Triangle Finishing Corp. v. Fair Lawn Finishing Co.

142 F. Supp. 575, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3159
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 12, 1956
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 142 F. Supp. 575 (Triangle Finishing Corp. v. Fair Lawn Finishing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Triangle Finishing Corp. v. Fair Lawn Finishing Co., 142 F. Supp. 575, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3159 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).

Opinion

SUGARMAN, District Judge.

On September 7, 1950 the plaintiffs, Triangle Finishing Corp. and Arthur J. Nisbet, commenced suit against the defendants Fair Lawn Finishing Company and Weldon G. Helmus.

The Pleadings.

The complaint, as finally amended, states two causes of action. The first, basing jurisdiction upon a federal question, diversity and amount alleges the residence of the parties; that from 1939 to 1948 the plaintiff, Arthur J. Nisbet (Nisbet), experimented upon and developed a method of heat setting nylon fibers and, in 1948, at the plant of the plaintiff, Triangle Finishing Corp (Triangle) built a machine for heat setting knit nylon fabrics in a certain manner called Trianizing, which became widely accepted in the nylon knit fabric industry. It further alleges that during that period Nisbet confidentially disclosed his process of Trianizing to the defendants, Fair Lawn Finishing Company (Fair Lawn) and Weldon G. Helmus (Helmus) with the limitation that the defendants not appropriate the process unto themselves. It further alleges that nonetheless, defendants obtained two patents (Nos. 2,-499,141 and 2,499,142) on February 28, 1950, based upon Nisbet’s disclosures to defendants from which patents it is alleged defendants are benefiting financially. The first cause of action then seeks judgment

“(a) declaring said patents Nos. 2,499,141 and 2,499,142 to be the property of and to belong to Plaintiffs and that Defendants are trustees ex malificio in behalf of Plaintiffs;
“(b) awarding an accounting to Plaintiffs so that they may recover all income, profits, royalties and other gains which Defendants, solely and jointly, have made and secured as a result of their possession of said patents Nos. 2,499,141 and 2,-499,142;
“(c) compelling an assignment of said patents Nos. 2,499,141 and 2,-499,142 to Plaintiffs, together with an assignment of all license agreements made for or in behalf of Defendants.”

[576]*576Except for the residence of the parties, the answer of the defendants to the amended complaint denies all of the first cause of action.

The second cause of action, basing jurisdiction upon the patent laws, alleges that Helmus applied for, received and assigned to Fair Lawn said patents; that defendants, before and since the issuance thereof, have threatened plaintiifs with infringement thereof; that said patents are the property of plaintiifs, are “void, invalid, of no legal effect, and should be cancelled”; that they were invented by Nisbet and not by Helmus, but were “surreptitiously and unjustly patented” by defendants. Then, asserting an actual controversy between plaintiffs and defendants as to infringement, validity and ownership of said patents and the absence of an adequate remedy at law, the second cause of action seeks a judgment

“(d) declaring that Plaintiffs do not infringe said patents Nos. 2,499,-141 and 2,499,142;
“(e) enjoining and restraining Defendants, their officers, directors, employees, agents and all those acting for or in their behalf, at first temporarily during trial and thereafter permanéntly, from threatening or harassing Plaintiffs or their customers or prospective customers with infringement of said patents Nos. 2,499,141 and 2,499,142;
“(f) awarding costs, counsel fees and such other relief as may seem just and proper in the premises.”

Except for the allegations of Helmus’ application for, receipt by and assignment to Fair Lawn of said patents, the defendants’ answer denies all of the second cause of action.

In addition to the foregoing denials, the answer, on behalf of both defendants, sets forth the defense that Nisbet, at the time he made the alleged disclosure to defendants, was an employee of duPont, under contract that any invention conceived by him during said employment should become the property of his employer. It might parenthetically be noted that this defense was abandoned during trial, the parties agreeing that, assuming the inventions to have been conceived by Nisbet, duPont asserts no claim to them. A further defense, on behalf of Helmus, avers that he, as the inventor of the patents, assigned the applications therefor to Fair Lawn, to whom they were ultimately granted and that any acts by Helmus were as an officer and employee of Fair Lawn and not on his own behalf.

The answer then sets up a counterclaim which, after predicating jurisdiction upon the patent laws, alleges the residence of the parties; that Fair Lawn is vested with right, title and interest in patents Nos. 2,499,141 and 2,499,142; that said patents are of great value to Fair Lawn and the public; that Fair Lawn expended large sums of money in making the inventions profitable to it and useful to the public; that Fair Lawn employed the inventions of, and manufactured and sold articles made according to and embodying the invention of said patents; that such articles have been introduced into extensive commercial use; that great and increasing demand exists for them, which demand Fair Lawn is prepared to meet to the benefit and advantage of the public. The counterclaim then charges that plaintiffs,, knowing the foregoing and without permission from Fair Lawn, injured it by unlawfully practicing the methods exposed by patent No. 2,499,142 and used and sold articles made according to the inventions disclosed by patent No;. 2,499,141; that plaintiffs derived, and will continue to derive, profit therefrom unless such alleged infringement be restrained; that plaintiffs continue their alleged infringement notwithstanding notice to desist from Fair Lawn; and finally, that plaintiffs have rejected Fair Lawn’s offer to grant them a license under said patents. The defendants then demand judgment

“(a) dismissing the complaint as to them and awarding expenses incurred in connection with this action and a reasonable attorney’s fee;
“(b) holding that said letters patent of the United States Nos. 2,499,-[577]*577141 and 2,499,142 are good and valid in law, that defendant Fair Lawn Finishing Company is vested with all right, title and interest in and to the inventions of and said letters patent and that plaintiffs have infringed upon said letters patent;
“(c) awarding a permanent injunction, and a preliminary injunction during the pendency of this action, restraining and enjoining plaintiffs, Triangle Finishing Corp. and Arthur J. Nisbet, their legal representatives or assigns, and each of their attorneys, agents, servants, employees and all others acting by and under their direction or authority from employing the inventions of said letters patent No. 2,499,142 and from making, using or selling articles made according to and embodying the inventions of said letters patent No. 2,499,141;
“(d) awarding an accounting of the damages of defendant, Fair Lawn Finishing Company, because of infringement of plaintiffs upon said letters patent Nos.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 F. Supp. 575, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/triangle-finishing-corp-v-fair-lawn-finishing-co-nysd-1956.