Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. 13-C-15-103324
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 494
September Term, 2016
______________________________________
VALERIE TRIM, et al.
v.
YMCA OF CENTRAL MARYLAND, INC. ______________________________________
Eyler, Deborah S., Arthur, Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ. ______________________________________
Opinion by Arthur, J. ______________________________________
Filed: July 25, 2017 “An automated external defibrillator (AED) is a portable device that checks the
heart rhythm and can send an electric shock to the heart to try to restore a normal
rhythm.” What is an Automated External Defibrillator?, NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND
BLOOD INSTITUTE, https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/aed (last viewed
July 25, 2017). 1
“AEDs are used to treat sudden cardiac arrest,” which is “a condition in which the
heart suddenly and unexpectedly stops beating.” Id. When a person suffers sudden
cardiac arrest, “blood stops flowing to the brain and other vital organs.” Id.
Sudden cardiac arrest “usually causes death if it’s not treated within minutes.” Id.
1 Maryland Code (1978, 2014 Repl. Vol.), § 13-517(a)(2) of the Education Article contains the following definition:
(2) “Automated external defibrillator (AED)” means a medical heart monitor and defibrillator device that:
(i) Is cleared for market by the federal Food and Drug Administration;
(ii) Recognizes the presence or absence of ventricular fibrillation or rapid ventricular tachycardia;
(iii) Determines, without intervention by an operator, whether defibrillation should be performed;
(iv) On determining that defibrillation should be performed, automatically charges; and
(v) 1. Requires operator intervention to deliver the electrical impulse; or
2. Automatically continues with delivery of electrical impulse. Consequently, “[u]sing an AED on a person who is having [sudden cardiac arrest] may
save the person’s life.” Id.
Maryland Code (1978, 2014 Repl. Vol.), § 13-517 of the Education Article
establishes a public access program for AEDs in this State. In brief summary, the statute
is designed to encourage the installation of AEDs in places of business and public
accommodation, but to ensure that the devices are operable and are to be used by people
who are properly trained to use them.
This case principally concerns whether § 13-517 of the Education Article or its
accompanying regulations prescribe a duty of care that requires a business to use an AED
to provide cardiac defibrillation to someone who has suffered or reasonably appears to
have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. We hold that they do not.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2
A. The Incident at the YMCA
On November 12, 2014, Vincent Trim, age 53, suddenly collapsed while he was
playing basketball at a YMCA in Ellicott City. Julie Heard, a YMCA fitness instructor,
was near the doors to the basketball court at the time. Ms. Heard had 20 years of training
and experience in administering life support and resuscitation measures, including the use
of an AED.
According to Ms. Heard, several people ran out of the court, asking someone to
2 In recounting the factual background in this case, we rely on the allegations of the complaint, as well as the undisputed factual assertions in connection with a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
-2- call 911. Ms. Heard heard that someone had fainted. Another YMCA employee heard
that a person was having a seizure. Yet another employee ran to the front desk to call
911.
Ms. Heard ran onto the court. She saw Mr. Trim lying unconscious on the floor.
He had no pulse and was gasping (exhibiting “agonal breathing”), which is a potential
sign of cardiac arrest. Ms. Heard began to administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(“CPR”), and she directed a bystander to go to the front desk to call 911. While she was
administering CPR, another member told her that she was already calling 911. Although
the YMCA had an AED that was just outside the doors of the basketball court, Ms. Heard
did not retrieve it or ask anyone to retrieve it for her.
As a result of Ms. Heard’s efforts, Mr. Trim began to breathe on his own, but his
breathing stopped again after a few seconds. With the assistance of another employee,
Ms. Heard continued to administer CPR until the Howard County paramedics arrived,
about five minutes after they were first called.
When the paramedics entered the court, a YMCA employee heard one of them say
that he needed to go back to the ambulance to retrieve his AED. The employee told the
paramedic that the YMCA’s AED was just outside the doors of the basketball court. The
paramedic instructed the employee to retrieve the AED, which he did.
