Tripp v. State

575 S.E.2d 507, 276 Ga. 104, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 160, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 18
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJanuary 13, 2003
DocketS02A1876
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 575 S.E.2d 507 (Tripp v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tripp v. State, 575 S.E.2d 507, 276 Ga. 104, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 160, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 18 (Ga. 2003).

Opinion

Sears, Presiding Justice.

The appellant, Hillman Tripp, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to bar his prosecution for murder based on the alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. In balancing the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 1 we conclude that the State’s delay in bringing Tripp to trial must be weighed against the State, but that that factor is outweighed by the lack of prejudice to Tripp. As for prejudice, 2 although the record shows that Tripp has suffered some anxiety and *105 stress, Tripp was only incarcerated for several weeks and then was released on bond, and thus has not shown oppressive pretrial incarceration. More importantly, there is no evidence in the record that Tripp’s defense has been impaired by the delay in bringing him to trial. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Tripp’s motion to bar his prosecution.

Decided January 13, 2003. Michael R. Duponte, Brian Steel, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Christopher M. Quinn, Ashutosh S. Joshi, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
1

407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972).

2

“In analyzing the prejudice factor, we ‘consider three interests: (i) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and (iii) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’ Brannen v. State, 274 Ga. 454, 456 (553 SE2d 813) (2001).” State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 513 (555 SE2d 710) (2001). Moreover, “ ‘[o]f these forms of prejudice, “the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” ’ ” Johnson, 274 Ga. at 513, quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 (II) (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

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Related

State v. Lattimore
696 S.E.2d 613 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2010)
Watkins v. State
600 S.E.2d 747 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2004)
Hudson v. State
591 S.E.2d 807 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
575 S.E.2d 507, 276 Ga. 104, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 160, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 18, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tripp-v-state-ga-2003.