Tremont & Suffolk Mills v. City of Lowell

39 N.E. 1028, 163 Mass. 283, 1895 Mass. LEXIS 94
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedMarch 2, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 39 N.E. 1028 (Tremont & Suffolk Mills v. City of Lowell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tremont & Suffolk Mills v. City of Lowell, 39 N.E. 1028, 163 Mass. 283, 1895 Mass. LEXIS 94 (Mass. 1895).

Opinion

Field, C. J.

The petitioner, a manufacturing corporation organized under the laws of this Commonwealth and owning and occupying mills in the city of Lowell, appealed, pursuant to St. 1890, c. 127, to the Superior Court for the purpose of obtaining an abatement of the taxes assessed upon its land, buildings, [284]*284and machinery in said city. The statutes require that the assessors shall enter the valuation and assessment of estates on the books furnished in accordance with the provisions of Pub. Sts. c. 11, § 53, in the following manner: “In column Number Seven, The true value of machinery used in all kinds of manufacturing establishments,” etc.; “ In column Number Fifteen, The true value of buildings, . . . including water wheels; such value to be exclusive of land and water power and of the machinery used in said buildings”; and “In columns Number Sixteen, Seventeen, and Eighteen, A description by name or otherwise of each and every lot of land assessed, . . . and the true value thereof.” The assessors are required to put down “ The value of real estate, specifying the value of buildings exclusive of land, and of land exclusive of buildings.” Pub. Sts. c. 11, §§ 13, 20, cl. 2, 50-54. St. 1886, c. 56. St. 1887, c. 86. By Pub. Sts. c. 11, § 45, the assessors are required to “ make a fair cash valuation of all the estate, real and personal, subject to taxation therein.” Under Pub. Sts. c. 11, § 69, a person is entitled to an abatement of his taxes “ if he makes it appear that he is taxed at more than his just proportion, or upon an assessment of any of his property above its fair cash value.” By St. 1885, c. 355, assessors are to be punished if they knowingly fix the valuation of any property at less or more than “ its full and fair cash value.”

The principal question in the exceptions in this case is, What is the standard or test whereby the fair cash value of land and of buildings affixed to land is to be determined when the valuation of the land is to be made exclusively of the buildings and the valuation of the buildings is to be made exclusively of the land. The dominant intention expressed in the statutes is, that every person shall be taxed upon a valuation of all his real property in the Commonwealth at the fair cash value of it in the condition it is in at the time as of which the valuation is made. Lowell v. County Commissioners, 152 Mass. 372, 384. Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 34, required that the list of the valuation and assessment of estates shall contain in separate columns certain particulars, among which are the description of the real estate, the true value of it, and the taxes assessed upon it, but a separate valuation of the land and of the buildings was not required. [285]*285St. 1861, c. 167, first required a valuation of the buildings to be made exclusively of the land. The act is entitled “ An Act to secure a uniform description and appraisal of estates in the Commonwealth for the purposes of taxation,” and it required the Secretary of the Commonwealth to furnish blank-books containing certain specified columns and tables to the cities and towns for the use of the assessors. The assessors were required to fill up the table of aggregates, and to deposit an attested copy of it in the office of the Secretary “ on or before the first day of October in each of the first four years of each decade,” and to make similar returns “ in the first four years of the last half of each decade,” and to deposit “in every fifth and tenth year of each decade ” in said office “ before the first day of October a certified copy under oath of the assessors’ books for those years.” § 3. See Pub. Sts. c. 11, §§ 53, 55, 57. One purpose of these requirements was undoubtedly to obtain statistics of the kind and value of the property in the Commonwealth, and another was to establish uniformity in the proceedings of the assessors; see Pub. Sts. c. 11, §§ 96, 97; but there is no indication anywhere that there was any intention of valuing the property of any inhabitant at more or less than its full and fair cash value. Pub. Sts. c. 11, § 59.

The Constitution requires the assessment to be proportional and reasonable, and that, in order that “ such assessments may be made with equality, there shall be a valuation of estates within the Commonwealth taken anew once in every ten years at least, and as much oftener as the General Court shall order.” Const. Mass. c. 1, § 1, art. 4. Equality in the assessment can be attained only by a valuation of all the property taxed according to the same standard of value, and the standard which has been adopted is the full and fair cash value of the property. This value is necessarily to be estimated with reference to any and all the uses to which the property is adapted in the hands of any owner. It often happens that a lot of land with old buildings upon it is worth as much, or nearly as much, without the buildings as with them; that the most profitable use the land can be put to is to remove the old buildings and build new ones; and that in order to do this the old buildings must be torn down at an expense nearly equal to or more than the value of the materials of the [286]*286buildings. Considered as a whole, the buildings add little or nothing to the value of the land. For certain purposes the buildings have value; they have an insurable value, but a building is insured on the assumption that it will not be removed from the land on which it stands. But the buildings, for the purposes of taxation as real estate, are in legal contemplation a part of the land. McGee v. Salem, 149 Mass. 238. Separated from the land, the buildings may have little or no value; if allowed to remain on the land, they may have great value, and as the value of the land and buildings for the purposes of taxation must be estimated with reference to all practicable uses to which they may be put by the owner or by any person who may become the owner, it often must be necessary to determine whether the best or most profitable use of the whole property is to remove the buildings or to permit them to remain.

The exceptions recite as follows: “ At the close of the evidence the respondent contended and aslced the court to rule, as matter of law, that in fixing the value of the petitioner’s real estate inside its mill yards, the proper method was to estimate and fix the value of the land considered separately and independently of all the buildings and other structures thereon, and as though said buildings and structures were in fact severed and removed from the land, and independently of the particular uses to which said land was devoted, but having regard to its location, area, actual physical formation, availability for general building purposes, and to its water power appurtenances, and then to add to such value so determined the value of the buildings and other mill structures thereon, estimated and determined with reference to their age, adaptability to the purposes for which they were designed, and their actual condition as of May 1st, 1889.”

The contention of the respondent in effect is, as we understand it, that, since the ■ land must be valued exclusively of the buildings, the land must be valued as if the buildings were removed from it, even although this value should amount to the whole value of the land and buildings taken together, and that the buildings must be valued, not as buildings to be immediately removed from the land, in which case they might be worth little or nothing, but as buildings which might remain on the land, and with reference to the uses which might be made of them if [287]*287they remained.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
39 N.E. 1028, 163 Mass. 283, 1895 Mass. LEXIS 94, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tremont-suffolk-mills-v-city-of-lowell-mass-1895.