The paramedics used the AED, but were unsuccessful in resuscitating Mr. Trim.
He died a few days later as a result of a cardiac arrest and the consequent cessation of
blood flow to his brain and other vital organs.
-3- B. Wrongful Death Action
On April 27, 2015, Mr. Trim’s widow, appellant Valerie Trim, filed a wrongful
death and survival action against the YMCA. Citing the COMAR regulations that were
propounded to implement § 13-517 of the Education Article, appellant principally alleged
that the YMCA “had a statutory and/or regulatory duty to utilize the AED on its premises
. . . after [Mr. Trim’s] collapse in the gymnasium.” Because it did not comply with that
alleged duty, appellant alleged that the YMCA was negligent per se. 3
The YMCA moved to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively, for summary
judgment. It advanced three grounds: (1) that § 13-517 does not impose an affirmative
duty to use an AED; (2) that the statute contains an immunity provision, which shields it
from liability “for any act or omission in the provision of automated external
defibrillation”; and (3) that an exculpatory clause within YMCA’s membership
agreement, which was signed by Mr. Trim, released it from liability.
After a hearing on April 28, 2016, the Circuit Court for Howard County granted
the YMCA’s motion. Appellant noted a timely appeal.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Appellant presents three issues, which we have rephrased as follows:
1. Did the circuit court err in determining that § 13-517 of the Education Article or its implementing regulations do not establish a statutory duty of care by the YMCA and its employees?
3 Contrary to that allegation, the violation of a statutory duty may afford evidence of negligence under Maryland law, but it does not establish negligence per se. See, e.g., Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 126 (2014); Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 557 (2003).
-4- 2. Did the circuit court err in determining that the YMCA and its employees were immune from civil liability under § 13-517 of the Education Article?
3. Did the circuit court err in determining that the YMCA membership agreement exculpated the YMCA and its employees from civil liability? 4
In response to the first question, we hold that the statute and regulations do not
establish a statutory duty of care that required the administration of automated external
defibrillation in the circumstances of this case. In view of our answer to the first
question, it is unnecessary to address the second and third questions. We shall affirm the
circuit court’s judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In its dispositive motion, the YMCA included materials outside of the pleading.
The circuit court did not exclude those materials. Hence, the court was required to treat
4 Appellant presented the questions as follows:
1. Whether the circuit court erred in determining that the Maryland Public Access Automated External Defibrillator Program Does Not Establish a Statutory Duty of Care Requiring Registered Facilities and Their Employees to Affirmatively Utilize the Onsite Automated External Defibrillator Device and Render Defibrillation to Individuals Suffering a Sudden Cardiac Arrest?
2. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Determining that the YMCA and its Employees Were Immune from Civil Liability for Alleged Acts and/or Omissions of Negligence in Failing to Provide Automated External Defibrillation to Vince Trim Following His Sudden Cardiac Arrest?
3. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Determining that the Language Contained in the YMCA Membership Agreement Exculpated the YMCA and its Employees from Civil Liability Stemming from Allegations of Negligence?
-5- the motion, and did in fact treat it, as a motion for summary judgment. Md. Rule 2-
322(c) (“[i]f, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment”); see
also Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 782 (1992).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court “shall enter judgment in favor of or
against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-501(f).
The propriety of a grant of summary judgment is a question of law. Butler v. S &
S P’ship, 435 Md. 635, 665 (2013) (citation omitted). In an appeal from the grant
of summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the
circuit court’s conclusions were legally correct. See D’Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549,
574 (2012).
In this case, unlike many summary judgment cases, there was no real dispute of
fact: the dispute involved the purely legal question of whether § 13-517 of the Education
Article or its implementing regulations imposed a duty of care on the YMCA to use an
AED when Mr. Trim exhibited signs of sudden cardiac arrest. We conduct a de novo
review of that exercise in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt,
Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 (2012); Sail Zambezi, Ltd. v. Md. State Highway Admin., 217 Md.
