In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00069-CR ___________________________
TREVIONTA TERRELL SANDERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from 372nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1645518D
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State indicted appellant Trevionta Terrell Sanders for robbery by threats.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2). In 2021, the trial court placed Sanders on
deferred-adjudication community supervision.1 Thereafter, the State filed a series of
petitions to proceed to an adjudication that ended with its fifth amended petition.
After a hearing on the State’s fifth amended petition, the trial court found that
Sanders had violated the conditions of his community supervision as alleged in six of
the eleven paragraphs of the State’s petition. After a punishment trial, the trial court
sentenced Sanders to ten years’ incarceration in the penitentiary.2
On appeal, Sanders argues that the trial court violated his right to confront
witnesses under the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. Because
1 The deferred-adjudication order incorrectly recites that Sanders committed the offense of robbery by causing bodily injury. See id. § 29.02(a)(1). The trial court later corrected this error with an order nunc pro tunc. 2 At one point, the trial court stated that it found Sanders “guilty” of robbery by causing bodily injury. At first blush, this appeared to be an adjudication of guilt for the wrong underlying offense, which was robbery by threats. But the trial court later corrected itself and stated that it was finding “true” the allegation in paragraph 2 of the State’s fifth amended petition, which alleged that Sanders had committed a new offense—robbery by causing bodily injury—as a basis for proceeding to an adjudication of quilt on the underlying offence—robbery by threats. After the punishment trial, the trial court sentenced Sanders without expressly finding him guilty of the underlying offense. Under these circumstances, the finding of guilt is implied. See Emeyabbi v. State, No. 06-10-00172-CR, 2011 WL 647242, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Sanchez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.). The judgment adjudicating guilt correctly reflects that Sanders had committed the offense of robbery by threats. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2).
2 Sanders’s complaint on appeal does not address all of the bases of his revocation, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment on the unchallenged bases. And on those bases that
Sanders attacked, we overrule his complaint as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
In its fifth amended petition to proceed to an adjudication, the State alleged
that Sanders had violated the conditions of his community supervision in eleven
paragraphs. Of the eleven paragraphs, the trial court found six to be true. Of the six,
two (paragraphs 2 and 4) dealt with new offenses that Sanders had committed against
a woman and her son on August 26, 2022. Two others (paragraphs 3 and 5) dealt
with Sanders’s evading arrest on August 26, 2022, and again on August 27, 2022. And
the last two (paragraphs 9 and 11) dealt with Sanders’s failure to report to his
probation officer and failure to provide a urine sample, respectively.
II. SANDERS’S ARGUMENT
Sanders contends that, based on violations of the Texas Constitution’s
confrontation clause, see id., the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
State’s Exhibit 2 and State’s Exhibit 3:
• State’s Exhibit 2 is a recording of the 911 call made by the woman who was the subject of the offense alleged in paragraph 2.
• State’s Exhibit 3 is an officer’s body cam video that contained conversations between EMS personnel and the paragraph-2 complainant
3 during which they discussed primarily her injuries and, to a lesser extent, her son’s injuries.3
Thus, the exhibits about which Sanders complains address, at most, paragraphs 2 (the
offense against a woman) and 4 (the offense against the woman’s son) of the State’s
fifth amended petition.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews an order to proceed to adjudication in the same
manner as a decision revoking regular community supervision. Powe v. State,
436 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d). We review a trial court’s
decision to revoke community supervision and to adjudicate guilt for an abuse of
discretion. Id. Proving a single violation suffices to support revocation. Garcia v.
State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d) (“Proof by a preponderance of the evidence
of any one of the alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is
sufficient to support a revocation order.”). Thus, we cannot hold that a trial court
3 In the video, the complainant stated that she had received burns on her hands and arms the previous Wednesday. We take judicial notice that the date of the offense—August 26, 2022—was a Friday. See Tex. R. Evid. 201. During the August 26, 2022 altercation with Sanders, the sterile wrappings on the complainant’s burns had come off, and the medics questioned whether the complainant should go to a hospital. Around the 5:00 point in the recording, one of the medics asked if “he” ripped the gauze off, and around 6:15 of the recording, the same medic asked about the little boy’s lip. During the revocation hearing, testimony showed that at some point during the altercation, the complainant’s two-year-old son received a “busted lip.” The complainant’s son is the subject of the offense alleged in paragraph 4. Photographs of their injuries were admitted without objection.
4 abused its discretion when an appellant does not challenge all of the grounds on
which the trial court based it rulings. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (“The appellant has failed to raise any contentions
concerning the finding that he committed the offense of escape. . . . We need not
address appellant’s other contentions since one sufficient ground for revocation will
support the court’s order to revoke probation.”); Garcia v. State, No. 02-15-00138-CR,
2017 WL 370924, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 26, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (“[T]he trial court’s judgment should be affirmed if the
appellant does not challenge each ground on which the trial court revoked community
supervision.”).
IV. DISCUSSION
Sanders does not challenge the trial court’s findings in paragraphs 3, 5, 9, and
11.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00069-CR ___________________________
TREVIONTA TERRELL SANDERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from 372nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1645518D
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State indicted appellant Trevionta Terrell Sanders for robbery by threats.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2). In 2021, the trial court placed Sanders on
deferred-adjudication community supervision.1 Thereafter, the State filed a series of
petitions to proceed to an adjudication that ended with its fifth amended petition.
