Trimm v. New York State Dept. of Corr's and Community Services

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 27, 2025
Docket7:24-cv-02737
StatusUnknown

This text of Trimm v. New York State Dept. of Corr's and Community Services (Trimm v. New York State Dept. of Corr's and Community Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trimm v. New York State Dept. of Corr's and Community Services, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT et —_____ □ 5/27/2025 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DEE BIDEDS ——_.

DUSTIN J. TRIMM, Plaintiff, No. 24-CV-2737 (NSR) ~against- OPINION & ORDER NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF CORR. AND COMMUNITY SERVS., et al., Defendants. NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge: Pro se Plaintiff, Dustin Trimm (the “Plaintiff’), currently incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims of constitutionally inadequate medical care and deliberate indifference under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.! (See Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff sues Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Daniel F. Martuscello, Health Commissioner Carol A. Moorse, Green Haven Correctional Facility Superintendent Mark Miller, and Green Haven Deputy Superintendent for Health Services Billie Tuohy (collectively, the “Defendants”). Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint (the “Motion”, ECF No. 23.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.

' Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, but under Second Circuit precedent, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees while the Eighth Amendment applies to convicted prisoners. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017). Plaintiff's Complaint indicates that he is a “convicted and sentenced state prisoner” and not a pretrial detainee. Accordingly, the Court will only analyze and address Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide adequate medical attention when he suffered an injury to his left leg when attempting to walk down the cell block at Green Haven Correctional Facility (“Green Haven”). On March 14, 2024, pro se Plaintiff “heard a weird noise

in [his] left leg between [his] calf and ankle.” (Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff describes it as sounding like “something had popped, snapped or tore” and that he could not apply any pressure to his left leg. Shortly after, Plaintiff notified a correctional officer and he was sent to the infirmary for an evaluation. (Id. at 17.) At the infirmary, Plaintiff was examined by a nurse at Green Haven who diagnosed him with a pulled muscle and gave him three Motrin, a muscle relaxer, and ice for his leg. (Id.) After this treatment, the attending nurse discharged Plaintiff from the infirmary over his objections. (Id.) The same nurse also gave Plaintiff a “mandatory clinic appointment slip” that allowed him to receive medicine from the clinic over the next two days. (Id. at 18.) Despite this slip, Plaintiff was denied medication on one of those two days because the original attending nurse had given him the wrong permit and “did not follow proper protocol and did everything wrong.”

(Id.) Plaintiff maintains that, as of the date of the Complaint, he has still yet to be called back to the infirmary since March 16, 2024.2 In addition to this incident, Plaintiff also noted that he has had issues with his legs since March 2023. (Id. at 19.) He claims that he has “dropped numerous sick call slips and was never called.” (Id.) Plaintiff appended to his Complaint several pieces of correspondence between him and DOCCS officials where he complains of inattention to his medical needs. See Exhibits 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10. Plaintiff also included several sick call slips that he maintains went unanswered. See Exhibits 2, 3, and 7.

2 Plaintiff signed and submitted the Complaint for transmission on March 28, 2024. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants filed the Motion on January 13, 2025 (ECF No. 23), as well as a memorandum of law (“Defs.’ MoL.”, ECF No. 24) and reply (ECF No. 25), in support thereof. As indicated by Defendants’ letter on

May 2, 2025, Plaintiff never served Defendants with an opposition to the Motion. (ECF No. 26.) As a result, the Court and Defendants treated Plaintiff’s letter of October 10, 2024 as the opposition brief (the “Opp.”). (ECF No. 22.) LEGAL STANDARDS A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction A challenge to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction is properly raised by way of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008). “A ‘case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.’” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Markarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d

Cir. 2000)). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170. While a Court must accept all factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, a jurisdictional showing must be made affirmatively; “it is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.” Id. When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. See Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In

considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “begins by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Pro se complaints, however, are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers. Thomas v. Westchester County, 2013 WL 3357171 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013). Because of this a pro se party’s pleadings should be read, “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Id. at 2. Applying the pleading rules permissively is especially appropriate when pro se plaintiffs allege civil rights violations. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.

2008). Even in a pro se case, however, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d. Cir.

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Trimm v. New York State Dept. of Corr's and Community Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trimm-v-new-york-state-dept-of-corrs-and-community-services-nysd-2025.