Trischan v. Suns Legacy Partners LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03184
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Andrea Trischan, No. CV-24-03184-PHX-SHD

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Suns Legacy Partners LLC,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant Suns Legacy Partners, LLC ("Suns Legacy") 16 Motion to Dismiss counts two, three, five, and seven of Plaintiff Andrea Trischan's First 17 Amended Complaint ("FAC").1 (Doc. 18.) For the reasons explained below, Suns 18 Legacy's motion is granted. 19 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 These facts are derived from the FAC, which are assumed true for purposes of this 21 motion. In November 2021, "ESPN published an investigative article titled 'Allegations of 22 Racism and Misogyny within the Phoenix Suns: Inside Robert Sarver's 17-Year Tenure as 23 Owner.'" (Doc. 6 ¶ 14.) In response, Suns Legacy, which operates the Phoenix Suns 24 basketball team, asserted it had a "commitment to racial diversity," but "many employees 25 disputed this defense." (Id. ¶ 15.) The National Basketball Association ("NBA") then 26 "mandated that [Suns Legacy] address its diversity and inclusion shortcomings," which 27 1 Suns Legacy requested oral argument. (Doc. 18 at 1.) It is not necessary to hear 28 further argument, and the ruling will be based solely on the papers. See LRCiv 7.2(f) (motions may be decided without oral argument). 1 "eventually lead[] to the creation of a Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) leadership 2 position." (Id. ¶ 17.) In 2022, Suns Legacy hired Trischan for this role. (Id. ¶ 18.) 3 "Upon joining the Suns, [Trischan] quickly observed challenges in executing her 4 role effectively." (Id. ¶ 19.) For example, Kim Corbitt, a senior vice president and 5 Trischan's direct supervisor, gave Trischan a list of individuals to serve on a diversity 6 council. (Id.) But Trischan's colleagues expressed concern because certain executives on 7 the list had "reputations for discriminatory or hostile behavior." (Id. ¶ 22.) Trischan's 8 "concerns and investigations into these troubling practices were met with increasing 9 hostility from management," including Corbitt. (Id. ¶ 29.) 10 During her time at SLP, Trischan had other issues involving Corbitt and another 11 employee, Elizabeth Mariscal. (Id. ¶ 36, 41–42.) On one occasion, Trischan alleges, 12 "Mariscal made a racially insensitive remark directed toward a group of Black employees 13 . . . eating Chick-fil-A." (Id. ¶ 36.) Trischan reported this to Corbitt, but Corbitt dismissed 14 Trischan's comments. (Id. ¶¶ 41–42.) On another occasion, Trischan alleges, Mariscal 15 gave a Black intern a negative assessment, despite the intern's colleagues "consistently 16 describ[ing] her as pleasant and easy to work with." (Id. ¶ 44.) Corbitt dismissed the 17 concern when Trischan reported it. (Id.) Corbitt also "refused to assign [Trischan] to a 18 different work partner" than Mariscal despite allegedly "knowing Mariscal harbored 19 disdain for Black individuals." (Id. ¶ 86.) 20 In March 2023, Trischan organized a women's lunch event. (Id. ¶ 30.) "Despite 21 receiving positive feedback" for the event, "Corbitt's demeanor changed abruptly the next 22 day, accusing [Trischan] of 'acting aggressively' without substantiating these claims." (Id.) 23 Then, during a May 2023 meeting, Trischan "noticed a distinct lack of unity" within the 24 human resources team. (Id. ¶ 31.) "When she suggested a meeting to foster team 25 cohesion," another employee "erupted" and accused Trischan of being "aggressive." (Id.) 26 Corbitt placed Trischan on administrative leave, then enforced a "Performance 27 Improvement Plan . . . as a pretext for termination, despite previously acknowledging that 28 the incident had been 'blown out of proportion.'" (Id. ¶ 32.) Corbitt ultimately terminated 1 Trischan, citing "vague accusations about her performance" and "failure to 'create an 2 inclusive culture.'" (Id. ¶ 33.) 3 After Trischan's termination, she "filed discrimination complaints with the U.S. 4 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ["EEOC"] and the Arizona Attorney 5 General's Office in July and August 2023." (Id. ¶ 34.) The EEOC issued a Notice of Right 6 to Sue letter on November 15, 2024. (Id. ¶ 6.) 7 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 8 On November 14, 2024, Trischan filed her Complaint asserting claims under 42 9 U.S.C. § 1981 for retaliation (Count One) and the Arizona Civil Rights Act ("ACRA") for 10 discrimination (Counts Two and Three). (Doc. 1.) On November 27, 2024, Trischan filed 11 her FAC, adding claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count Four), and 12 for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") (Count Five), intentional infliction 13 of emotional distress ("IIED") (Count Six), and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision 14 ("negligent hiring") (Count Seven). (Doc. 6.) 15 Suns Legacy now moves to dismiss Counts Two, Three, Five and Seven of the FAC: 16 the ACRA claims, the NIED claim, and the negligent hiring claim. (Doc. 18.) Trischan 17 filed a response on January 24, 2025, (Doc. 20), and Suns Legacy filed a reply on January 18 31, 2025, (Doc. 21). 