advising of her intent to file a grievance for failure to provide timel scheduling under the terms of the Side Agreement. ECF No. 57-20. Berfield testified tha following his receipt of these emails, he contacted SCI-Forest to inquire about Plaintiff's schedul at SCI-Forest. ECF No. 56-7 p. 14:13. He was informed that a K-9 was no longer required at SCI+ Forest. Id. Berfield emailed Hoover stating that “Your schedule has remained the same... [t]h destination is Somerset.” ECF No. 36-3.?

Plaintiff maintains that she did not receive Berfield’s Sunday afternoon email directing he to SCI Somerset until she was already en route to SCI Forest on the morning of September 12, 2022. ECF No. 52 § 16. Upon reading the email, Plaintiff contacted Burger for clarity as to wher she was supposed to report and requested that he contact Berfield for guidance as to where sh should report. Jd. { 18. In a signed statement, Burger related that when he asked Berfield fo clarification, Berfield responded “No, don’t call her back. Let the Bitch slice her own throat.” EC

2 In his deposition, Berfield explained that he did not, nor was he required to, explain in detail why this supervisory command was given. ECF No. 55-7 at 42:19-44:15. Hoover disputes this explaining that Berfield was required to give her more information.

No. 57-8. Berfield refutes this in his deposition, testifying that he never made this statement or an other statement to that effect. ECF No. 36-5, p. 22-23.

Plaintiff, not hearing back from Burger, proceeded to SCI-Somerset arriving over 4 hour late. Id. | 20, 21. Plaintiff was the only K-9 handler to report to SCI-Somerset late. Jd. ¥ 31.

Following the incident, Burger submitted a Report of the Incident. Jd. § 22. DO Investigator Harold Kertes was assigned to conduct an administrative investigation int insubordination. ECF No. 55-13 p. 56:3. During that investigation, Kertes reviewed Hoover’s vehicle telematics data and identified discrepancies in her reported work hours. /d. at p. 34:5. Th investigation expanded to include Plaintiffs time reporting practices. Id. Specifically, Plaintifi recorded work time beginning when she began preparing her assigned dogs at home before leaving, including feeding and walking them, rather than when she departed for work. ECF No. 55-5 at p. 57-59.

Plaintiff disputes that her refusal to comply with the direct order to report to SCI-Somerse prompted the broader investigation. ECF No. 52 | 23. Instead, she contends she was targete because, as a union representative, she had repeatedly filed grievances regarding violations of th Side Agreement. Id.?

During the investigation, Plaintiff was directed to turn over all her state-issued equipmen including her dogs. Her state-issued cell phone was collected for review. ECF No. 52 □□□ Investigator Kertes observed Plaintiff delete at least one text message before surrendering th device. Id. § § 26-27. As a result of the administrative investigation, Plaintiff was suspende

3 Importantly, the Complaint and the evidentiary record are silent as to any grievances prior to September 2022.

without pay effective September 23, 2022. Id. { 28. She was informed she could face crimina charges for theft and fraud in relation to her time reporting, though there is no evidence in th record to suggest that any such criminal charges were ultimately filed.

On September 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Claim for Discrimination with the EEOC. Eleve days later, she filed a grievance with the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Associatio (PSCOA) challenging the suspension. Jd. {{ 32.

She remained suspended without pay or benefits from September 23 through January 9, 2023. Id. § 28. Plaintiff was reinstated as a Corrections Officer One at SCI Cambridge Springs, a entry-level position with fewer overtime opportunities and approximately four dollars less hour!

pay than her prior position as a CO-2 K-9 handler. Jd. {| 33, 35.

I. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant i entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 20 (3d Cir, 2000); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). When deciding a motio for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorabl to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth. of Pa. & N.J., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Gd Cir, 1994)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fac remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith respect to an issue 0

.

which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof ... the burden on the moving party may b discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence 0 evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Jd. at 325. Once the moving party has met tha threshold burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is som metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuin issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (settin, forth types of evidence on which nonmoving party must rely to support its assertion that genuin issues of material fact exist). Unsupported allegations, subjective beliefs, or argument alone cannot forestall summa judgment. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (nonmoving party may no successfully oppose summary judgment motion by simply replacing “conclusory allegations of th complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”). If the nonmoving party fail “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... there can be ‘no genuine issue O material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmovin party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Katz v, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 97 F.2d 53, 55, n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23). In Moore v. Walton, 96 F.4t 616 (3d Cir. 2024), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently explained: “A □□□□□□□ dispute exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for th nonmoving party, and a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under thi governing law.” Jd. at 622 (internal punctuation and citations omitted).