App. 138, 150 (2014).
-6- DISCUSSION
“[I]n some instances, the duty of care in a negligence action may arise from statute
or regulation.” Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 103 (2014). “[W]here there
is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes
the plaintiff,” a “defendant’s duty ordinarily is ‘prescribed by the statute’ or ordinance[,]
and . . . the violation of the statute or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence.” Brooks
v. Lewin III Realty, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 78 (2003) (quoting Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344,
358-59 (2000)); accord Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. at 111; Gourdine v.
Crews, 405 Md. 722, 755 (2008); Pendleton v. State, 398 Md. 447, 466 (2007);
Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 584 (2003).
“Under this principle, in order to make out a prima facie case in a negligence
action, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed
to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the
violation proximately caused the injury complained of.” Brooks v. Lewin III Realty, Inc.,
378 Md. at 79; accord Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. at 112; Kiriakos v.
Phillips, 448 Md. 440, 457 (2016); Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 421 Md.
355, 388 (2011); C & M Builders, LLC v. Strub, 420 Md. 268, 281-82 (2011).
Appellant contends that § 13-517 and its accompanying regulations were designed
to protect a class of persons who, like her late husband, have suffered or reasonably
appear to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. She contends further that the statute and
the regulations prescribe a duty of care that requires entities such as the YMCA to use an
AED when a person has suffered or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac
-7- arrest. Finally, she contends that her husband died as a proximate result of the YMCA’s
breach of that alleged duty.
We need not decide whether the General Assembly passed § 13-517 for the
protection of the particular class that appellant has identified, whether Mr. Trim was a
member of that class, or whether the failure to administer automated external
defibrillation was a proximate cause of Mr. Trim’s death. In this case, the decisive
question is whether § 13-517 or the implementing regulations mandate that an entity like
the YMCA use an AED when a person suffers or appears to have suffered sudden cardiac
arrest.
To answer that question of statutory interpretation, we first examine the ordinary
meaning of the enacted language. Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc., 439 Md. 646,
665 (2014) (quoting Nichols v. Suiter, 435 Md. 324, 339 (2013)). “If the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the language[.]” Windesheim
v. Larocca, 443 Md. 312, 341 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[A] court
may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain
and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or
subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Stickley v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 431 Md. 347, 359 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless,
to understand the meaning of statutory language, we must look beyond individual words
and clauses to the larger context, including other surrounding provisions and the apparent
purpose of the enactment. See, e.g., Williams v. Peninsula Regional Med. Ctr., 440 Md.
573, 580-81 (2014).
-8- I. The Language of the Statute
Section 13-517(b)(1) of the Education Article establishes “a Public Access
Automated External Defibrillator Program” – i.e., a program concerning public access to
AEDs. The program is administered by the Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”)
Board. Id. § 13-517(b)(3).
The EMS Board has the power to adopt regulations to administer the program; to
issue and renew certificates to “facilities” that meet the statutory requirements; and to
deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew a facility’s certificate if it fails to meet the
statutory requirements. Id. § 13-517(c)(1)-(3). The statute defines the term “facility” to
mean “an agency, association, corporation, firm, partnership, or other entity.” Id. § 13-
517(a)(4). The YMCA is a “facility.”
Subject to a few exceptions that are inapplicable to this case, “[e]ach facility that
desires to make automated external defibrillation available shall possess a valid
certificate from the EMS Board.” Id. § 13-517(d)(1). To qualify for a certificate, a
facility must:
(1) Comply with the written protocol approved by the EMS Board for the use of an AED which includes notification of the emergency medical services system through the use of the 911 universal emergency access number as soon as possible on the use of an AED;
(2) Have established automated external defibrillator maintenance, placement, operation, reporting, and quality improvement procedures as required by the EMS Board;
(3) Maintain each AED and all related equipment and supplies in accordance with the standards established by the device manufacturer and the federal Food and Drug Administration; and
-9- (4) Ensure that each individual who is expected to operate an AED for the registered facility has successfully completed an educational training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.
