Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard

114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 1281
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 6, 1981
DocketCiv. 59339
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 114 Cal. App. 3d 317 (Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 1281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

*320 Opinion

TORRES, J. *

Plaintiff, Trent Meredith, Inc., brought this action in the superior court against defendant, City of Oxnard, challenging the constitutionality of ordinance No. 1781 of the City of Oxnard and sought to bar its enforcement through declaratory injunctive relief. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to Government Code section 65970 et seq. and both parties agree that it is in compliance therewith. The Pacific Legal Foundation has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff. The City of Walnut Creek has filed an amicus brief in support of defendant with which 49 cities or school districts have joined. (Hereafter we refer jointly to plaintiff and their amicus as plaintiff subdivider and refer to defendant and their amici as defendant city.)

Plaintiff subdivider contended that ordinance No. 1781 violates section 4 of article XIII A of the California Constitution and as such constitutes an illegal tax assessment.

The trial court found the ordinance was enacted pursuant to state law and was a valid exercise of the police power. Summary judgment was granted in favor of defendant city. Plaintiff subdivider appeals.

Facts

In 1976 the League of California Cities, the County Supervisors Association and the California School Board Association joined forces to develop specific legislation clearly authorizing the imposition of fees, charges, land acquisition, etc., by local government units for ultimate use by the school districts in alleviating the impact of rapid student population growth. This effort was successful with the passage of Senate Bill No. 201 (Gov. Code, § 65970 et seq.) in September of 1977. Senate Bill No. 201 is set forth in its entirety in appendix A to this opinion.

On June 6, 1978, the voters of this state, added article XIII A to the California Constitution. Section 4 of this article reads as follows: “Sec. 4. Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such dis *321 trict, except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within such City, County or special district.”

On November 6, 1979, the defendant city enacted ordinance No. 1781 1 pursuant to Government Code section 65970 et seq. The ordinance requires real property developers either to pay fees or dedicate land to local school districts to relieve conditions of overcrowding caused by such development as a precondition to issuance of a building permit. Ordinance No. 1781 is set forth in its entirety in appendix B to this opinion.

Issue

Whether the school facilities fees and in lieu dedication requirements imposed pursuant to ordinance No. 1781 of the City of Oxnard are a “special tax” within the meaning of article XIII A, section 4.

Discussion

I.

The plaintiff subdivider asks this court to hold that ordinance No. 1781 is a “special tax” within the meaning of article XIII A, section 4 and as such requires two-thirds voter approval for imposition.

Government Code section 65970 et seq. were enacted by the California Legislature in 1977 as a means of alleviating overcrowding of local school facilities caused by new residential development. Ordinance No. 1781 was adopted pursuant to the provisions of that enabling legislation (appen. B, § 27-77.2 of the ordinance). It is clear that ordinance No. 1781 was enacted and operates under the authority of Government Code, section 65970 et seq. Therefore, we confine our discussion to the latter code sections.

*322 Government Code section 65970 reads: “The Legislature finds and declares as follows: “(a) Adequate school facilities should be available for children residing in new residential developments.

“(b) Public and private residential developments may require the expansion of existing public schools or the construction of new school facilities.

“(c) In many areas of the state, the funds for the construction of new classroom facilities are not available when new development occurs, resulting in the overcrowding of existing schools.

“(d) New housing developments frequently cause conditions of overcrowding in existing school facilities which cannot be alleviated under existing law within a reasonable period of time.

“(e) That, for these reasons, new and improved methods of financing for interim school facilities necessitated by new development are needed in California.” (Italics added.)

It is not disputed by either party that subdivision (e) of Government Code section 65970 spells out in clear unambiguous language that the purpose of the legislation is to provide a method of financing for interim school facilities necessitated by new development.

Plaintiff subdivider argues that the fees imposed under Government Code section 65974 constitute a “special tax” within the meaning of section 4 of article XIII A because (a) a “special tax” is one collected and earmarked for a special purpose, (b) a “special tax” includes new or increased exactions imposed by a city for revenue purposes and (c) the exaction is not a “special assessment.”

In Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] the court upheld the validity of article XIII A against constitutional challenge. The court stated “... article XIII A consists of four major elements, a real property tax rate limitation (§ 1), a real property assessment limitation (§ 2), a restriction on state taxes (§3), and a restriction on local taxes (§ 4). Although petitioners insist that these four features constitute separate subjects, we find that each of them is *323 reasonably interrelated and interdependent, forming an interlocking, ‘package’ deemed necessary by the initiative’s framers to assure effective real property tax relief. Since the total real property tax is a function of both rate and assessment, sections 1 and 2 unite to assure that both variables in the property tax equation are subject to control. Moreover, since any tax savings resulting from the operation of sections 1 and 2 could be withdrawn or depleted by additional or increased state or local levies of other than property taxes, section 3 and 4 combine to place restrictions upon the imposition of such taxes. Although sections 3 and 4 do not pertain solely to the matter of property taxation, both sections, in combination with sections 1 and 2, are reasonably germane, and functionally related, to the general subject of property tax relief.”

The court in Amador

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Bluebook (online)
114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 1281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trent-meredith-inc-v-city-of-oxnard-calctapp-1981.