Tremont Towers v. Clifton Properties

Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div.

Tremont Towers v. Clifton Properties

1992 Mass. App. Div. 118, 1992 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 52

CourtMassachusetts District Court, Appellate Division

DecidedJune 24, 1992

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 1992 Mass. App. Div. 118 (Tremont Towers v. Clifton Properties) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tremont Towers v. Clifton Properties, 1992 Mass. App. Div. 118, 1992 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 52 (Mass. Ct. App. 1992).

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Opinion

Meagher, J.

This is a summary process action brought by the plaintiff/landlord against the defendant/tenant. On September 26,1991, the defendant’s counterclaim, which alleged fraud with regard to the zoning of the property, was dismissed by the trial court. After this dismissal, the two parties negotiated an agreement for judgment which stated that the plaintiff would take possession of the premises and accept a reduced amount of damages. The parties negotiated a further agreement releasing the defendant from the four year term of the lease in return for the defendant releasing all its claims against the plaintiff.

Thereafter, on October 10, 1991, the defendant with a new attorney brought a motion to vacate the consent judgment and a motion for a stay of execution indicating that it was ill advised at the time of the agreementfor judgment. On October 30, 1991, the court allowed the defendanfs motion pursuant to M.RC. P., Rule 60(b) (1). The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court.

There is no right of review of summary process actions in the Boston Municipal Court Appellate Division. Emerson v. Dubois, 1989 Mass. App. Div. 160; Pine Hill Estates, Inc. v. Rita Stone, 1986 Mass App. Div. 99. The Appellate Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the underlying cause of action. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

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Meagher, J.

This is a summary process action brought by the plaintiff/landlord against the defendant/tenant. On September 26,1991, the defendant’s counterclaim, which alleged fraud with regard to the zoning of the property, was dismissed by the trial court. After this dismissal, the two parties negotiated an agreement for judgment which stated that the plaintiff would take possession of the premises and accept a reduced amount of damages. The parties negotiated a further agreement releasing the defendant from the four year term of the lease in return for the defendant releasing all its claims against the plaintiff.

Thereafter, on October 10, 1991, the defendant with a new attorney brought a motion to vacate the consent judgment and a motion for a stay of execution indicating that it was ill advised at the time of the agreementfor judgment. On October 30, 1991, the court allowed the defendanfs motion pursuant to M.RC. P., Rule 60(b) (1). The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court.

There is no right of review of summary process actions in the Boston Municipal Court Appellate Division. Emerson v. Dubois, 1989 Mass. App. Div. 160; Pine Hill Estates, Inc. v. Rita Stone, 1986 Mass App. Div. 99. The Appellate Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the underlying cause of action. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

1992 Mass. App. Div. 118, 1992 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tremont-towers-v-clifton-properties-massdistctapp-1992.

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