IV. Discussion A. Gender Discrimination and Retaliation Plaintiff's gender discrimination and retaliation claims fail because the record does not support an inference that any adverse employment action was taken because of her gender or i response to any protected activity under Title VII. Plaintiff alleges generally that she was “treated different from male coworkers” and tha Captain Berfield, who became her supervisor in August 2022, treated her less favorably than mal officers in the K-9 unit. ECF No. 1 § 2, 39. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff, as a woman. is a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for her position, or that her suspensio constitutes an adverse employment action. The question, therefore, is whether the circumstance surrounding that action give rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to support such an inference. Her complain asserts that Berfield treated her differently from male handlers, but it does not identify specifi conduct demonstrating gender-based discrimination. In opposing summary judgment, Plaintif! advances a broader theory that DOC officials orchestrated a scheme to engineer her suspension! That theory, however, rests largely on speculation and is unsupported by evidence in the record.

The only particularized allegation of gender-based animus concerns a statement attribute to Berfield—‘“let the bitch slice her own throat.” Berfield denies making the remark. Eve assuming the statement was made, a single offensive comment, standing alone, is insufficient as matter of law to establish that the disciplinary action taken against Plaintiff was motivated b gender discrimination. See, e.g., Bumbarger v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., 170 F. Supp. 3d 801, 828 (W.D. Pa. 2016). Because Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence from which a reasonable ju

could conclude that her suspension or demotion occurred because of her gender, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim.

Plaintiff’s retaliation theory in Count I fails for a separate reason. To establish retaliatio under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that she engaged in protected activity — such as opposin discrimination or participating in a Title VII proceeding — and that the employer took advers action because of that activity. Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 3d Cir. 2022); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff identifies no such protected activity tied to the allegation in Count I. Membership in a protected class, standing alone, does not constitute protected activity. See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, because th record does not support an inference of discrimination or retaliation based on gender, Defendan is entitled to summary judgment on Count I.

B. Discrimination and Retaliation for engaging in Union Activities Plaintiffs next retaliation and discrimination claims rest on the premise that the DOC acted against her because of her participation in union activities. Title VII, however, does no prohibit retaliation or discrimination based on union advocacy or participation in workplac grievances. Because the conduct identified by Plaintiff concerns a contractual scheduling disput rather than opposition to unlawful discrimination, Count II cannot proceed.

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and from retaliating against employees who oppose practice made unlawful by the statute or participate in a Title VII proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006). Workplac

complaints constitute protected activity only when they involve opposition to discrimination base on one of those protected characteristics. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad, of Wilmington, 45 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006); Barber, 68 F.3d at 701-02.

The conduct identified by Plaintiff concerns a scheduling dispute arising under a union Side Agreement. In an email to supervisory personnel, Plaintiff asserted that a schedule chang violated the agreement’s requirement of two weeks’ notice and indicated that the matter would b grieved. ECF No. 53-20 at 5. The communication does not reference discrimination based on an protected characteristic nor does Plaintiff contend that the anticipated grievance would challeng such discrimination.

Because Plaintiffs complaint concerned a contractual scheduling issue rather tha opposition to unlawful discrimination, it does not constitute protected activity under Title VII. See Ferra v. Potter, 324 F. App’x 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2009). Title VII does not create a cause of actio for adverse treatment based on union membership or participation in union activities. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count II.

C. Count III - Retaliation for Filing a Complaint with the EEOC Plaintiff's final retaliation claim under Title VII fails because the record does not support the required causal connection between her protected activity and the suspension and demotio that followed. Although Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge shortly before the suspension was imposed, the undisputed record demonstrates that the disciplinary process leading to that action was already underway before the EEOC charge was filed.

Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because she ha opposed an unlawful employment practice or participated in a Title VII proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Once again, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish tha (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3 there was a causal connection between the two. Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-41. The first two elements are not in dispute. Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC o September 15, 2022 alleging discriminatory treatment in the K-9 Drug Interdiction Unit. Filing a EEOC charge constitutes protected activity under Title VII. See Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 2005). Eight days later, on September 23, 2022, Plaintiff was placed on unpal suspension — an action that qualifies as materially adverse for purposes of a retaliation claim. So then, any dispute centers on causation. A plaintiff may establish causation throug unusually suggestive temporal proximity or through other evidence from which retaliatory motiv

may reasonably be inferred. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 Gd Cir. 2000).

Here, the sequence of events undermines any inference of retaliatory motive. O September 12, 2022 — three days before Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge—Investigator Kerte scheduled a meeting with Plaintiff to occur on September 22, 2022. ECF No. 1 at {] 64. At th conclusion of the meeting, Plaintiff was informed that she would be placed on unpaid leave. □□□ □ {4 66-67. Thus, the disciplinary inquiry that culminated in Plaintiff's suspension had already bee initiated before Plaintiff engaged in the protected activity on which she now relies.

Plaintiff argues that the meeting was pretextual. But the pretext theory she advances relates to her broader claim of gender discrimination, not to retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. A

discussed above, the Court has found no evidentiary support for that theory. Nor does Plaintif identify evidence suggesting that the EEOC filing itself prompted the disciplinary action.

In these circumstances, the brief interval between the EEOC charge and Plaintiff suspension is insufficient, standing alone, to establish causation. Because the undisputed recor shows that the disciplinary process began before the protected activity occurred, no reasonabl jury could infer that the suspension was imposed in retaliation for the EEOC filing.

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant on Count III.

V. Conclusion For the reasons above, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 33] wil be GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.

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