Id. § 13-517(e)(1)-(4).
A certificate is valid for three years (id. § 13-517(h)(3)), and the EMS Board must
issue a “renewed certificate to a facility that meets” the statutory requirements. Id. § 13-
517(h)(1).
There is no dispute that, at the time of the events that gave rise to this case, the
YMCA had a valid certificate. In the language of the statute, therefore, the YMCA was a
“registered facility.” Id. § 13-517(a)(10).
II. Duties Under the Statute
In her brief, appellant acknowledges that “[t]he AED Statute and related COMAR
regulations are silent as to whether or not a registered facility like the YMCA has an
affirmative duty to provide and render automated external defibrillation in the event of a
sudden cardiac arrest.” In our view, the legislative and regulatory silence establish that §
13-517 imposes no affirmative duty on a registered facility like the YMCA.
The legislative silence in this statute stands in contrast to the affirmative
obligations that were enunciated in statutes or ordinances that have been found to
prescribe a duty of care towards members of a specific class. In each of those cases, the
statute, ordinance, or regulation employed mandatory language to define what a person
had a duty to do or to refrain from doing. See, e.g., Kiriakos v. Phillips, 448 Md. at 495
(concluding that a social host owes a duty to persons injured as a result of a minor’s
underage drinking, where a statute provided that “an adult may not knowingly and
- 10 - willfully allow an individual under the age of 21 years actually to possess or consume an
alcoholic beverage at a residence”); Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. at 125, 128
(concluding that an apartment complex owes a duty to unsupervised children where a
regulation stated that “an owner shall ensure that a recreational pool . . . is completely
surrounded by a barrier that . . . does not allow the passage of a sphere 4 inches in
diameter,” the size a young child’s head); Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 421
Md. at 392-95 (concluding that a landowner owes a duty to its neighbors where an
ordinance stated that “[a] person must not engage in any land-disturbing activity or by
any action cause or permit any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or other material, to
be deposited upon or to roll, flow, or wash upon or over the premises of another in a
manner to cause damage”); Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. at 83, 89
(concluding that a landlord owed a duty to the occupants of a rental unit where
ordinances stated that “[a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and windows shall be kept
clean and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint” and that “[a]ll interior loose or
peeling wall covering or paint shall be removed”); Moore v. Myers, 161 Md. App. 349,
364 (2005) (concluding that owners of pit bull terriers owed a duty to persons attacked by
their dogs where an ordinance stated that “[t]he owner shall maintain the dog within a
building or a secure kennel” and that “[w]henever the dog is removed from the building
or kennel it shall be secured by an unbreakable or unseverable leash and maintained
under the control of an adult”); compare Pace v. State, 425 Md. 145, 169-70 (2012)
(concluding that a federal statute did not impose a statutory duty of care on the defendant,
where the petitioner “could not ‘identify . . . specific words and phrases in the [statute]
- 11 - that . . . obligated the . . . State defendants to take some specific action”) (internal
quotation omitted).
Nothing in § 13-517 obligated the YMCA to take any specific action when Mr.
Trim exhibited signs of sudden cardiac arrest. The statute, therefore, does not impose an
affirmative obligation on the YMCA to use the AED.
III. The Implementing Regulations
In arguing that a registered facility has an affirmative duty to use an AED
whenever a person suffers or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest,
appellant relies largely on the implementing regulations that the EMS Board adopted, not
on the language of the statute itself. Appellant incorrectly refers to the regulations as “the
words utilized by the Legislature,” which they are not. 5
Nonetheless, assuming that the EMS Board could prescribe a duty of care on
registered facilities like the YMCA, its regulations do not, in our view, impose an
affirmative duty to use an AED when a person suffers or reasonably appears to have
suffered sudden cardiac arrest.