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD 20 "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 21 accepted as true" and construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, "to state a claim 22 to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation 23 marks omitted). A claim is plausible if the plaintiff pleads "factual content that allows the 24 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 25 alleged." Id. In making this determination, the Court does not accept legal conclusions as 26 true, nor does the Court consider "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 27 supported by mere conclusory statements." Id.; see also id. ("Nor does a complaint suffice 28 if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." (alteration in 1 original) (quotation marks omitted)). That said, "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 2 motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 3 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (emphasis added). A "well-pleaded complaint may proceed even 4 if" actual proof of those facts "is improbable[] and . . . a recovery is very remote and 5 unlikely." Id. at 556 (quotation marks omitted). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 Suns Legacy brings two challenges to Trischan's complaint: first, that Trischan's 8 ACRA claims (counts two and three) are barred by the statute of limitations, and second, 9 that Trischan's negligence claims (counts five and seven) are barred by the exclusive 10 remedies provision of Arizona's workers' compensation statute. (Doc. 18 at 4, 7.) Each 11 argument will be addressed in turn. 12 A. Timeliness of the ACRA Claims 13 "When a district court sits in diversity, or hears state law claims based on 14 supplemental jurisdiction, the court applies state substantive law to the state law claims." 15 Mason & Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int'l LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 16 2011). State substantive law includes the state statute of limitations. Albano v. Shea Homes 17 Ltd. P'ship, 634 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 2011). "Federal courts must [also] abide by a 18 state's tolling rules, which are integrally related to statutes of limitations." Id. Under the 19 ACRA, "[i]n no event shall any action be brought pursuant to this article more than one 20 year after the charge to which the action relates has been filed." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41- 21 1481(D). 22 1. Judicial Admission 23 The parties dispute when Trischan filed charges with the EEOC and the Arizona 24 Civil Rights Division ("Division"), and thus, when the one-year limitations period began 25 to run. Trischan's FAC alleges that she filed charges in July and August 2023, (Doc. 6 at 26 8), in which case "the one-year statute of limitations expired, at the latest, at the end of 27 August 2024," (Doc. 18 at 8). However, in her response to Suns Legacy's motion to 28 dismiss, Trischan asserts that she filed charges with the EEOC and Division on November 1 13, 2023. (Doc. 20 at 9.) This later date would extend the limitations period to November 2 13, 2024, one day before Trischan filed her complaint in this court. (Id.) Trischan does 3 not explain the discrepancy between her FAC and her response, so it is unclear whether 4 she filed multiple charges with the EEOC and Division, whether the FAC's allegations are 5 incorrect, or whether some other explanation exists. (See id. at 9–13.) 6 "Factual assertions in pleadings and pretrial orders, unless amended, are considered 7 judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party who made them." Am. Title Ins. Co. 8 v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). When a conflict arises between 9 statements made in the parties' briefing and allegations in the complaint, the complaint 10 controls. Cf. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 470 n.6 (2013) 11 (holding that defendant was bound by concessions made in answer despite new arguments 12 in briefing). And while a party may correct an "ostensible judicial admission" by 13 "explain[ing] the error in a subsequent pleading," Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 14 859–60 (9th Cir. 1995), Trischan offers no explanation for the contradiction between her 15 FAC and Response. Thus, for purposes of this order, the operative filing dates with the 16 EEOC and Division are July and August of 2023 and to preserve her claim, Trischan had 17 to file her complaint sometime before the end of August 2024. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41- 18 1481(D). Because Trischan did not file her complaint until November 2024—three months 19 after the August deadline—her ACRA claims are untimely. 20 2. Equitable Tolling 21 Trischan next argues that the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled because 22 (1) she reasonably relied on a Right to Sue Notice she received from the EEOC that 23 indicated the deadline to file was November 13, 2024, and (2) her complaint—filed on 24 November 14, 2024—was only one day late because of a technical error with the court's 25 filing system. (Doc. 20 at 9–13.) 