Tremont Coal & Coke Co. v. Shields

Ninth Circuit

Tremont Coal & Coke Co. v. Shields

167 F. 946, 93 C.C.A. 346, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 1, 1909

DocketNo. 1,639

StatusPublished

This text of 167 F. 946 (Tremont Coal & Coke Co. v. Shields) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tremont Coal & Coke Co. v. Shields, 167 F. 946, 93 C.C.A. 346, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401 (9th Cir. 1909).

Pincite

Opinion

ROSS, Circuit Judge

(aiter stating the facts as above). It is not our province any more than it was that of the court below to weigh the conflicting statements of the witnesses upon the question of the alleged negligence on the part of the defendant. That was for the jury to do, under appropriate instructions from the court. The company’s superintendent in his testimony, as has been seen, denied that any timbers had been requested of him, asserted that there were timbers on hand for use when needed, that the tunnel, except at the entrance thereto where timbers were placed, was in sandstone, and needed no timbers, and that he had carefully inspected it as late as 3 o’clock of the afternoon preceding the plaintiff’s injury. The testimony of the witnesses Roberts, Marquette, and Morris also tended to support the denial of the defendant’s alleged negligence. To what extent the jurors were the proper judges.

That question, lying as it does at the foundation of the case, having been taken from the jury by the court below, the judgment must be, ' and accordingly is, reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

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ROSS, Circuit Judge

(aiter stating the facts as above). It is not our province any more than it was that of the court below to weigh the conflicting statements of the witnesses upon the question of the alleged negligence on the part of the defendant. That was for the jury to do, under appropriate instructions from the court. The company’s superintendent in his testimony, as has been seen, denied that any timbers had been requested of him, asserted that there were timbers on hand for use when needed, that the tunnel, except at the entrance thereto where timbers were placed, was in sandstone, and needed no timbers, and that he had carefully inspected it as late as 3 o’clock of the afternoon preceding the plaintiff’s injury. The testimony of the witnesses Roberts, Marquette, and Morris also tended to support the denial of the defendant’s alleged negligence. To what extent the jurors were the proper judges.

That question, lying as it does at the foundation of the case, having been taken from the jury by the court below, the judgment must be, ' and accordingly is, reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

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Bluebook (online)

167 F. 946, 93 C.C.A. 346, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tremont-coal-coke-co-v-shields-ca9-1909.