Among other things, the regulations require a facility to designate an AED
coordinator who has received CPR and AED training and who must ensure that the AED
5 It is true that, insofar as a regulation illustrates an agency’s understanding of the authority that the legislature has delegated to it, the regulation may supply some indirect evidence of the meaning of a statute. See Christ by Christ v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 Md. 427, 437 (1994). But to understand what a statute means, we typically look to the statutory language itself, not to the implementing regulations. Again, it is telling that appellant does not base an argument on the statutory language itself.
- 12 - equipment is regularly inspected (presumably to ensure that it works). See COMAR
30.06.02.01(A). They require a facility to inform its employees and volunteers about the
operation, maintenance, and location of its AEDs. See id. 30.06.02.01(B). They require
a facility to place its AEDs in locations that are visible and readily accessible to anyone
who might be willing to operate them in case of an instance of cardiac arrest. See id.
30.06.02.01(C). They require a facility to have a telephone or “other communication
service” to notify public safety officials in case of an emergency. See id. 30.06.02.01(D).
They require the facility to submit data to the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical
Services Systems. See id. 30.06.02.01(E). They require the facility to ensure that all
“expected operators,” which are defined as “individual[s] identified by a registered
facility to operate an AED at a registered facility” (see id. 30.06.01.01(B)(3)), have
completed CPR and AED training. See id. 30.06.02.01(F). Finally, in a section titled
“Protocol,” they state that “[a]ll personnel who are expected to operate an AED” must
“utilize the AED in accordance with their training.” See id. 30.06.02.02.
Nothing in these regulations imposes an affirmative duty to use an AED whenever
a person suffers or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. The
regulations simply require a facility to obtain training for the persons who may operate
the device, to take steps to ensure that the device will work if it is needed, to inform
employees and volunteers about where the devices are located and how they work, to
have a means of communicating with the authorities in case of an emergency, and to
make reports to the governing body. Most of the regulations are concerned only with
- 13 - what a facility must do in order to obtain a certificate. Neither the statute nor the
regulations, therefore, creates the duty that appellant seeks to enforce.
IV. Legislative History of the Statute
Appellant goes on to argue that the drafting history of § 13-517 reveals a
legislative intention to require registered facilities to use AEDs whenever a person suffers
or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. Although Maryland courts
ordinarily do not look to legislative history if, as in this case, the meaning of a statute is
clear on its face (see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo, 439 Md. 441, 453-55 (2014)), we have
considered appellant’s arguments and found them wanting.
The General Assembly enacted the original version of § 13-517 in 1999.
Appellant focuses on amendments that occurred in 2008.
Before the 2008 amendments, the statute contained the following language:
(c) The EMS board may: . . . (5) Approve educational and training programs required under this section that . . . (ii) Include training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation . . . .
* * * *
(f) To qualify for a certificate a facility shall: . . . (6) Ensure that each individual who operates an automated external defibrillator for the authorized facility has successfully completed an education training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.
(j) An individual who is authorized to operate an automated external defibrillator at an authorized facility may administer automated external defibrillation to an individual who is reasonably believed to be a victim of sudden cardiac arrest if physician services or emergency medical services are not immediately available.
- 14 - Md. Code (1978, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 13-517 of the Education Article.
In 2008 the General Assembly altered those provisions in the following manner:
(c) The EMS board may: . . . (5)(4) Approve educational and training programs required under this section that . . . (ii) Include training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation AND AUTOMATED EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATION . . . .
(f)(e) To qualify for a certificate a facility shall: . . . (6) (4) Ensure that each individual who operates IS EXPECTED TO OPERATE an automated external defibrillator AED for the authorized REGISTERED facility has successfully completed an education training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.
(j) An individual who is authorized to operate an automated external defibrillator at an authorized facility may administer automated external defibrillation to an individual who is reasonably believed to be a victim of sudden cardiac arrest if physician services or emergency medical services are not immediately available.
