Treasure v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.

37 V.I. 17, 1997 WL 416387, 1997 V.I. LEXIS 13
CourtSupreme Court of The Virgin Islands
DecidedJuly 9, 1997
DocketCiv. No. 949/1993
StatusPublished

This text of 37 V.I. 17 (Treasure v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Treasure v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 37 V.I. 17, 1997 WL 416387, 1997 V.I. LEXIS 13 (virginislands 1997).

Opinion

CABRET, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this negligence action, plaintiff moves the Court to compel defendant St. Croix Basic Services, Inc. ("SCBS") to produce certain documents Patrick Fitzpatrick ("Fitzpatrick"), Shift Manager of SCBS, brought to his March 20, 1995 deposition. Defendant SCBS opposes the motion. On April 24, 1997, SCBS was ordered to submit the contested documents to the Court for an in camera inspection.1

This dispute arose during plaintiff's March 20, 1995 deposition of Fitzpatrick. It appears that while Mr. Fitzpatrick was being deposed, counsel for plaintiff became aware of his file and questioned him about its contents. Counsel for SCBS vehemently objected and directed Mr. Fitzpatrick not to respond to the [19]*19questions, nor to read or hand over his written notes.2 Counsel's objection was based upon a claim that anything prepared during the course of litigation is privileged.

Plaintiff claims that the documents contained in Mr. Fitzpatrick's file are discoverable. In support of his motion, plaintiff contends that Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits an opponent to examine materials used by a witness to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying. Plaintiff further maintains that the use of documents by a witness for such a purpose results in the waiver of any asserted privileges.

In opposition to said motion, defendant SCBS states that although Mr. Fitzpatrick brought his own file into the deposition room, he did not refer to the contents of the file to refresh his recollection during the deposition. SCBS also states that all of the documents sought by plaintiffs concern the deposition or preparation for the deposition and are outside the scope of discovery. SCBS further claims that the items sought were made during the course of litigation and in connection with a litigation-related activity and plaintiff's motion should be denied as it attempts to intrude upon the attorney-client privilege.

To the extent that SCBS relies on the attorney-client privilege, the Court rejects said objection, as the defendant has not supported this claim. As a general rule, "communications found by the judge to have been between lawyer and his client in the course of that relationship and in professional confidence, are privileged." 5 V.I.C. § 854(1). Defendant suggests that the materials are privileged because they were prepared in connection with a meeting with counsel for SCBS, and SCBS is Mr. Fitzpatrick's employer. Such a suggestion ignores the clear and unambiguous language of § 854(1), which requires a confidential communication between a lawyer and his or her client. Further, the district court in Olive v. Isherwood, Hunter & Diehm, 23 V.L 168, 656 F. Supp. 1171 (D.C.V.I. 1987), stated that the essential elements of the attorney-client privilege were as follows:"

[20]*20(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to the fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (I) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.

Olive, 23 V.I. at 172 (citing United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). See also 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2292 (1961).

In this case, SCBS has failed to establish the first essential element. It has not been shown to the satisfaction of the Court that Mr. Fitzpatrick, at the time of his meeting, was or sought to become a client of Attorney George Eltman. The privilege, however, could apply if Mr. Fitzpatrick's deposition was taken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), as a representative for SCBS, but SCBS has neither alleged nor established that it designated Mr. Fitzpatrick to testify on its behalf. Further, the record unequivocally reveals that Fitzpatrick's deposition was taken not as an officer, director or managing agent of SCBS, but as a fact witness in this case. Consequently, the attorney-client privilege cannot be triggered where here, as between Mr. Fitzpatrick and counsel for SCBS, there is no attorney-client relationship. Thus, to the extent that the items in Mr. Fitzpatrick's file are not protected by the attorney-client privilege, they may be discoverable pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).3

As noted earlier, plaintiff relies on Federal Rule of Evidence 612 for disclosure. However, reference to this rule indicates that the materials contained in Mr. Fitzpatrick's file should not be disclosed. Rule 612 provides in relevant part:

[21]*21[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying, either
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.

The sole purpose of Rule 612 is "to promote the search of credibility and evidence." Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing the advisory committee note to Rule 612). In Sporck, the Third Circuit held that although applicable to depositions and deposition testimony, Rule 612 is a rule of evidence, and not a rule of discovery. Sporck, 759 F.2d at 317. Further, the Supreme Court has cautioned that "a trial court should exercise discretion to guard against fishing expeditions among papers which a witness may have used in preparing for trial." Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318 (citing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942)).

In the case at bar, it is clear that subsection (1) of Rule 612 is inapplicable, because there is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Fitzpatrick used his file to refresh his recollection while testifying at his deposition. In fact, Fitzpatrick did not refer to these items at all except to identify them at the insistence of plaintiff's counsel. Mr. Fitzpatrick did, however, admit that the file contained some notes he had written down before, during and after his meeting with Attorney George Eltman.4 Mr.

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Related

Goldman v. United States
316 U.S. 129 (Supreme Court, 1942)
United States v. United Shoe MacHinery Corporation
89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Massachusetts, 1950)
Olive v. Isherwood
656 F. Supp. 1171 (Virgin Islands, 1987)
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.
93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Delaware, 1982)
Sporck v. Peil
759 F.2d 312 (Third Circuit, 1985)
S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B. Corp.
103 F.R.D. 407 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
37 V.I. 17, 1997 WL 416387, 1997 V.I. LEXIS 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/treasure-v-hess-oil-virgin-islands-corp-virginislands-1997.