26 Arizona courts have not addressed whether equitable tolling applies to the ACRA's 27 one-year statute of limitations. They have, however, applied equitable tolling to a different 28 limitations period in the statute: the 90-day filing deadline, which is triggered upon receipt 1 of the right to sue notice.2 See Kyles v. Contractors/Eng'rs Supply, Inc., 949 P.2d 63, 65– 2 67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). Unlike the 90-day deadline, the one-year statute of limitations 3 specifies that "[i]n no event shall any action be brought . . . more than one year after" filing 4 charges with the EEOC and Division. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1481(D) (emphasis added). 5 Such absolute language may indicate that no circumstance, equitable or otherwise, tolls the 6 one-year limitations period. See Enriquez v. Gemini Motor Transport LP, 2021 WL 7 5908208, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2021) (noting that "the statutory language seems to foreclose 8 [equitable tolling]"). But see McCloud v. Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 170 P.3d 691, 696 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) for the 10 assertion that "limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling" (quotation 11 marks omitted)). 12 It is not necessary to decide whether equitable tolling applies to ACRA's one-year 13 limitations period because even if it does, Trischan's claim fails. Trischan's primary 14 argument—that she relied on a misleading Right to Sue Notice—is undermined by a critical 15 fact: she received the Right to Sue Notice after she decided to file this action. (Doc. 20 at 16 13) (acknowledging that Trischan received the Right to Sue Notice on November 15, two 17 days after she first attempted to file her complaint). In making her decision to file, Trischan 18 could not have "reasonably relied" on or been misled by a document she did not have. The 19 Right to Sue Notice does not support equitable tolling.3 20 Trischan's remaining arguments are premised on the assumption that the filing 21 deadline was November 13, 2024. (Doc. 20 at 9–13.) She argues that the November 13 22 deadline should be tolled one day, to November 14, because she attempted to file on the 23 13th, but due to a technical error the court only received her filing fee, not her filing 24 documents. Id. Trischan asserts that she was diligent in discovering and fixing this error, 25 responding within two hours when the court notified her of the deficiency, and that the 26 2 Due to an amendment in 2021, the statute no longer includes the 90-day filing 27 deadline. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1481(D) (2021).

28 3 Trischan cites to a November 2024 Right to Sue Notice as “Exhibit 1” but did not attach it. (See Doc. 20 at 9.) 1 court should therefore toll the deadline. Id. 2 Trischan's explanation for the delay from November 13th to 14th may be well taken. 3 But the period Trischan must account for is the three-month delay between August 2024 4 (the deadline for filing based on her allegations) and November 2024 (when her complaint 5 was filed). Absent a showing "(1) that [Trischan] . . . pursu[ed] [her] rights diligently," 6 during this period and "(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way," 7 Trishan is not entitled to equitable tolling. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) 8 (citation omitted). 9 As alleged, Trischan's ACRA claims are untimely and she has not demonstrated that 10 the limitations period should be equitably tolled. Accordingly, Claims Two and Three are 11 dismissed with leave to amend. Trischan may, if she has a basis to do so under rule 11, 12 correct the FAC's allegation that she filed charges with the EEOC and Division in July and 13 August of 2023 if the allegation is indeed an error. See Sicor, 51 F.3d at 859–60; PAE 14 Gov't Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "there is 15 nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent a party from filing successive 16 pleadings that make inconsistent or even contradictory allegations" but noting that Rule 11 17 still serves as a basis to "deal[] . . . with bad faith conduct"). 18 B. Negligence Claims 19 Suns Legacy next argues that Trischan's state-law claims for negligent hiring and 20 NIED are barred because "in the employment context, workers' compensation is the 21 exclusive remedy for allegations of negligence." (Doc. 18 at 6–7.) "It is well settled that 22 work-related injury claims are generally redressed exclusively under Arizona's workers' 23 compensation scheme." Gamez v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 34 P.3d 375, 378 (Ariz. Ct. App. 24 2001). As such, to defeat the preemptive effect of Arizona's workers' compensation 25 scheme, Trischan must show that her negligence claims are exempted from its reach. 26 1. Willful Misconduct Exception 27 Under the "exclusive remedy" provision of Arizona's worker compensation statutes, 28 an employee may not "maintain an action at law for damages" against their employer unless 1 their "injury is caused by the employer's wilful misconduct." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23- 2 1022(A). "Wilful misconduct . . . means an act done knowingly and purposely with the 3 direct object of injuring another." Id. § 23-1022(B). "Gross negligence is not sufficient to 4 establish wilful misconduct under § 23-1022." Gamez, 34 P.3d at 378. Nor does "wanton, 5 wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence" qualify. Id. 6 (citation omitted); see also Serna v. Statewide Contractors, 429 P.2d 504, 508 (Ariz. Ct. 7 App. 1967) (holding that willful misconduct requires "deliberate intention as distinguished 8 from some kind of intention presumed from gross negligence"). In short, an employer's 9 negligence, no matter its severity, cannot establish willful misconduct. 10 As a result, Arizona's workers' compensation scheme does not preclude intentional 11 tort claims, but it does preclude claims predicated on an employer's negligence. 12 Mosakowski v. PSS World Med., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d. 1112, 1130–31 (D. Ariz. 2003); 13 compare Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 586 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that employee's 14 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was not barred by Arizona's workers' 15 compensation scheme), with Irvin Invs., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 800 P.2d 979, 980, 982 (Ariz. 16 Ct. App. 1990) (directing employee's negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim to 17 be dismissed because it was covered by the workers' compensation statute). 18 This conclusion is necessary given the nature of a negligence claim. The 19 "fundamental distinction between negligence and an intentional tort is whether the 20 consequences of the act or omission are unintentional or intentional." Ryan v. Napier, 425 21 P.3d 230, 235 (Ariz. 2018). As a result, "negligence and intent are mutually exclusive 22 grounds for liability." Id. at 236. Trischan's argument that Suns Legacy's alleged intentional 23 misconduct allows her negligence claims to proceed cannot be reconciled. After all, "[a] 24 finding of negligence necessarily includes a finding that the act was not intentional," Globe 25 Indem. Co. v. Blomfield, 562 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), and an unintentional 26 act cannot support a finding of willful misconduct under section 23-1022(A), see Gamez, 27 34 P.3d at 378. Trischan's negligence claims therefore do not qualify for the willful 28 misconduct exception. 1 2. Compensation for Mental Injuries 2 Trischan briefly argues that her NIED claim can proceed under § 23-1043.01(B), 3 which specifies that certain mental injuries are compensable through workers' 4 compensation. (Doc. 20 at 15) (arguing that Trischan's mental injuries resulting from Suns 5 Legacy's NIED are not covered by workers' compensation because Suns Legacy intended 6 to cause her harm). But this argument suffers from the same defect as her arguments under 7 the willful misconduct exception—that is, it assumes that Suns Legacy's conduct was 8 intentional, not negligent. (See id. at 15.); see also Ryan, 425 P.3d at 235–36 ("Any given 9 act may be intentional or it may be negligent, but it cannot be both."). 10 Arizona's workers' compensation scheme is the "exclusive remedy" for Trischan's 11 negligent hiring and NIED claims. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1022(A). Suns Legacy's 12 motion to dismiss is therefore granted. See Brandon v. Liddy, 2012 WL 4052372, at *7 13 (D. Ariz. 2012) ("Ultimately, because plaintiff is seeking to hold defendants liable on 14 account of their negligence, her claim for negligent supervision does not fall under the 15 wilful misconduct exception and fails as a matter of law."); Fox v. Arizona, 2023 WL 16 4315221, at *9 (D. Ariz. 2023) (dismissing a plaintiff's negligent hiring claim because 17 "Plaintiff's claim is based on the negligence of her statutory employer" and was therefore 18 barred by the exclusive remedies provision (citation omitted)); Soto v. LHM Corp., 2017 19 WL 11438581, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2017) (dismissing a plaintiff's NIED claim with prejudice 20 because "courts have repeatedly determined that negligence claims by employees against 21 their current or former employers are precluded by" the exclusive remedies provision). 22 Because Trischan's negligence claims are barred as a matter of law, leave to amend would 23 be futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 24 Accordingly, 25 IT IS ORDERED that Suns Legacy's partial motion to dismiss the FAC (Doc. 18) 26 is granted as follows: 27 (1) Counts Two and Three (ACRA) are dismissed with leave to amend; 28 (2) Count Five (NIED) is dismissed without leave to amend; and 1 (3) Count Seven (Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision) is dismissed 2 without leave to amend. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Trischan may file a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") within 14 days of this Order. Consistent with LRCiv 15.1, Trischan || shall file, concurrently with any SAC, a notice of filing the amended pleading that attaches 6 || acopy of the amended pleading indicating in what ways it differs from the Complaint. 7 Dated this 22nd day of September, 2025. 8 / 9 10 ) | H le Sharad H. Desai 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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