Trisci v. Trisci

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Trisci v. Trisci

251 A.D.2d 494, 673 N.Y.S.2d 918, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6893

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 15, 1998

StatusPublished

This text of 251 A.D.2d 494 (Trisci v. Trisci) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Trisci v. Trisci, 251 A.D.2d 494, 673 N.Y.S.2d 918, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6893 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

—In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff wife appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Peter C. Patsalos, J.), dated June 23, 1997, which granted the defendant husband’s motion to dismiss, as time-barred, the third cause of action which was to rescind the parties’ antenuptial agreement.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The third cause of action of the complaint was to rescind the parties’ antenuptial agreement dated March 5, 1982. The husband moved to dismiss that cause of action as time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations because the action was not commenced until December 1996 (see, Djavaheri-Saatchi v Djavaheri-Saatchi, 236 AD2d 583; Anonymous v Anonymous, 233 AD2d 350). The wife contended that the cause of action was not time-barred because the Statute of Limitations was tolled by duress.

When duress is part of the cause of action alleged, the Statute of Limitations is tolled until the duress terminates, as such conduct is considered a continuing wrong (see, Zoe G. v Frederick F. G., 208 AD2d 675). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the wife, she has not met her burden of demonstrating such continuing duress as would toll the running of the Statute of Limitations. Rosenblatt, J. P., Sullivan, Altman and Luciano, JJ., concur.

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—In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff wife appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Peter C. Patsalos, J.), dated June 23, 1997, which granted the defendant husband’s motion to dismiss, as time-barred, the third cause of action which was to rescind the parties’ antenuptial agreement.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The third cause of action of the complaint was to rescind the parties’ antenuptial agreement dated March 5, 1982. The husband moved to dismiss that cause of action as time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations because the action was not commenced until December 1996 (see, Djavaheri-Saatchi v Djavaheri-Saatchi, 236 AD2d 583; Anonymous v Anonymous, 233 AD2d 350). The wife contended that the cause of action was not time-barred because the Statute of Limitations was tolled by duress.

When duress is part of the cause of action alleged, the Statute of Limitations is tolled until the duress terminates, as such conduct is considered a continuing wrong (see, Zoe G. v Frederick F. G., 208 AD2d 675). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the wife, she has not met her burden of demonstrating such continuing duress as would toll the running of the Statute of Limitations. Rosenblatt, J. P., Sullivan, Altman and Luciano, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

251 A.D.2d 494, 673 N.Y.S.2d 918, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6893, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trisci-v-trisci-nyappdiv-1998.

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