Trcka v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Trcka v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co.

123 So. 332, 168 La. 805, 1929 La. LEXIS 1873

CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana

DecidedJune 17, 1929

DocketNo. 29587.

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 123 So. 332 (Trcka v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Trcka v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co., 123 So. 332, 168 La. 805, 1929 La. LEXIS 1873 (La. 1929).

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Opinion

ST. PAUL, J.

Plaintiff sued defendant for alleged breach of the terms of a contract verbally entered into “previous to July 21st, 1925,” with the understanding, however, “that defendants were to make up a memorandum of agreement and send it to your petitioner for signatures,” which said memorandum of agreement was in fact executed and signed by both parties on July 21, 1925.

The defendant pleaded an exception of no cause of action; whereupon the trial judge ruled that said exception be maintained “in so far as plaintiff seeks to recover on a contemporaneous, collateral, verbal contract,” and overruled “in so far as plaintiff seeks to recover under the written agreement sued on.”

Plaintiff appealed, and defendant moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment, appealed from even though signed by the trial judge, is only interlocutory and not final.

The signing of a judgment by the trial judge cannot make it a final judgment, if in fact it be only an interlocutory judgment. State ex rel. Pflug v. Judge of Civil District Court, 35 La. Ann. 765. And we think the judgment herein above set forth is not final, hut only interlocutory. For, in ef-' feet, all that the trial judge did 'was to strike from the petition all reference to antecedént *808 verbal agreements and declare that the evidence would be confined to the breach of written agreement of July 21, 1925. Cf. Bossier’s Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La. 221, 41 So. 553.

The appeal herein taken is therefore dismissed.

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ST. PAUL, J.

Plaintiff sued defendant for alleged breach of the terms of a contract verbally entered into “previous to July 21st, 1925,” with the understanding, however, “that defendants were to make up a memorandum of agreement and send it to your petitioner for signatures,” which said memorandum of agreement was in fact executed and signed by both parties on July 21, 1925.

The defendant pleaded an exception of no cause of action; whereupon the trial judge ruled that said exception be maintained “in so far as plaintiff seeks to recover on a contemporaneous, collateral, verbal contract,” and overruled “in so far as plaintiff seeks to recover under the written agreement sued on.”

Plaintiff appealed, and defendant moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment, appealed from even though signed by the trial judge, is only interlocutory and not final.

The signing of a judgment by the trial judge cannot make it a final judgment, if in fact it be only an interlocutory judgment. State ex rel. Pflug v. Judge of Civil District Court, 35 La. Ann. 765. And we think the judgment herein above set forth is not final, hut only interlocutory. For, in ef-' feet, all that the trial judge did 'was to strike from the petition all reference to antecedént *808 verbal agreements and declare that the evidence would be confined to the breach of written agreement of July 21, 1925. Cf. Bossier’s Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La. 221, 41 So. 553.

The appeal herein taken is therefore dismissed.

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123 So. 332, 168 La. 805, 1929 La. LEXIS 1873, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trcka-v-bragmans-bluff-lumber-co-la-1929.

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