After a hearing on the State’s fifth amended petition, the trial court found that
Sanders had violated the conditions of his community supervision as alleged in six of
the eleven paragraphs of the State’s petition. After a punishment trial, the trial court
sentenced Sanders to ten years’ incarceration in the penitentiary.2
On appeal, Sanders argues that the trial court violated his right to confront
witnesses under the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. Because
1 The deferred-adjudication order incorrectly recites that Sanders committed the offense of robbery by causing bodily injury. See id. § 29.02(a)(1). The trial court later corrected this error with an order nunc pro tunc. 2 At one point, the trial court stated that it found Sanders “guilty” of robbery by causing bodily injury. At first blush, this appeared to be an adjudication of guilt for the wrong underlying offense, which was robbery by threats. But the trial court later corrected itself and stated that it was finding “true” the allegation in paragraph 2 of the State’s fifth amended petition, which alleged that Sanders had committed a new offense—robbery by causing bodily injury—as a basis for proceeding to an adjudication of quilt on the underlying offence—robbery by threats. After the punishment trial, the trial court sentenced Sanders without expressly finding him guilty of the underlying offense. Under these circumstances, the finding of guilt is implied. See Emeyabbi v. State, No. 06-10-00172-CR, 2011 WL 647242, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Sanchez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.). The judgment adjudicating guilt correctly reflects that Sanders had committed the offense of robbery by threats. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2).
2 Sanders’s complaint on appeal does not address all of the bases of his revocation, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment on the unchallenged bases. And on those bases that
Sanders attacked, we overrule his complaint as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
In its fifth amended petition to proceed to an adjudication, the State alleged
that Sanders had violated the conditions of his community supervision in eleven
paragraphs. Of the eleven paragraphs, the trial court found six to be true. Of the six,
two (paragraphs 2 and 4) dealt with new offenses that Sanders had committed against
a woman and her son on August 26, 2022. Two others (paragraphs 3 and 5) dealt
with Sanders’s evading arrest on August 26, 2022, and again on August 27, 2022. And
the last two (paragraphs 9 and 11) dealt with Sanders’s failure to report to his
probation officer and failure to provide a urine sample, respectively.
II. SANDERS’S ARGUMENT
Sanders contends that, based on violations of the Texas Constitution’s
confrontation clause, see id., the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
State’s Exhibit 2 and State’s Exhibit 3:
• State’s Exhibit 2 is a recording of the 911 call made by the woman who was the subject of the offense alleged in paragraph 2.
• State’s Exhibit 3 is an officer’s body cam video that contained conversations between EMS personnel and the paragraph-2 complainant
3 during which they discussed primarily her injuries and, to a lesser extent, her son’s injuries.3
Thus, the exhibits about which Sanders complains address, at most, paragraphs 2 (the
offense against a woman) and 4 (the offense against the woman’s son) of the State’s
fifth amended petition.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews an order to proceed to adjudication in the same
manner as a decision revoking regular community supervision. Powe v. State,
436 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d). We review a trial court’s
decision to revoke community supervision and to adjudicate guilt for an abuse of
discretion. Id. Proving a single violation suffices to support revocation. Garcia v.
State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d) (“Proof by a preponderance of the evidence
of any one of the alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is
sufficient to support a revocation order.”). Thus, we cannot hold that a trial court
3 In the video, the complainant stated that she had received burns on her hands and arms the previous Wednesday. We take judicial notice that the date of the offense—August 26, 2022—was a Friday. See Tex. R. Evid. 201. During the August 26, 2022 altercation with Sanders, the sterile wrappings on the complainant’s burns had come off, and the medics questioned whether the complainant should go to a hospital. Around the 5:00 point in the recording, one of the medics asked if “he” ripped the gauze off, and around 6:15 of the recording, the same medic asked about the little boy’s lip. During the revocation hearing, testimony showed that at some point during the altercation, the complainant’s two-year-old son received a “busted lip.” The complainant’s son is the subject of the offense alleged in paragraph 4. Photographs of their injuries were admitted without objection.
4 abused its discretion when an appellant does not challenge all of the grounds on
which the trial court based it rulings. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (“The appellant has failed to raise any contentions
concerning the finding that he committed the offense of escape. . . . We need not
address appellant’s other contentions since one sufficient ground for revocation will
support the court’s order to revoke probation.”); Garcia v. State, No. 02-15-00138-CR,
2017 WL 370924, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 26, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (“[T]he trial court’s judgment should be affirmed if the
appellant does not challenge each ground on which the trial court revoked community
supervision.”).
IV. DISCUSSION
Sanders does not challenge the trial court’s findings in paragraphs 3, 5, 9, and
11. The violations in those paragraphs, as well as those in paragraphs 2 and 4, were
the bases on which the trial court revoked Sanders’s community supervision and
adjudicated him guilty. Thus, based on the findings in paragraphs 3, 5, 9, and 11, we
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Moore,
605 S.W.2d at 926; Garcia, 2017 WL 370924, at *2 (“Because we can affirm the trial
court’s judgment based on the unchallenged . . . finding, any putative error in
5 connection with the [challenged] finding becomes moot.”).4 We overrule Sanders’s
sole issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Sanders’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: November 9, 2023
4 In Sanders’s brief, he argues that the erroneous admission of State’s Exhibits 2 and 3 impacted his punishment. But absent error, harm is a moot issue. Alawad v. State, 57 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (Yates, J., concurring). Under the procedural posture of this appeal, if we addressed the merits of Sanders’s complaint to determine error, we would be providing an advisory opinion. We are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions. Tucker v. State, 136 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.).