Trent Scentail Smith v. Carter

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMay 22, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-07780
StatusUnknown

This text of Trent Scentail Smith v. Carter (Trent Scentail Smith v. Carter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trent Scentail Smith v. Carter, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TRENT SMITH, Case No. 2:22-cv-07780-MEMF-PD 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING 13 v. PETITION WITHOUT 14 BRIAN BIRKHOLZ, Warden, PREJUDICE 15 Respondent. 16 17 On September 19, 2022, Trent Smith (“Petitioner”), an inmate at the 18 Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc, California, proceeding pro se, 19 filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking expungement of a prison 20 disciplinary record.1 [Dkt. No. 9-1.] 21 22 1 Petitioner initially filed the Petition in the District of Montana, where he was 23 sentenced. That court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction because the judicial remedy, if any, lies in the district of confinement. [Dkt. No. 1 at 2.] Petitioner then 24 filed it in the District of Colorado, where the challenged disciplinary proceeding 25 occurred. [Id. at 1.] That court screened the petition, found it deficient, and gave Petitioner the opportunity to amend. [Dkt. No. 3.] The court screened the 26 subsequently filed amended petition, found it deficient because it was not on the District of Colorado habeas application form, and gave Petitioner two opportunities 27 to amend. [Dkt. Nos. 4, 7, 8.] On September 19, 2022, Petitioner filed the Petition 28 on the correct form. [Dkt. No. 9-1.] The court then transferred the Petition to this 1 I. Background and Petitioner’s Contentions 2 In May 2019, when Petitioner was housed at the Federal Correctional 3 Institution in Florence, Colorado, he was issued an incident report charging 4 him with conduct disruptive to security or orderly running of a Bureau of 5 Prisons (BOP) facility most like extortion, blackmail or protection. On June 6 11, 2021, a disciplinary hearing was held and the presiding officer found that 7 Petitioner had committed the charged prohibited act and imposed discipline 8 that included the loss of 27 days of good conduct time. [Dkt. No. 21 at 4.] 9 Petitioner challenges that determination on the ground that the incident 10 reports do not describe him demanding or receiving money or anything of 11 value from the officer in return for protection or interfering with the officer’s 12 ability to do his duties. [Dkt. No. 9 at 5.] Accordingly, Petitioner alleges that 13 there is no evidence to support the findings and that he was thus denied due 14 process. [Id.] Petitioner requests that the Court reinstate his 27 days of good 15 time credit and expunge the incident report and any other reports associated 16 with it. [Id. at 4.] 17 In response to the Petition, Carrie E.K. Cervantes, the Discipline 18 Hearing Administrator for the BOP Western Regional Office, reviewed the 19 incident report, evidence supporting the charge, and the disciplinary officer’s 20 written report. [Dkt. No. 21-1 at ¶ 7.] After reviewing the evidence, 21 Cervantes determined that the incident report needs to be re-heard. [Id.] On 22 January 5, 2023, Cervantes vacated the disciplinary hearing officer’s decision, 23 vacated the sanctions, and ordered that the matter be reheard. [Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8, 24 and at 10, 13.] The incident report and the loss of 27 days of good time credit 25 no longer appear in Petitioner’s disciplinary record. [Id.] 26 27 28 1 II. Discussion 2 A. Dismissal is Warranted Because Petitioner’s Claim is 3 Moot 4 Article III of the Constitution “limits the jurisdiction of the federal 5 courts to live cases and controversies.” Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949, 951 6 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 7 193, 199 (1988) (“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to the 8 adjudication of actual, ongoing controversies between litigants.”). An actual 9 case or controversy exists when, throughout the litigation, a petitioner 10 continues to have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit and suffers 11 some actual injury that is likely to be “redressed by a favorable judicial 12 decision.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citations omitted). When, 13 because of events that occur after a case is initiated, a court cannot give any 14 effectual relief in favor of the petitioner, the proceeding becomes moot. 15 Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (citation omitted); see also 16 Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (“In general, a case becomes moot 17 when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally 18 cognizable interest in the outcome.”) (citations and internal quotation marks 19 omitted). Since mootness is a jurisdictional bar, moot petitions should be 20 dismissed. Kittel, 620 F.3d at 951–52. 21 Petitioner requests the reinstatement of good time credits and 22 expungement of the disciplinary records associated with the incident at issue. 23 [See Dkt. No. 9 at 4-5.] On January 5, 2023, the BOP vacated the disciplinary 24 decision and sanctions and ordered the matter to be reheard. [Dkt. Nos. 21 at 25 3; 21-1 at 3.] Because the BOP has vacated the underlying disciplinary 26 decision and sanctions, there is no further relief that this Court can provide 27 and the Petition is now moot. See e.g., Yagman v. Thomas, 612 F. App’x 408, 28 1 || 409 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding the case became moot when the BOP vacated the 2 || underlying disciplinary proceedings). 3 There is an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are 4 || “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17. However, 5 || this exception is limited to extraordinary cases where (1) the duration of the 6 || challenged action is too short to allow for full litigation before it ends, and 7 || (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the petitioner will be subjected to 8 || the challenged action again. Id. 9 Petitioner has not alleged or shown that there is a reasonable 10 || expectation he will be subject to the same disciplinary charges again. 11 || Moreover, if he was subjected to any further disciplinary charges as the result 12 || of a rehearing, it appears he could file a new habeas corpus petition 13 || concerning any future alleged violation of his due process interest. As such, 14 || the Petition should be dismissed as moot. Ti. Order 16 7 For the reasons set forth above, this action is dismissed without

18 prejudice. 19 50 IT IS SO ORDERED.

31 | DATED: May 22, 2023

23 UNITHD STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Murphy v. Hunt
455 U.S. 478 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Calderon v. Moore
518 U.S. 149 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Spencer v. Kemna
523 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Kittel v. Thomas
620 F.3d 949 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Stephen Yagman v. Linda Thomas
612 F. App'x 408 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Trent Scentail Smith v. Carter, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trent-scentail-smith-v-carter-cacd-2023.