Treyone Devon Johnston v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 13, 2018
• Docket: 49A02-1709-CR-2169
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 13 2018, 7:51 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Rory Gallagher Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Appellate Division Tyler G. Banks Indianapolis, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Treyone Devon Johnston, March 13, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1709-CR-2169 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable David J. Certo, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G12-1607-CM-26450

Bailey, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-CR-2169 | March 13, 2018 Page 1 of 4 Case Summary [1] Following a bench trial, Treyone Devon Johnston (“Johnston”) was convicted

of Disorderly Conduct, as a Class B Misdemeanor. 1 Johnston now appeals,

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting his claim of self-defense.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] Around 2:00 a.m. on July 10, 2016, Officer Kevin Moore of the Indianapolis

Metropolitan Police Department (“Officer Moore”) was parked in his patrol

car, observing the crowd at a nightclub in downtown Indianapolis. At some

point, Officer Moore heard and saw an argument between Johnston and

another man. Officer Moore exited his car, approached the club, and saw

Johnston punch the man. A fight ensued. Officer Moore’s verbal attempt to

break up the fight was unsuccessful, at which point Officer Moore deployed his

taser. Johnston was arrested and charged with Disorderly Conduct. The trial

court then held a bench trial, at which Johnston claimed self-defense. The court

found Johnston guilty and imposed a sentence. Johnston now appeals.

1 Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-CR-2169 | March 13, 2018 Page 2 of 4 Discussion and Decision [4] Johnston argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut his claim

of self-defense. In reviewing such challenges, we use “the same standard as for

any claim of insufficient evidence.” Carroll v. State, 744 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Ind.

2001). We “will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense

was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v. State, 770

N.E.2d 799, 800-801 (Ind. 2002). Moreover, in conducting our review, “[w]e

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Sanders v.

State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999). Rather, we consider the evidence, and

all reasonable inferences, in a light most favorable to the judgment. Id.

[5] To obtain a conviction, the State was obligated to prove, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Johnston “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . . engage[d] in

fighting or tumultuous conduct.” I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a). At trial, Johnston argued

that he was acting in self-defense. Under the Indiana self-defense statute, “[a]

person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect

the person . . . from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use

of unlawful force.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). However, the use of force is not

justified if “the person has entered into combat with another person or is the

initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the encounter and

communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the other person

nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.” I.C. § 35-41-

3-2(g)(3). “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the

evidence,” Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800, the State must then “disprove, beyond a

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-CR-2169 | March 13, 2018 Page 3 of 4 reasonable doubt, at least one element of self-defense,” Carroll, 744 N.E.2d at

433. To meet this burden, the State may either “rebut[] the defense directly or

rely[] on the sufficiency of evidence in its case-in-chief.” Id. at 434.

[6] Johnston’s self-defense argument relied on testimony indicating that he was not

the initial aggressor—testimony that conflicts with Officer Moore’s testimony.

Moreover, there was no evidence that Johnston withdrew from the physical

altercation. See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(3); Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. Ultimately,

the evidence favorable to the judgment indicates that Johnston argued outside a

nightclub, threw the first punch, and kept fighting even after Officer Moore

arrived. We conclude that this is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable

trier of fact could reject a claim of self-defense and find Johnston guilty.

[7] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-CR-2169 | March 13, 2018 Page 4 of 4