Treetop Rentals LLC v. Belkis Brito.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0256
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-256

TREETOP RENTALS LLC

vs.

BELKIS BRITO.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Belkis Brito, appeals from an order of a

judge of the Housing Court denying her emergency motion to

vacate the execution of a summary process judgment. After

acquiring a default judgment for possession, the plaintiff,

Treetop Rentals LLC, evicted the defendant from a property in

Lawrence, Massachusetts. After being evicted, the defendant

moved to vacate the judgment and be awarded damages, claiming

that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts (bankruptcy

court) imposed an automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362,

that precluded execution of the judgment. Because the

defendant's bankruptcy petition was decided months before judgment issued and execution took place, there was no automatic

stay. We affirm.

Background. After obtaining title to the property at issue

in a foreclosure sale, the plaintiff filed a summary process

action against the defendant and her husband in March 2020.

While this summary process action was pending, the defendant

filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in bankruptcy court, moving for

discharge of her debt. A bankruptcy judge determined that the

defendant was not entitled to discharge and denied her motion on

June 4, 2021. Two months later, the United States Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (bankruptcy appellate

panel) summarily affirmed that decision.

On October 20, 2021, the Housing Court judge issued a

default judgment, awarding the plaintiff possession of the

property and money damages. The following month, the Housing

Court issued the plaintiff a writ of execution, allowing the

plaintiff to evict the defendant from the property. The

defendant repeatedly objected to execution, filing multiple

unsuccessful motions to stay.1 The plaintiff levied on the

execution in December 2021.

The defendant sought a stay of execution from a single 1

justice of this court. The single justice denied relief, ruling, "The defendant failed to appear at the summary process trial on October 13, 2021, without any valid excuse. . . . [T]he defendant has no reasonable possibility of prevailing on

2 Returning to the bankruptcy court, the defendant filed a

motion seeking sanctions, arguing that the plaintiff violated 11

U.S.C. § 362 by executing the judgment for possession. The

bankruptcy court denied the defendant's motion, finding that the

automatic stay had terminated before issuance of the judgment or

eviction. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed that

decision.

Undeterred, the defendant filed the underlying motion in

the Housing Court on December 2, 2022, requesting that the court

"reverse the order of the execution which caused illegal

eviction." After a hearing, the Housing Court judge denied the

defendant's motion.2 The defendant appeals from the order

denying her motion.

Discussion. Motion to vacate. We review for an abuse of

discretion the judge's order denying the motion to vacate the

order of execution. See Audubon Hill S. Condominium Ass'n v.

Community Ass'n Underwriters of Am., Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct.

an appeal from the denial of her motion to remove the default judgment."

2 The defendant requested a hearing on the motion for the court to consider "newly discovered evidence." During the hearing, the Housing Court judge and the parties referred to a memorandum issued by a bankruptcy judge dated November 8, 2022, which apparently concluded that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over claims arising out of damage caused by the plaintiff to the defendant's property during the eviction. That memorandum is not in the appellate record.

3 461, 472 (2012). The defendant argues that the plaintiff's

execution of the possession judgment was illegal because there

was an automatic stay in place, by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 362,

so the Housing Court judge was required by law to vacate the

judgment.3 The argument is unavailing.

Debtors are entitled to an automatic stay of judicial

proceedings, including summary process proceedings, upon the

filing of a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See

also Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Wellesley v. Ardemore Apartments

Ltd. Partnership, 436 Mass. 811, 817 (2002) (Superior Court

action and foreclosure sale stayed by bankruptcy filing). But

that stay is not indefinite. In Chapter 7 bankruptcy

proceedings for individuals, an automatic stay ends at "the time

a discharge is granted or denied." 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).

In this case, an order denying the defendant's discharge

entered on June 4, 2021. That order terminated the automatic

stay. See, e.g., Barraford v. T & N Ltd., 17 F. Supp. 3d 96,

104 (D. Mass. 2014) (automatic stay terminated on date that

defendants were granted discharge). In these circumstances, the

judge properly denied the defendant's motion.

Because the eviction took place in December 2021 and the 3

defendant no longer lives at the property, granting a stay of execution would have had no effect. We do not consider whether the Housing Court had the power to grant the relief requested, which was to "reverse the order of the execution."

4 Ethical violations. The defendant argues that the clerk-

magistrate of the Northeast Housing Court "knowingly delay[ed]

the transmission of the records from the lower court to the

court of appeal for three years," and the judge committed error

by permitting that to happen. We find no support in the record

for this assertion. This appeal is from the judge's January 4,

2023 order denying the defendant's motion to vacate the

execution. The record before us reflects that the clerk

assembled the record and transmitted notice about fifteen days

after the defendant filed a transcript of the motion hearing;

this complied with the duties of the clerk under Mass. R. A. P.

9 (e), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1615 (2019).

Order dated January 4, 2023, affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, Grant & Hodgens, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: April 16, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.