2008 Md. Laws, ch. 593, § 1. 6
Appellant focuses, first, on the removal of former subsection (j), which said that
an “authorized” person at an “authorized facility” “may administer automated external
defibrillation[.]” (Emphasis added.) She argues that by deleting the paragraph that
contained the permissive verb “may,” the legislature “essentially endorsed an implicit
reading and interpretation,” under which a facility “shall” provide automated external
6 The 2008 legislation is accessible through the General Assembly’s website, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov.
- 15 - defibrillation if a person suffers (or reasonably appears to have suffered) sudden cardiac
distress.
Appellant tacitly concedes the case with the equivocal language about “implicit”
readings. To ascertain what a statute means, a court looks at the actual language of the
statute and does not add language that the legislature did not include. Nothing in the
actual language states or even implies that a facility has an affirmative obligation to use
an AED in any circumstance.
Appellant goes on to cite the amendment to what is now subsection (e)(4). In that
amendment the legislature changed the phrase “an individual who operates an automated
external defibrillator” to “an individual who is expected to operate an AED.” In her
view, the change “establishes an affirmative and ‘expected’ duty on the part of a
registered facility.”
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive. In full, subsection (e)(4) states that “[t]o
qualify for a certificate a facility shall: . . . (4) Ensure that each individual who is
expected to operate an AED for the registered facility has successfully completed an
educational training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.” In
context, this language means that a facility can obtain a certificate only if the person who
is expected (i.e. anticipated) to use its AED has the proper training to use the AED. This
language does not create a duty to use an AED in any specific set of circumstances; it
simply creates a condition precedent for the acquisition of a certificate. The legislature
did not surreptitiously incorporate an affirmative duty to use an AED when it required an
- 16 - expected (or anticipated) operator to receive training before a facility could receive a
certificate.
Appellant concludes with a rhetorical question about why the legislature would
establish a statewide program for public access to AEDs unless it intended that registered
facilities would have an affirmative obligation to use them. The short answer is that the
legislature wanted to encourage businesses, public facilities, and places of public
accommodation to make these life-saving devices available, while ensuring that the
devices would work, that people knew where they were located, and that they would be
used by persons with proper training if they are used at all.
The Court of Appeals of New York has expressed a similar insight. In Miglino v.
Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 342 (2013), that court held that
even though a statute required a fitness club to install an AED and to have at least one
employee or volunteer who held a valid certification in the use of the device, the club had
no affirmative duty to use the AED when a member suffered sudden cardiac arrest. Id. at
349. In rejecting the contention that its interpretation rendered the statute meaningless,
the court stated, “[T]here is nothing meaningless or purposeless about a statute that seeks
to insure the availability of AEDs and individuals trained in their use at locations – i.e.,
health clubs – where there is a population at higher risk of sudden cardiac arrest.” Id. “A
law that mandates the presence of AEDs and trained individuals at health clubs is easy to
obey and enforce,” the court added. Id. By contrast, an affirmative duty to employ the
device in specific circumstances “would engender a whole new field of tort litigation,
saddling health clubs with new costs and generating uncertainty.” Id. at 349-50. The
- 17 - court concluded that “[t]he legislature is unlikely to have imposed such a new duty absent
an express statement.” Id. at 350. We agree.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we hold that § 13-517 of the Education Article and its implementing
regulations do not impose an affirmative obligation on registered facilities, like the
YMCA, to use an AED when a person suffers, or reasonably appears to have suffered,
sudden cardiac arrest. Consequently, we affirm the grant of the YMCA’s dispositive
motion. 7
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
7 In view of our decision, it is unnecessary to decide whether the failure to use the AED at all amounts to an “omission in the provision of automated external defibrillation,” which would render the YMCA immune from civil liability under § 13- 517(j)(1) of the Education Article. It is also unnecessary to decide whether the exculpatory language in the YMCA’s membership agreement operates as a prospective release of the claims in this case.
- 18 -