Trina Honeycutt v. State of Arkansas

2020 Ark. App. 449, 608 S.W.3d 631

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: September 30, 2020
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 449 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Reason: I attest to the accuracy DIVISION II and integrity of this document Date: 2021-07-12 14:07:12 No. CR-20-65 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: 9.7.5 Opinion Delivered: September 30, 2020

TRINA HONEYCUTT APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT V. [NO. 16JCR-15-343]

STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE TONYA M. ALEXANDER, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge

Trina Honeycutt appeals a Craighead County Circuit Court order revoking her

probation and sentencing her to five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.

Honeycutt claims that she needed rehabilitation rather than incarceration and that her

noncompliance was excusable given her untreated substance-abuse issues. We find no error

and affirm.

On April 27, 2015, Honeycutt pled guilty to one count of theft of property with a

value of over $1,000 and less than $5,000. In return for her guilty plea, she received a five-

year suspended imposition of sentence (SIS). As a condition of her suspended sentence, she

agreed that she would not commit any criminal offense punishable by imprisonment; would not use, sell, distribute, or possess any controlled substance; and would pay court costs and

fees in the amount of $256 in regular installments of $50 a month.1

In September 2017, the State filed a petition to revoke Honeycutt’s SIS. The State

alleged that Honeycutt had failed to live a law-abiding life and to be of good behavior. More

specifically, the State alleged that she had violated state law by possessing illegal drugs, had

been charged with possession of methamphetamine, and had attempted to discard a baggie

of methamphetamine to avoid arrest and prosecution. The State further alleged that she

failed to pay her fines, court costs, and restitution as ordered.

Subsequently, the State amended its petition to include additional violation

allegations. The State alleged that Honeycutt had failed to appear at four separate hearings—

December 1, 2017, October 8, 2018, February 11, 2019, and September 3, 2019—resulting

in arrests warrants being issued and that she had failed to return to custody at the Craighead

County jail after she was released from a drug-rehabilitation program for noncompliance.

Honeycutt was also later charged with an additional count of possession of

methamphetamine arising out of an incident on February 22, 2018.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial on the petition to revoke. The State presented

evidence of two separate incidents wherein Honeycutt was arrested and charged with

possession of methamphetamine. The State also entered into evidence, without objection,

records from the Craighead County Sheriff’s Office showing that Honeycutt had made no

payments on her court-ordered costs, fines, and fees; the warrants issued for her arrest after

1 We note that the probation order also required Honeycutt to pay a $250 public- defender fee. The sentencing order, however, did not include this fee.

2 she failed to appear; and documents evidencing her failure to return to jail after her removal

from the drug-rehabilitation program.

Honeycutt also testified at the revocation hearing. In her testimony, she made several

admissions. She admitted that she had not led a law-abiding life and had used controlled

substances. In fact, she admitted that she was an addict and that her addiction resulted in

most of her probation violations. Her addiction resulted in her removal from one drug-

rehabilitation program over a dispute regarding her prescribed medication and from another

treatment program after a former resident accused her of stealing a bible. After she was

discharged from treatment, she did not report back to the county jail as ordered upon her

release.

Concerning her court dates, she missed her first court date because of a mistake, the

second because of anxiety due to her PTSD, and the third because she was not feeling well.

She also admitted that she had not paid her monetary obligations, claiming that it was

difficult to make ends meet, that it had “slipped” her mind that she needed to pay, and that

she had only recently obtained employment.

Despite these admissions, she stated that she had been sober for approximately nine

months. She testified that she believed she could easily overcome her addiction and asked

the court to give her another chance. After hearing all the evidence and arguments of

counsel, the circuit court revoked Honeycutt’s SIS and sentenced her to five years in the

Arkansas Department of Correction. Honeycutt challenges the revocation arguing that she

needed rehabilitation rather than incarceration and that her noncompliance was excusable

given her untreated substance-abuse issues.

3 Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-308(d) (Supp. 2019), a circuit

court may revoke a defendant’s suspended sentence at any time prior to the expiration of

the period of suspended sentence if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a term or condition of the defendant’s

suspended sentence. Keyes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 202, 575 S.W.3d 166. The State bears

the burden to prove a violation of a term or condition by a preponderance of the evidence.

Baker v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 468.

On appeal, we uphold the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly against the

preponderance of the evidence. Id. We need proof of only one violation of the conditions

of probation or SIS to support a revocation, and evidence that is insufficient for a criminal

conviction may be sufficient for a revocation proceeding because the burdens of proof are

different. Keyes, supra. Because a determination of the preponderance of the evidence turns

heavily on questions of credibility and weight to be given to the testimony, the appellate

courts defer to the circuit court’s superior position in this regard. Id.

Honeycutt first argues that the circuit court erred in failing to find her

noncompliance excusable due to her drug addiction and need for rehabilitation. In a

revocation proceeding, the State, however, need only present evidence of noncompliance.

E.g., Hart v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 434, at 3, 530 S.W.3d 366, 368. Once the State goes

forward with evidence of noncompliance, the defendant must then go forward with

evidence of a reasonable excuse for noncompliance. E.g., Anglin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 34,

36, 249 S.W.3d 838, 838 (2007).

Here, the State presented ample evidence of noncompliance: failure to live a law-

abiding life; methamphetamine possession; failure to appear at hearings; failure to report to

4 jail after her dismissal from her drug-treatment program; and failure to pay her court-ordered

monetary obligations. While Honeycutt testified about her reasons for her noncompliance,

the circuit court had the discretion to either accept or reject any of her excuses for

noncompliance. See Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 306, 550 S.W.3d 916. The circuit court

did not abuse its discretion in rejecting her excuses, especially when she had admitted

violations of her SIS even during a period of sobriety.

Finally, Honeycutt’s argument that the circuit court erred in imposing a five-year

sentence rather than rehabilitation for her drug addiction also fails. Upon a revocation of a

suspended sentence, the circuit court can impose any sentence that could have been imposed

as long as any sentence of imprisonment, when combined with any previous term of

imprisonment, does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense. Ark. Code Ann. §

16-93-308(g) (Supp. 2019); see also, Neal v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 480, 588 S.W.3d 759.

The court heard and considered Honeycutt’s request for additional rehabilitation but

rejected it. The court in its oral ruling specifically noted that Honeycutt had been discharged

from two separate treatment programs during the pendency of the revocation proceedings

and questioned whether any additional efforts at rehabilitation at the time would even be

fruitful. Given the evidence presented, the circuit court’s decision was not an abuse of

discretion.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.

Terry Goodwin Jones, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.