Treadwell v. Marrs

83 P. 350, 9 Ariz. 333, 1905 Ariz. LEXIS 127
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 18, 1905
DocketCivil No. 860
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 83 P. 350 (Treadwell v. Marrs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Treadwell v. Marrs, 83 P. 350, 9 Ariz. 333, 1905 Ariz. LEXIS 127 (Ark. 1905).

Opinion

KENT, C. J.

(after stating the facts). — It is contended by the appellee that the location certificate of the Buster claim was insufficient, both in law and in fact, and that the appellants could acquire no rights thereunder. The trial court held the certificate to be sufficient on its face, and found against the appellee in his contention that the evidence introduced upon the trial showed that the statements of the certificate as to the position of the claim were untrue in fact.

We do not deem it necessary on this appeal to pass upon the correctness of either of the court’s rulings in this respect, as we are of the opinion that the record and the evidence in the case did not warrant a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. This is an adverse suit, in which the plaintiffs seek to establish their right to possession of that portion of the Buster claim in conflict with the Copper Link. The only testimony that showed the boundaries, area, and extent of such alleged conflict, and upon which the court could base a judgment of right of possession therein in favor of the plaintiffs, was the testimony of the surveyor, Merritt. This [342]*342testimony the trial court ordered stricken out. Without this testimony, the plaintiffs could not recover, and the correctness of the' court’s ruling in this respect is the controlling question determinative of this appeal.

The situation before the court was this: The plaintiffs were the owners of the Buster claim, having acquired it some seventeen years after its location. In the supposition that they were correctly tracing the boundaries of the claim, and approximately the position of the old monuments, shortly after acquiring the claim, they erected two new center end monuments and four corner monuments; the course and direc- ■ tion of the claim as so monumented being north, forty degrees east, and south, forty degrees west. Bight years thereafter, the defendant filed his application for a patent, and the . plaintiffs their adverse, and commenced this, their adverse, suit, in which they alleged a conflict based upon the position of the Buster as supposed and as monumented by Treadwell for them. After the adverse suit was brought, but prior to the trial, the plaintiffs discovered that the Buster as monumented by them did not conform with the calls of the location certificate of the claim, either as to direction or extent, or with the old monuments as the claim was originally located. On the trial the plaintiffs admitted that they must be held to have abandoned that portion of the Buster called for in the location certificate which lay south of the new south end line as shown by the monuments erected by them on the supposed south end line of the claim,- — to wit, some five hundred and fifty feet, — but claimed that they were entitled to that portion of the Buster as shown by the original monuments to be within the area of the conflict as alleged in the complaint. The theory of the plaintiffs was that the evidence showed that the original north center end monument, instead of being seven hundred and fifty feet north, forty degrees east, from the initial monument as shown by their adverse map and survey, was in fact two hundred feet north, forty degrees east, and that the original south center end monument, instead of being seven hundred and fifty feet south, forty degrees west, as shown by their adverse map and survey, was thirteen hundred feet south, forty degrees west; and they claimed the right to the possession of the ground where it conflicted, comprised in a claim, the north center end monument of which [343]*343was two hundred feet north, forty degrees east, of the initial monument, and the south center end monument of which was seven hundred and fifty feet south, forty degrees west, or the area as shown by the portion of the claim in the excluded conflict map, which is southwest of the heavy line drawn across the claim. This conflict they sought to prove by the testimony of Merritt, the surveyor. The trial court heard this testimony under objection, and subsequently ordered it stricken out. The erection of the monuments by the plaintiffs through their agent, Treadwell, had no effect in changing the rights of the plaintiffs, or in changing the position and location or boundaries of the claim, except in so far as it showed an abandonment of the southerly portion of the claim. No new location certificate was filed, and no amendment of the old was attempted. The claim remained, therefore, as originally located. But the adverse and the conflict, as pleaded, was based upon a survey and adverse map made by the surveyor from the monuments as erected by Treadwell. Manifestly, then, such survey and map, and the evidence based thereon, showing a conflict, could in no event be competent, unless the claim as originally located was as to direction and course identical with the direction and course as monumented by Treadwell.

Passing by, without determining it, the question whether an attempt to prove such a conflict was not such a departure as in any event would render such proof inadmissible, we think the trial court rightly excluded the evidence introduced to show the conflict. The Treadwell monuments being valueless, in order to make the survey of Merritt and his testimony as to the conflict based thereon competent evidence, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that the claim as originally located was in accord with such survey to the extent of the conflict claimed. The claim as surveyed by Merritt ran north and south, forty degrees east and west, respectively. The location notice calls for a claim running north and south; manifestly, not the same. The plaintiffs contend that this location certificate ought not to be construed, however, as calling for the north and south end monuments as due north and south, but should be construed as permitting the location of these monuments, the one two hundred feet north, forty [344]*344degrees east, and the other approximately thirteen hundred feet southerly, but in a line forty degrees west from a north and south line; claiming that the evidence shows the existence at each of. said points of the original north and south end monuments. The well-settled rule in that respect is that, where the monuments are found upon the ground, or their position or location can be determined with certainty, the monuments govern, rather than the location certificate; but where the course and distances are not with certainty defined by monuments or stakes, the calls in the location notice must govern and control. In the case before us, however, the plaintiffs must not only show the existence and location of these monuments in order for them to control as against the location certificate, but, in order to enable them to be entitled upon their adverse to the possession of the ground alleged to be in conflict, they must establish the position of these north and south end monuments to be in fact the one two hundred feet north, forty degrees east, and the other to be south, forty degrees west, of the initial monument; for if these monuments are not so in fact located, then the course and distances and boundaries of a claim based upon them, which would be the true Buster claim, would not correspond with the course and distances and boundaries of the claim as surveyed and platted by the surveyor, Merritt, and his testimony as to the conflict would not describe the true conflict between the Buster and the Copper Link.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the testimony given with respect to the existence and location of these monuments. The only testimony in regard thereto is the testimony of the witnesses Boggs, Treadwell, Powers, and McDonald.

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Bluebook (online)
83 P. 350, 9 Ariz. 333, 1905 Ariz. LEXIS 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/treadwell-v-marrs-ariz-1905.